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Abstract 
 
Many discussions of On Liberty fail to consider the reception of Mill’s political ideas during 
the nineteenth-century, which is significant for revising our understanding of Mill, his thoughts 
and how they have been interpreted. Accordingly, this thesis is a wide-ranging study of the 
English reception of Mill’s political thought from 1831 to 1900. Throughout this period, Mill’s 
public image went through incredible changes due to the cumulative effect of almost seventy 
years of engagement, absorption and dismissal. Bringing together a variety of reactions to 
Mill’s texts from the 1830s, particularly On Liberty (1859), including periodicals, plays, poems 
and speeches, this thesis unveils the reactions of his commentators and the development of 
Mill’s controversial reputation during the nineteenth-century, challenging both the traditional 
and revisionary view of Mill scholarship. I structure this discussion in accordance with five 
key aspects which deeply influenced Mill’s thought. The first was discussion concerning a 
collectivist theory of liberty in the 1830s. The second considers how scandalous On Liberty 
was, where I propose that Mill’s critics misjudged the significance of this essay. The third 
concerns the powers of the state in promoting a tolerant society and removing restraints upon 
liberty. The fourth was the lack of clarity on the state’s prerogatives over the individual. 
Finally, public support for the family as a model for social progress and the framework for an 
equal community, one where everyone played a special role and liberty surpassed all 
distinctions such as the private or public sphere. This thesis critically examines how 
contemporary responses to On Liberty stepped over the importance of Mill’s reception, which 
in turn contributes to a fuller understanding of Mill and his political thought. 
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Introduction 
 
MILL’S ON LIBERTY AND ITS RECEPTION 
 
Implications, ambiguities and the major themes of Mill’s On Liberty 
 
On Liberty is known today as the text on freedom and individuality.1 Its author, John Stuart 
Mill, is consistently described as a man of liberty. The principal argument is disdainful of 
conformity, passionately drawing attention to the importance of individuals freely enriching 
themselves through capitalising upon their freedom to pursue their own interests,2 adding 
diversity of character where freedom of thought and discussion are indispensable for 
development.3 The text is equally concerned with the struggle between liberty and authority, 
where Mill defines liberty as ‘protection against the tyranny of the political rulers’4 who are 
guilty of cultivating character poorly, hindering social freedom and self-governance through 
maintaining ‘wretched education, and wretched social arrangements’.5 Mill’s one very simple 
principle was intended to govern the relationship between society and the individual, to enforce 
a rule6 where the exercise of power over another can only be done in order to prevent harm to 
others.7 This prompted a number of ongoing discussions regarding the boundaries of 
interference and the preservation of liberty, which would come to be of paramount importance 
when discussing On Liberty. 
                                                        
1 For a study revolving around these two terms see C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty who notes that On Liberty was 
penned by ‘a consistent liberal, deeply committed to the cause of individual freedom for everyone’ (p. 9). See 
further Francis Wrigley Hirst, Liberty and Tyranny which claims On Liberty was an ‘epoch-making treatise’ 
spurred into publication by Humboldt’s essay The Sphere and Duties of Government (p. 24). 
2 See Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom, where he argues that individuality is ‘the central thesis 
of Liberty’ (pp. 235-236). See further Peter Nicholson, ‘The reception and early reputation of Mill’s political 
thought’, in John Skorupski, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill, pp. 464-496. Mill moved ‘so cautiously, 
temperately and decorously in On Liberty’ in addressing individuality so as to present a form of individualism 
which would appear harmless to society (p. 470). This reception study is brief and uses very few newspapers or 
periodicals to explore Mill’s political thought, even then, they are not used to address a connection between 
Mill’s writings and the public reception of him. 
3 See John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill. In On Liberty, a ground rule of Mill’s liberalism, which is also 
characteristic of a liberal state, ‘is that all its citizens have unrestricted access to dialogue’ (p. 384). 
4 The Collected works of John Stuart Mill (hereafter ‘CW’), vol. 18, p. 217. (All citations here from this edition 
have removed the textual variants noted there). 
5 CW 10, p. 215. 
6 See Henry R. West, ‘Mill’s case for Liberty’, in Ten, ed. Mill’s On Liberty. Mill seeks a rule that ‘would 
protect others from interfering on the basis of their paternalistic judgement’ (p. 38). 
7 See Joseph Hamburger, On Liberty and Control, particularly pp. 3-17, for a discussion questioning whether 
Mill ‘establishes grounds for control and restraint’ in his harm principle, specifically concerning another agenda, 
‘which concerned “things [society] left alone that it ought to control”’ (p. 7). On Liberty is an ‘advocacy of both 
liberty and control’ whilst still celebrating individuality (p. 16). 
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Mill’s plea for freedom of discussion stems from a belief that liberty has been increasingly 
threatened and curbed by an oppressive public opinion, disastrous to both the intellectual and 
moral development of society. After all, it is a ‘bold, vigorous, independent train of thought’8 
which develops intellectual figures with outward characters, the aim of On Liberty was to 
thwart ‘the “noxious power” of compression’.9 Mill crucially notes however that this applies 
‘only to beings in the maturity of their faculties, to personalities, to beings who are capable of 
being improved by free and equal discussion’.10 The principle championed in On Liberty 
promotes the formation of opinions to improve the common good. Mill’s proposal ‘to embed 
individuals in alternative social networks, to “cultivate character”’11 would produce developed 
beings with marked, energetic characters.12 Conformity would prove debilitating. 
 
Mill’s objection to hostility towards expressions of individuality led to the differentiation 
between self-regarding and other-regarding acts as a basis of legitimate interference upon 
individual liberty.13 Unwarranted interference is strictly forbidden by Mill, even in situations 
which may promote the happiness of an individual, as ‘the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection’.14 Mill was deeply troubled as to whether individualism or 
collectivism ought to be the predominant principle of his theory of liberty.15  In light of this, 
many studies note Mill’s ‘overriding devotion to the concept of individual freedom of choice 
and a celebration of the act of choosing’16 as a dominant theme of the text. 
 
                                                        
8 CW 18, p. 242. 
9 Allan D. Megill, ‘J. S. Mill’s Religion of Humanity and the Second Justification for the Writing of On 
Liberty’, p. 618. 
10 Frank Thilly, ‘The Individualism of John Stuart Mill’, p. 14. Mill’s conception of individualism claims that 
the best solution to the social problems of the period can be found in an unhindered ‘direct and exclusive 
interest of the human race’ (p. 16). 
11 Karen Zivi, ‘Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of Rights’, p. 50. Mill ‘never conceived 
of the individual as completely extractable or isolatable from society’ (p. 52). 
12 See Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism. Mill’s commitment to ‘elevate character and make moral 
reasoning self-critical leaves less room for variegated human development than some writers have imagined’ (p. 
xlviii). On the contrary, see Nicholas Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, who notes On Liberty ‘advocated the liberating 
effects and the moral transformation that accompanies the self-critical examination of all ideas’ (p. 9). Thus, 
self-critical discussion of opinions actually increases room for human development. 
13 See Clark W. Bouton, ‘Mill On Liberty and History’. Bouton suggests that for Mill, the ‘only solution is to 
insulate the individual from the public opinion of the dominant class’ (p. 572). 
14 CW 18, p. 223. 
15 See further J. P. Day, ‘Individual Liberty’, in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed. Of Liberty, pp. 17-29. 
16 Harry M. Clor, ‘Mill and Millians on Liberty and Moral Character’, p. 3. 
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Mill felt that those of sound intellect and rationality should not have their liberty interfered 
with. Such freedom however was not extended to children or those mentally unsound.17 Mill 
became increasingly concerned with ensuring individuals developed a cultivated character,18 
for people often lack the desire, skill, or compulsion to make the best of their lives. Mill noted 
that the ‘one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion’ is ‘peculiarly calculated 
to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality’.19 Deeply cherished 
throughout On Liberty,20 freedom to act upon shared common values would restrain any 
development of social tyranny.21 Here, we must consider more closely the spectrum of 
interpretations seeking to make sense of the central ideas of On Liberty. 
 
The central argument offered here is the following. A close historical and contextual reading 
of Mill’s writings challenges both the traditional and revisionary view of On Liberty. The 
traditional view, put forward by thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin, emphasises the utilitarianism 
connection between Mill, his father and Bentham, adding that for this reason, the young Mill 
was both inconsistent and incoherent. The revisionary reading, taken up most notably by Alan 
Ryan, John Rees and John Gray argues that Mill’s work can be shown to contain a coherent 
theory, reading Mill’s principle of liberty in relation to harm to others’ interests and that Mill’s 
account of human interests derivable from his distinctive indirect utilitarianism. A reception 
history seeks to add to both of these interpretations to help clarify the confusion surrounding 
Mill’s ideas on liberty. The reception of Mill’s theory of liberty, we will see, was deeply 
influenced by five key aspects. The first was public support for a collectivist theory of liberty 
since the 1830s. The second considers the reception of the individual chapters and arguments 
in On Liberty, unveiling which issues were most and least provocative for Mill’s readers from 
                                                        
17 See Gerald C. MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’. It is problematic to denote ‘forms’ of liberty as 
either negative or positive. It is this ascription of liberty as positive or negative which has prevented scholars 
from being clear as to what they mean by these variables and what justifies the use of one term over another. 
18 See John Gray, ‘Mill’s Liberalism and Liberalism’s Posterity’ for an account of how difficulties in engaging 
with works by liberal thinkers stems from a misunderstanding of progressive ideals such as freedom, where they 
have been viewed ‘with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension’ (Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on 
Liberty, p. 172) reiterating, amongst other liberals, Mill’s concerns for the stagnation of society. 
19 CW 18, p. 271. In support see Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, where it was claimed that ‘we have 
not yet got rid of the troublesome minority who will yield only to compulsion’ (p. 105). Authority cannot be 
kept at bay if Mill’s principle of liberty is to function. 
20 See P. R. Struhl, ‘Mill’s Notion of Social Responsibility’ for an elegant summation noting ‘that a social 
consciousness is natural, ought to be encouraged, indeed coerced, so that men and women live as equal 
comrades in an atmosphere of respect, cooperation, and concern’ (p. 162). 
21 See specifically Struhl, ‘Mill’s Notion of Social Responsibility’ for a study focusing upon Mill’s devotion to 
the community, disregarding studies which conclude On Liberty should be read negatively. Mill ‘was the enemy 
not the ally of the kind of personal isolationism we attribute to contemporary conservatism’ (p. 162). See 
Bernard Semmel, The Pursuit of Virtue, who notes that ‘a life of isolation from society, or one given up entirely 
to self-interest, diminished individuality and consequently diminished individual liberty’ (p. 197). 
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1859. The third was commentator’s reaction to Mill’s apparent reluctance to pardon any 
restraints upon liberty. The fourth was the lack of clarity on the state’s prerogatives over the 
individual, leading Mill’s critics debating how to improve upon the argument of On Liberty. 
Finally, in the 1890s, we see a renewal of attacks directed at Mill’s sovereignty of the individual 
(previously challenged after the emergence of Stephen’s essay in 1873), further warnings that 
Mill’s liberty risked individual excess and greater consideration on the abuses of power across 
society. This thesis therefore has one primary objective. It considers chiefly newspapers and 
periodicals which have not largely hitherto been explored in Mill scholarship, outlining the 
response to Mill’s theory of liberty from 1831, in order to clarify readings of Mill’s political 
thought in both primary and secondary literature. Broadly, it follows the consequences of 
Mill’s writings, particularly On Liberty, as well as the development of Mill’s scandalous 
reputation in nineteenth-century England. 
 
My account proceeds in the following manner. This introduction outlines the basic argument 
concerning Mill’s intentions in writing On Liberty and the number of readings which have 
surfaced as a result. The thesis is then divided into five chapters. Using six of Mill’s earlier 
publications, the first chapter examines the reception of Mill’s theory of liberty from 1831 to 
1859.22 The reception of these earlier publications demonstrates the complexity in 
understanding Mill’s theory of liberty and how those reading Mill reacted to his ideas. 
Culminating with the reputation of Mill in the 1850s, this chapter uses a close historical and 
contextual reading of Mill’s writings to argue that he should chiefly be read in context 
alongside his critic’s comments. Chapter 2 demonstrates how Mill’s critics responded to the 
individual chapters and leading arguments of On Liberty in the 1860s. The immediate reception 
revealed how controversial Mill’s essay was. It could not be left unchallenged for it had 
outraged religious groups, judged those lacking a particular type of education whilst also 
appealing to those leaning towards radical politics. Mill was a unique figure but most of all, 
these responses demonstrate the wide uses of the term liberty in nineteenth-century England. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the central arguments put forth in the 1870s, led by James Fitzjames 
Stephen’s 1873 work, ultimately suggesting that On Liberty was a plea for toleration rather 
than a defence of liberty. Chapter 4 engages with Spencer, Herbert and Levy in order to 
                                                        
22 The earlier publications include ‘The Spirit of the Age’ (1831), ‘On Genius’ (1832), ‘Bentham’ (1838), 
‘Coleridge’ (1840), the System of Logic (1843) and the Principles of Political Economy (1848). 
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demonstrate how these three loyalists proved instrumental in keeping Mill’s reputation alive. 
The re-emergence of discussion on where and how the state could intervene, paired with the 
individualism/collectivism debate initiated by Dicey, meant that by the 1880s, Mill was too 
useful to be dismissed, even for his critics. Chapter 5 offers a reception of On Liberty from 
1890 to 1900 in the context of debate on the family and what this meant for ideas such as 
equality, liberty and sociability. By the 1890s, it was clear from the reaction to Mill’s essay in 
1859 that cooperation was a central ingredient for individual development. This also resulted 
in further discussion on the family and the liberty of all individuals across society. Various 
political and religious periodicals wrote on the diverse roles everyone in society can play and 
this, coupled with greater consideration on social responsibilities, opened debate on how to 
achieve a truly progressive society. Accordingly, the 1890s revealed a new phase in the 
reception of On Liberty, one which reflected the relevance and absorption of his writings on 
liberty long after his death. Moreover, responses in the 1890s highlight that despite the criticism 
Mill received since the publication of On Liberty, what consistently united both him and his 
commentators was an eagerness for a new dawn of progress. 
 
A conclusion draws these five arguments together in order to show how Mill’s conception of 
liberty cannot entirely be described or explained by the traditional nor the revisionary reading 
of Mill or On Liberty. The reception of Mill and particularly On Liberty enables us to read Mill 
alongside the reactions of his commentators, critics, admirers, opponents and friends. The ways 
in which these ideas were received unveils how nineteenth-century periodicals, from a variety 
of political and religious affiliations, felt about ideas on liberty. Mill’s ambition in On Liberty 
was to establish boundaries concerning the relationship between liberty and authority, to 
highlight the importance of individuality and warn society of the dangers of the tyranny of the 
majority. The resulting portrait of Mill in light of a reception history reveals the following: it 
revises our understanding of the role of Mill and On Liberty in nineteenth-century England. 
Secondly, it highlights public support for a collectivist vision of liberty and thirdly, a universal 
and radical approach of leaving people to decide what is in their best interests. It is often taken 
for granted the influence Mill had on those around him, rather than being examined in depth. 
Accordingly, the combination of these points offers a revised understanding of Mill’s political 
thought, particularly On Liberty, challenging contemporary understandings of Mill’s impact 
by providing a more detailed reading of the reception of his ideas. 
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Prevailing Understandings: A Spectrum of Interpretation 
 
On Liberty has been read in a number of different and conflicting ways. For many, Mill was a 
defender of liberty for the intellectual elite; for others, he was, and remains, one of the strongest 
defenders of liberal individuality.23 This explains why On Liberty does not escape charges of 
inconsistency and ambiguity. To add to interpretations, liberty itself has been read in multiple 
ways, further stressing the complex nature of the text.24 In light of Mill’s great concerns with 
liberty and freedom, it is fitting to begin with contextual readings of these terms in order to 
further engage and explore the interpretations that result from reading On Liberty. 
 
Negative Liberty 
 
On Liberty has been read as a text devoted to negative liberty, the absence of constraints upon 
pursuing one’s own ends. Mill himself, after all, had written that ‘liberty consists in doing what 
one desires’.25 More recently, negative liberty, or freedom, has been categorised as ‘a state 
where no one’s life and liberty are secure’,26 one which alienates the individual and 
subordinates the collective to an unprogressive path.27 Ascertaining the limits of intervention 
and the means in which we may enforce it has proven to be heavily problematic for both 
admirers and critics of Mill alike.28 Even so, On Liberty has been understood as a text devoted 
to negative liberty, critical of interference, as one should be free to pursue one’s own ends. In 
this negative sense, it is liberty from absence or restraint, or in a major sense, ‘the absence of 
                                                        
23 See G. L. Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’. When reading On Liberty, ‘we find no evidence for an 
‘absolutist’ view but a much more sensitive interpretation of the part rules play in moral and social life’ (p. 135). 
24 See Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ and MacCallum’s criticism of this in ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’. 
MacCallum proposes a triadic formula comprising variables such as agent, constraints and purpose. See further 
Nelson, ‘Liberty: One concept too many?’, who notes that an exercise-concept is conceptualisable in terms of 
MacCallum’s single concept. See also Elford, ‘Reclaiming two concepts of liberty’ where it is argued that 
MacCallum’s triadic structure is actually unable to conceptualise a particular understanding of liberty. 
25 CW 18, p. 294. 
26 James Oakes, ‘What’s Wrong with “Negative Liberty”’, p. 80. Oakes presents a very critical reading of 
negative liberty. 
27 See Lloyd D. A. Thomas, ‘The Justification of Liberalism’. Individuality and originality, terms associated 
with negative liberty, are presupposed ideals. Liberalism ought to be justified ‘on something which can be 
accepted by any man’ irrespective of their wants, where a ‘stable and tolerable’ society protects our interests (p. 
210). For a chief study on negative liberty see Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty and D. Miller, 
‘Constraints on Freedom’. 
28 See Kristján Kristjánsson, ‘For a Concept of Negative Liberty – but which Conception?’. When considering 
these two readings, ‘there can be no ‘pure’ negative account of freedom – nor for that matter any ‘pure’ positive 
one’ referring to this objection as ‘the thesis of conceptual equivalence’ (p. 222). See further Nadia Urbinati, 
Mill on Democracy. The dualistic image of Mill is inaccurate and On Liberty should be read with three concepts 
of liberty in mind. These are ‘liberty as noninterference, liberty as nonsubjection, and liberty as moral self-
development’ (pp. 159-160). See further Quentin Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, pp. 237-268. 
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human interference of coercion’.29 Whatever the outcome of an action, ‘the only freedom 
which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do 
not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it’.30 Much of the 
urgency of Mill’s plea in On Liberty has been read from a chiefly ‘libertarian’ angle, resulting 
in Berlin’s conclusions that ‘the defence of liberty consists in the negative goal of warding off 
interference’.31 A negative reading of On Liberty caters for the development of some of Mill’s 
most cherished traits: originality, genius and developing independent characters. The warning 
which Mill postulates is that if such a form of liberty is ignored, the pressure of social opinion 
will result in ‘collective mediocrity’.32 Berlin has noted that ‘Millian freedom’ has been 
equated with negative liberty as Mill concerns himself with fending off interference.33 
MacCallum added that negative freedom should not be abandoned and that such freedom ‘is 
thus always of something, from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something’ 
where liberty ‘is always and necessarily from restraint’.34 
 
The freedom to pursue individuality has been referred to as a definite and vigorously defended 
theme of On Liberty. The ‘importance of the free development of individual character in the 
face of the many obstacles modern society was putting in its way’35 added value to safeguarding 
the rights and values of mankind. Brink strongly defends Mill’s key elements of freedom of 
expression and equality, noting that ‘Mill intended his free-speech principles to play a larger 
role in articulating and grounding more general liberal principles governing thought and 
action’36 but does not endorse an unqualified right to liberty. Mill’s focus in On Liberty is to 
                                                        
29 Don A. Habibi, ‘The Positive/Negative Liberty Distinction and J. S. Mill’s Theory of Liberty’, p. 349. It is 
claimed that negative liberty is valuable to and of itself. 
30 CW 18, p. 226. 
31 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 127. See Skinner, ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, pp. 237-265. See further 
D. M. White, ‘Negative Liberty’, for an account of liberty in a purely negative sense. 
32 CW 18, p. 268. See further Harry Holloway, ‘Mill’s Liberty, 1859-1959’. Mill was suspicious of the state and 
the majority. Character was an ideological device used to defend middle-class interests. Mill’s development of 
individuality and elitism ‘add up to an idealized version of middle-class interests and values’ (p. 31). 
33 See Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. 
34 MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, pp. 314, 330. 
35 J. C. Rees, ‘A Phase in the Development of Mill’s Ideas on Liberty’, p. 39. Ernest Barker, Political Thought 
in England, 1848-1914, further notes that Mill’s essay was ‘a fine vindication of spiritual liberty and originality 
against restraints whether of legislation or of social opinion’ (p. 206). Mill looked forward to an age when such 
ideas could materialise in light of present obstacles and challenges. 
36 David Brink, ‘Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression’, in Ten, ed. Mill’s On Liberty, p. 60. See 
further S. V. Laselva, ‘A Single Truth’ where paternalism in particular is accredited with the most serious 
charge alongside a series of inconsistencies found in On Liberty. Laselva argues that by embracing his 
paternalistic tendencies, Mill abandoned his harm principle, where he rules out paternalism but sanctions good 
samaritanism (p. 496). See further David Archard, ‘Freedom Not to be Free’. Mill’s liberty principle is anti-
paternalist as ‘it denies that a person’s own good is sufficient ground for the curtailment of their liberty’ (p. 
453). 
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protect ‘the individual against all forms of social pressure’ where Mill was most concerned 
‘with the intrusion of society upon the individual’.37 Ryan contends that ‘the impetus to the 
writing of On Liberty was to protect freedom from the assaults of illiberal do-gooders’.38 On 
Liberty has been said to make ‘a timeless case for freedom of speech and action that has 
inspired generation after generation around the world’.39 In order to best understand On 
Liberty, we must take note of Mill’s insistence that for a well-organised and educated society, 
all must be able to liberate themselves from constraint.40 On Liberty ‘tills the soil in which 
individuality can flourish’,41 presenting most expressively ‘an ardent and persuasive argument 
for the most unhindered individualism’.42 Mill’s treatise cements its position as the ‘most 
influential statement of the irreducible value of human individuality’,43 earning Mill the 
reputation of ‘the philosopher of liberty’.44  
 
Thus far, it has been established that liberty gives us the opportunity to pick positive choices 
both for ourselves and society and this was used to defend individuality in accordance with 
utility. Scarre has written that we see ‘the promotion of self-development in On Liberty as 
intimately connected with Mill’s utilitarian project of enhancing human happiness’.45 
Commonly perceived as Mill’s ‘demand for liberty in isolation from other values’,46 On Liberty 
is a defence which magnifies the value of liberty, where the individual, ‘is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’.47 To safeguard 
sovereignty, we ought not to compel or violate the rights of the individual.48 This is found in 
                                                        
37 Alan Ryan, ‘Mr. McCloskey on Mill’s Liberalism’, p. 254. 
38 Ryan, ‘Mill in a Liberal Landscape’, in Skorupski, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill, p. 501. 
39 Richard Reeves, ‘John Stuart Mill’, p. 48. In The Life of John Stuart Mill, Michael Packe disputes this noting 
that On Liberty ‘was really more of a hymn or incantation’ and was ‘intended rather to excite than to persuade’ 
(p. 400). As added to by Claeys, it was a case of ‘extreme over-exuberance’ (p. 5). 
40 See for a detailed account G. W. Smith, ‘Freedom and Virtue in Politics’, pp. 112-134. 
41 Martin Hollis, ‘The Social Liberty Game’, in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed. Of Liberty, p. 32. 
42 Shirley Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, p. 297. 
43 Stefan Collini, ed. On Liberty, p. vii. 
44 Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, p. 1. 
45 Geoffrey Scarre, Mill’s On Liberty, p. 62. If more people are maximally happy, then society ought to allow 
them room to develop their interests and capacities. F. L. Van Holthoon, The Road to Utopia, notes that 
‘capacity is the mark of originality’ and is one of the characteristics of genius (p. 22). 
46 Graeme Duncan and Gray, ‘The Left Against Mill’, p. 219. 
47 CW 18, p. 224. Or at least that ‘the individual wishes to be his own master’, in Stegenga’s terms ‘J. S. Mill’s 
Concept of Liberty and the Principle of Utility’, p. 284. See Struhl, ‘Mill’s Notion of Social Responsibility’, 
where ‘one’s conduct is one’s own concern’ (p. 156). On the contrary, see Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 
which considers a higher freedom found through a ‘collective entity’ as opposed to an individualistic pursuit for 
liberty (pp. 8-9). 
48 See Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. See in particular vol. 3, where Feinberg opposes legal 
hard paternalism and advocates personal sovereignty as ‘respect for a person’s autonomy is respect for his 
unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the interests of others 
need protection from him’ (p. 68). When an individual’s autonomy is infringed upon, even for his own good, ‘it 
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On Liberty when Mill noted that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others’.49 If 
and when harm is forced upon another, one is not to intervene. Mill’s concerns led to his 
articulation of ‘the devastating effect of social pressure on individuals who dared to be 
different’.50 Himmelfarb argues that On Liberty promotes the interests of liberty for men and 
women against a social tyranny, protecting them from subversion by society where Mill sought 
to defend his principle of liberty and not to grant greater powers to an elite few as no 
authoritative voice is permitted in matters of morality and liberty.51 Ten draws attention to a 
sympathetic reading of Mill’s defence of liberty, stating that the tyranny of the majority is 
something which surfaces as a recurring theme throughout Mill’s personal development.52 
Berger adds that it is Mill’s understanding of utilitarianism which directs his moral order, 
adding that Mill’s ‘theory of liberty is best understood as a defence of a right to freedom that 
is itself defended in terms of a right to autonomous activity’.53 Social  tyranny is a great threat 
to the flourishing of liberty. Arneson notes that whilst Mill does not mention the term 
autonomy, ‘he at least flirts with the concept’ where he ‘has in mind autonomy rather than 
freedom as the value to be held up for admiration’.54 Accordingly, possessing the means to act 
upon our individual liberty brings independence and is the idea of ‘authoring one’s own 
world’.55  
                                                        
is still a violation of his personal sovereignty’. This ‘applies just as much to coercion of another that it intended 
to increase his de facto freedom (open options) as it does to compulsions and prohibitions intended to promote 
any other element of a person’s well-being’ (p. 68). See R. J. Arneson, ‘Joel Feinberg and the Justification of 
Hard Paternalism’ for a comprehensive study of Feinberg’s work. 
49 CW 18, p. 223. 
50 Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, p. 110. 
51 Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism. Mill’s principle of liberty ‘was required for the liberation 
of women’ (p. 181). Mill was a prominent activist of women’s rights and they were perhaps the most obvious 
victim of social tyranny. 
52 See Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’. The first phase ‘was fearful of any power that might be exercised without the 
control of public opinion’, the second ‘advocated a passive acceptance by the public of the enlightened doctrines 
propounded by more cultivated minds’. Culminating in On Liberty, cultivated minds were seen to be ‘very 
valuable’, enabling the flowering of intellectually active people (pp. 67-68). 
53 Fred Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom, pp. 231-232. 
54 Richard Arneson, ‘Mill versus Paternalism’, p. 476. See further D. G. Brown, ‘Mill on Harm to Others’ 
Interests’. The ‘calculation of what a person’s interests are belong to prudential reasoning, not to legal or moral 
or sociological reasoning’ (p. 399). See further Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Ryan is supportive of 
Mill, stating that we can draw a line distinguishing self-regarding and other-regarding behaviour in terms of the 
private and public morality of individuals. This is simplified to a distinction between moral and prudential rules. 
See pp. 213-230 for further discussion. Mill comes close to making a distinction between freedom and 
autonomy, noting the Mormon practice of polygamy in particular. Mill’s hesitation rests in his worry of how 
voluntary the choice will be. See further CW 18, p. 290. 
55 Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty, p. 19. See further J. A. 
Blumenthal, ‘A Psychological Defence of Paternalism’. We should have the freedom to choose and learn from 
our mistakes. Those who enforce paternalism are equally as vulnerable as other individuals and ‘their 
interventionist decisions should therefore not be privileged’ (p. 215).  
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Thus far, it has been suggested that at the heart of On Liberty is a pronounced importance to 
develop one’s own character, free from violation or restraint. It has been ‘widely argued that 
autonomy is a character ideal’,56 echoed by Skorupski who credits autonomy ‘as the doctrine 
defended in On Liberty’.57 Mill’s heartfelt plea for enriching personal character and self-
cultivation is arguably his most cherished trait found in an individual.58 Mill was far from shy 
in expressing concerns about a ‘pinched and hidebound type of human character’ which was 
becoming the norm in society as most were content with ordinariness. One of Mill’s greatest 
anxieties was the lack of men of genius who rendered progress possible, for ‘mass domination 
would destroy the atmosphere of freedom’. For Mill, society needed to foster a ‘more 
pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought’. Such men 
‘should be encouraged in acting differentially from the mass’59 who are idle and ignorant. 
People ought to be eccentric, to be forceful ambassadors of individuality. For Cowling, On 
Liberty seeks to ‘moralize all social activity’,60 to enable such development indicating a strong 
moral foundation underlying many of the concepts which make up On Liberty. After all, Mill 
only ‘argues in favour of liberty for the sake of only some members of civilised society, but 
not all’.61 
 
Positive Liberty 
 
In contrast, there are those who favour a positive reading of On Liberty. Abraham notes that 
reading On Liberty negatively is counter-objective for Mill, as a ‘negative liberty ideology is 
not a neutral resource, equally available to all interests or all movements’.62 Mill ‘can no longer 
be seen as an apostle of ‘negative liberty’ alone’ as economic cooperation was ‘an essential 
component in Mill’s ‘positive’ notion of liberty, where liberty is defined in terms of society 
                                                        
56 Young, ‘The Value of Autonomy’, p. 35. 
57 Skorupski, ‘The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill’, p. 191. See further Mill’s reference to ‘l’autonomie de 
l’individu’ as residing at the heart of his text (CW 17, p. 1832). 
58 In particular, see Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’, which explores a ‘higher 
type of character’. Collini refers to this ideal type of character as the ‘moral tissue that was assumed to provide 
the flesh on the otherwise abrasively bare skeleton of the Individualist idea of the state’ (p. 37).   
59 CW 18, pp. 265, liv, 269. 
60 Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, pp. 87-93. 
61 Richard B. Friedman, ‘A New Exploration of Mill’s Essay On Liberty’, p. 283. Mill is also guilty of wavering 
between liberty as a social or strictly individual value. 
62 David Abraham, ‘Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a “Negative Citizenship” 
Regime’, p. 64. 
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helping to provide the preconditions for individual self-development’.63 A positive form of 
Millian liberty ‘is a crucial component of the articulation of principles of justice and the 
resistance to certain forms of oppression’.64 Positive liberty permits support from others in 
pursuit of a common good and rejects non-interference.65 In instances where an individual lacks 
the will to engage in virtuous activity, meddling may be beneficial as only ‘a virtuous society 
could remain a free society’.66 Mill’s encouragement for discussion urges people to engage 
with others, where ‘instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested 
exertion to promote the good of others’, ultimately carving itself into the development and 
maturity of society. 
 
Mill concedes that there is a ‘servile type of character’67 that does not desire liberty and this 
individual is subject to decay unless external social or political coercion is issued.68 For 
Friedman, ‘liberty can be lost by what may be called lack of self-determination’.69 This is not 
to discredit liberty as a valued concept for Mill, for as Halliday writes, it is liberty ‘which 
‘unfreezes’ the social structure and makes possible persuasion as well as sanction’,70 
demonstrating the differing treatments of the individual in On Liberty.71 On Liberty explores 
the antagonism of opinions and considers the relationship this has with society and 
individuals.72 Urbinati claims that ‘the main objective of On Liberty is to examine the kinds of 
coercion that the state and society can legitimately exercise over individuals ‘in the maturity 
of their faculties’73 where the state’s task is one solely to ‘umpire between the majority of fools 
                                                        
63 Claeys, ‘Justice, Independence, and Industrial Democracy’, pp. 122, 134-135. 
64 John Christman, ‘Saving Positive Freedom’, p. 87. 
65 See MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’. For studies advocating positive liberty, see A. J. M. Milne, 
Freedom and Rights, Christman, ‘Saving Positive Freedom’ and for a forceful account against negative liberty, 
see Charles Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’. Semmel asserts that the problem of free will ‘was 
critical to the argument of On Liberty’, (John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue, p. 165). The essay was a 
plea for positive liberty ‘for the sense of participation and self-realization in the idea of freedom’ (p. 166). Eldon 
J. Eisenach, Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism, notes On Liberty was ‘perhaps primarily, a neoradical 
plea for positive liberty, the sense of participation and self-realization’ (p. 63). 
66 Eisenach, Mill and the Moral Character of Liberalism, p. 63. 
67 CW 18, pp. 277, 52. See further H. S. Jones, ‘Mill as Moralist’ where Jones argues that On Liberty is an 
exposition of a positive concept of liberty, so much so that Mill is a ‘positive libertarian’ (p. 299). 
68 See J. E. Parson’s, ‘J. S. Mill’s Conditional Liberalism in Perspective’, p. 148. Mill’s differentiation between 
those who are capable of improving through liberty of thought and discussion and others, such as children and 
barbarians, who are not, means Mill is ‘a conditional liberal’. 
69 Friedman, ‘A New Exploration of Mill’s Essay On Liberty’, p. 290. 
70 R. J. Halliday, ‘Some Recent Interpretations of John Stuart Mill’, p. 15. 
71 See K. C. O’Rourke, John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression. See further Richard Lindley, Autonomy, 
Young, Personal Autonomy and Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy for three of the most recent studies on how 
autonomy supports the politics of left liberalism. For studies arguing the contrary, see Alasdair MacIntyre, After 
Virtue and Michael Sandel, Liberalism and its Critics. 
72 See Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism, p. 261. 
73 Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, p. 134. 
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and the minority of Socrates’.74 Wollheim further notes that ‘the fundamental aim of John 
Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty was the revival of the old issue of the proper limits to be set to 
state action’.75 Scholars have commented on the utility of intervention specifically if harm 
violates an obligation or interest when distinguishing between conduct which does and does 
not concern others.76 
 
Thus far, On Liberty has been read as a work calling for the enrichment of the individual. There 
is always a possibility that individuals may choose freely to sacrifice their chances for self-
development in the name of another pursuit, which may of course be detrimental to the 
common good of society.77 In such instances, Mill’s concern was if coercion would penetrate 
‘deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself’.78 Baum has noted that coercion 
may well stifle the ‘mental freedom’ of an individual, but in instances it may be necessary.79 
These are of course grave concerns, yet Mill’s main anxiety was social tyranny. Possession of 
mental freedom enables individuals to pursue a moral good and tyranny of the majority posed 
a grave threat to such freedoms.80 Conflicting with traditional readings and his appointment as 
the ‘Saint of Rationalism’,81 such a reading reveals an element of ‘moral totalitarianism’,82 
where Mill placed his great hope of progress in just a few, who were trusted with leading the 
masses who are looked upon ‘as incapable of reasoned thought and hence in need of instruction 
                                                        
74 Hollis, ‘J. S. Mill’s Political Philosophy of Mind’, p. 340. See further Jones, Victorian Political Thought, 
which notes that Mill was very much in favour of extending state action where it could be demonstrated that it 
‘would supplement rather than supplant free individuals’ (p. 40). See Halliday, John Stuart Mill. Mill was ‘too 
frightened of the unchecked and ‘undirected course of democracy’’ (p. 114). This suggests an underlying 
autocratic tone and need for the state to monitor action and behaviour. 
75 Richard Wollheim, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Limits of State Action’, p. 1. 
76 See Brown, ‘Mill on Liberty’. The principle of liberty is not absolute and is in fact synonymous with that of 
utility. Whilst the former determines possible justifications to the prevention of harm, the latter is the 
application in the prevention of harm to an agent. See Gray, Liberalism, which claims this is the precise problem 
with Mill’s principle of liberty. It ‘specifies only the necessary, and not the sufficient condition of justified 
restraint’ (p. 220). Happiness from a utilitarian perspective is only achievable in a society governed by the 
principle of liberty. See further Brown, ‘What is Mill’s Principle of Utility’, which calls for more value to be 
given to the principle of utility. See also Ted Honderich, ‘The Worth of J. S. Mill On Liberty’. Mill’s discussion 
on intervention is utilitarian as it ‘must be settled by the Principle of Utility’ (p. 468). 
77 See further Robert Hoag, ‘Happiness and Freedom’. Mill’s principle of liberty depends upon a concept of 
happiness but one that is fundamentally non-hedonistic. Hoag notes that ‘Mill accepts at least some hedonists' 
substantive claims about pleasures' values, but offers a different account or explanation of their value’ (p. 191). 
78 CW 18, p. 220. 
79 Bruce Baum, ‘J. S. Mill on Freedom and Power’, p. 194. 
80 See Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 1. It is claimed that ‘free citizens are likelier to be 
highly capable and creative persons through the constant exercise of their capacities to choose, make decisions, 
and assume responsibilities’ (p. 9). In instances of preventing tyranny of the majority, ‘liberty should be the 
norm; coercion always needs some special justification’ (p. 9). 
81 See Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, pp. 51-55. Gladstone famously described Mill as this after his death. 
82 Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, p. xlviii. 
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from the enlightened few’.83 Such a reading ultimately results in Mill emerging as more elitist 
than often considered.84 
 
In light of these revised readings to On Liberty, Hamburger notes that Mill’s work is 
considerably less libertarian due to the great deal of evidence for ‘limitations on liberty and 
many encroachments on individuality’85 found within the text. In this regard, liberty was just 
one of the many elements that made up On Liberty and we ought not to read the text supposing 
that liberty is the core of his argument.86 The text calls for a sense of moral regeneration and 
imposing this upon society may be necessary. Intervention, or coercion, can be defended based 
upon Mill’s commitment to a moral and social virtue.87 In instances ‘where the rules of justice 
are transgressed and rights violated there society may intervene, through law or opinion’.88 
Whilst coercion does not necessarily result in good character, Holloway stresses that ‘the law 
could enforce those basic rights for all which were essential to a man’s becoming a first-class 
citizen’89 as, admittedly, few might actually be the best judges of their own interests owing to 
a lack of education. 
 
The rule of law further contributes towards this positive reading of On Liberty.90 Mill’s 
principle ‘gives the state the right to deprive citizens of the grounds for arriving at an 
                                                        
83 Rees, ‘A Phase in the Development of Mill’s Ideas on Liberty’, p. 41. 
84 See in particular Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue. This study reveals Mill as more 
conservative than stereotypical liberals of the nineteenth-century. Mill’s faith was not embedded in a liberal 
framework for ‘Mill was not prepared to see man as innately virtuous, nor progress as inevitable’ (p. 187). 
85 Hamburger, On Liberty and Control, p. xi. See further Peter Carbone, ‘John Stuart Mill on Freedom, 
Education, and Social Reform’. Carbone notes that the tension between freedom and control forms one of the 
most distinguishing traits of Mill’s thought, particularly in On Liberty. See further Peter Radcliff, Limits of 
Liberty for a general study on the limitations of Mill’s theory. 
86 See Y. N. Chopra, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’. Contrary to Mill arguing for the maximisation of liberty in all 
instances, ‘he fails to take into account important aspects of it, so that, regrettably, he is not to be regarded as a 
wholly dependable champion of it’ (p. 418). 
87 See Feinberg, ‘Legal Paternalism’. Paternalism is not rejected entirely, especially if a person’s own good is at 
risk. Legal paternalism is however deemed a ‘preposterous doctrine’ (p. 105). Imposing external constraints 
upon an individual is likely to be ‘self-defeating’ (p. 120). D. N. Husak, ‘Paternalism and Autonomy’, argues 
that instead of forming objections to paternalism, we ought to ‘concentrate instead on assessing the justifiability 
of instances of paternalism on their individual merits’ and posits three reasons for doubting paternalism as an 
inconsistent treatment (p. 46). 
88 Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, p. 134. This study explains how Mill’s notion of interests is best seen 
in terms of justice and rights. 
89 Holloway, ‘Mill and Green on the Modern Welfare State’, p. 399. 
90 The most compelling debate between Hart and Raz versus Devlin and Stephen. This debate extends from the 
publication of On Liberty through to contemporary accounts. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom. Raz 
adopts a moderate anti-individualist position concerning the common collective good. This debate concerns 
whether punishment, or an enforcement of morals, is justifiable in any particular case. Moreover, is 
conversation or ‘suasion’ perhaps the only apt means of discussing our individual moral choices. This further 
raises questions of pursuing human altruism or public duties as a means of aiding a rational sense of public 
engagement. 
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independent judgement as to whether the law should be obeyed’.91 Providing governments 
further power to intervene and prevent harm may encourage more honest citizens. Moreover, 
the educational benefits of expressing opinions mean On Liberty is a form of ‘undiluted 
paternalism’92 at best. When disorder and regression are as grave as Mill stresses, the price of 
such ‘may give the government’s commands very real binding force’.93 Devlin sanctions state 
action and intervention in individual private lives noting that ‘authority should be a grant and 
liberty not a privilege’.94 Devlin’s claim places On Liberty in the centre of a debate that it is 
the purpose of law to enforce good moral convictions.95 Devlin appeals directly to the moral 
fabric of society. Echoing similar words of Stephen a century before him, Devlin added that 
‘the suppression of vice is as much the law’s business as the suppression of subversive 
activities’.96  
 
Stephen’s 1873 response to On Liberty claimed that the purpose of law was to promote virtue 
and to hinder vice. Stephen further noted that ‘restraints on immorality are the main safeguards 
of society against influences which might be fatal to it’.97 Stephen and Mill’s relationship has 
invited much interest.98 Hart, in particular99 claimed that you can act against an individual’s 
will only in instances to prevent harm to others, where opponents of his fail to provide a 
universally acceptable conception of legal punishment.100 Hart thus remains convinced that it 
                                                        
91 Thomas Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, p. 218. See further Jack Lively, ‘Paternalism’, in A. 
Phillips Griffiths, ed. Of Liberty, pp. 147-165 which looks closely at Mill’s paternalism. 
92 Oskar Kurer, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Welfare State’, p. 725. See further, John Kleinig, Paternalism, which 
notes that ‘our lives do not always display the cohesion and maturity of purpose that exemplifies the liberal idea 
of individuality’ justifying the use of paternalism in such instances (p. 67). 
93 Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, p. 226. 
94 Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, p. 102. This is also the mark of a free society. 
95 See further Devlin, ‘Law, Democracy and Morality’ and ‘Mill on Liberty in Morals’. 
96 Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, p. 13. 
97 James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, p. 11. Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, notes Stephen 
furthered this when he ‘argued that Mill’s principle of the sovereignty of individual judgement fostered 
disengaged individuals and weakened social ties’ (p. 125). 
98 See Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, pp. 88-89. The differences between Mill and Stephen in their 
understanding of restraints upon liberty are said to ‘mirror their different conceptions of human interests’ (p. 
89). Mill thought personal autonomy to be vitally important and Stephen thought little of it as an element of 
well-being. 
99 See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality, pp. 16-24. According to Hart, Stephen and Devlin maintain 
that ‘it is morally justifiable to use the criminal law’ and to punish immorality (p. 18). Ryan later comments that 
Devlin’s argument is ‘embarrassingly poor’ (p. 246). 
100 For a rejection of the harm principle see Nils Holtug, ‘The Harm Principle’. It is rejected based upon a 
premise that it ‘protects individual liberty on too narrow a basis’ and ‘exploits only one dimension of affect in 
person-affecting morality’ making it indefensible (p. 387). 
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is not the law’s business to involve itself in regulating or inducing individual morality,101 
providing one of the most recent challenges to this positive reading of legal intervention. 
 
Even so, harm to others is the condition under which interference is acceptable, identified as 
‘the pivotal notion’102 of On Liberty. Mill explicitly notes ‘there is a primâ facie case for 
punishing him, by law’,103 expressing ‘a preference for legal action, as against mere societal 
intervention, in the prevention of harm by an individual to others’.104 In instances when 
compulsion is ruled out, ‘conviction and persuasion need not be’,105 as Mill promoted 
‘disinterested exertion’.106 Williams notes that ‘his respect for their rights does not lead him to 
withdrawal or passiveness’,107 and Long further comments that ‘toleration does not mean the 
suspension of judgement’108 in ensuring both moral order and meaningful discussion in society. 
 
Positive Paternalism 
 
In light of these negative and positive readings of liberty, consideration must be turned to 
positive paternalism, or what has equally become known as ‘positive parentalism’,109 which 
focuses not just on intervening, but rather ‘on developing policies that would help citizens 
flourish by helping them develop their own strengths and abilities’.110 Mill placed great value 
upon enhancing education within society.111 In light of this, Mill’s demand for the ‘ascendancy 
of public opinion in the state’112 has led scholars to assert that the central concern of Mill’s 
                                                        
101 See Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality. In his preface, Hart warns that ‘it is comparatively easy to make 
criminal law and exceedingly difficult to unmake it’. For support, see Wendy Donner, ‘Autonomy, tradition, and 
the enforcement of morality’, in Ten, ed. Mill’s On Liberty. The notion that morality should be enforced is 
‘refuted by the thriving reality of social diversity and pluralism of modern democracies’ due to the resilience of 
Mill’s system (p. 159). See further Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom, pp. 259-265 for a brilliant 
summary of the Hart vs. Devlin debate on enforcing morality. 
102 Chopra, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, p. 419. 
103 CW 18, p. 224. 
104 Chopra, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, p. 420. 
105 Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, p. 135. 
106 CW 18, p. 277. 
107 Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, p. 135. 
108 See Douglas Long, Bentham on Liberty, p. 135. Running parallel to Bentham’s justification of the use of 
coercion and/or control, On Liberty advocates ‘‘self-protection’ by the community’ where the community is 
comprised of any number of individuals, differentiating this criterion from coercion on the grounds of self-
regarding and other-regarding actions. 
109 Blumenthal, and P. H. Huang, ‘Positive Parentalism’. This may promote the most beneficial outcome by 
developing institutions to support individuals, encouraging governments to foster development and 
supplementing traditional elements of paternalism. 
110 Blumenthal, ‘A Psychological Defence of Paternalism’, in Christian Coons and Michael Weber, eds. 
Paternalism, p. 210. 
111 A chief study is Francis Roellinger, ‘Mill on Education’ and E. G. West, ‘Liberty and Education’. 
112 CW 18, p. 275. 
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essay ‘was the revival of the old issue of the proper limits to be set to state actions’.113 
McCloskey asserts that liberty is essential if a state is to be legitimate, for Mill’s principle 
supports the idea that ‘the end of the state is to maximise the goods of true knowledge, rational 
belief, self-direction, self-perfection, moral character and responsibility, happiness and 
progress’.114 A state that is managed properly will provide accessible means to education and 
enable individuals to cultivate a moral character, requisites for individuality. McCloskey 
echoed claims that liberty was never intended as the end goal115 as it was ultimately the 
responsibility and business of the state ‘to secure and promote goods’.116 After all, Mill’s belief 
in education and social improvement ‘led him to favour the enlargement of the state’s powers 
to counteract the pressures of society’.117 Mill ‘advocated a whole set of institutional 
arrangements, including liberty, equality, variety, socialization and participation, because they 
transform people’s wants and thus influence their choice of lifestyles’.118  
 
Mill’s belief that institutional arrangements would redirect our desires towards higher faculties 
does not mean his conception of the good is a diversion from his position as a liberal. Strasser 
claims that ‘his greatness as a defender of liberty is precisely due to his ability to show why 
liberty must be protected on utilitarian grounds’.119 Bird adds that ‘there would seem to be a 
prima facie case on utilitarian grounds for restricting our options so as to induce us to select 
better alternatives’.120 In the name of enhancing liberty, social interactions and preventing 
harm, nonlegal ‘moral suasion’121 was appropriate. An educated opinion is vital in the 
                                                        
113 Wollheim, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Limits of State Action’, p. 1. 
114 H. J. McCloskey, ‘Mill’s Liberalism’, p. 145. 
115 See further Cowling, Mill and Liberalism. Cowling claims that liberty was not something we ought to work 
towards as it was a term employed to legitimise an elite moral order. 
116 McCloskey, ‘Mill’s Liberalism’, p. 155. 
117 Maurice Cranston, ‘John Stuart Mill and Liberty’, p. 89. 
118 Kurer, ‘John Stuart Mill: liberal or utilitarian?’, p. 206. See further Robert F. Landenson, ‘Mill’s Conception 
of Individuality’. Much of On Liberty (particularly chapter 3) provides a utilitarian argument for the value of 
individuality as truth is one of the greatest goods Mill pushes for us to achieve. 
119 Mark Strasser, ‘Mill and the Utility of Liberty’, p. 68. See further D. H. Monro, ‘Utilitarianism and the 
Individual’, which asks us to reconsider a reconciliation between utilitarianism and individualism. See further 
James Bogen and Daniel Farrell, ‘Freedom and Happiness in Mill’s Defence of Liberty’. Mill ‘provides 
consistently utilitarian arguments for his harm principle throughout On Liberty’ (p. 326). Also see Berger, 
Happiness, Justice and Freedom where it is argued that it is Mill’s close-knit doctrines which ‘provide the basis 
for a more defensible form of utilitarianism, and of political liberalism, that has often been previously supposed 
possible’ (p. 1). 
120 Colin Bird, The Myth of Liberal Individualism, p. 126. Bird defends Mill the liberal and Mill the utilitarian, 
stating that Mill’s harm principle in On Liberty is presented on utilitarian grounds (p. 126). 
121 See particularly Claeys, ‘Mill, Moral Suasion, and Coercion’, in Thom Brooks, ed. Ethical Citizenship: 
British Idealism and the Politics of Recognition, pp. 79-104. Claeys argues that ‘nonlegal rules would be 
formulated and enforced which ought in principle sustain the principle of liberty while ensuring the progress of 
morality’ (p. 80).
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development of the common good, but we should be cautious of individuals who opt to enact 
a ‘moral totalitarianism’ upon the masses,122 or that individual liberty could be suppressed in 
society ‘where every adult has an entitlement to a voice in government’.123 Mental freedom 
enables mankind ‘to attain the mental stature which they are capable of’,124 so that men ‘may 
not only have true opinions, but that they may also know the truth’.125 Packe notes that synthetic 
truths were the structure of On Liberty, a theme that ran throughout his life, where ‘every honest 
point of view achieved an aspect of the truth’.126 What Mill hoped for from this process was 
the establishment of a healthy society where opinions ‘have been reached by agreed, rational, 
self-evident reasoning’.127 
 
Thus far, positive paternalism appears to promote the type of individuality Mill wants us all to 
develop. The government or an individual interferes with another person in order to prevent 
them from harm as one of the many experiments of living conducted to promote character. Mill 
regards true education as ‘self-education’,128 which inadvertently requires the state to provide 
the means to do so. The formation of individual character through circumstance was 
indisputably sustained by the ‘unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual 
condition of mankind by education’.129 The state was not to interfere, but rather to govern 
institutions which would cater for the education of the individual, without exerting influence 
nor control over what they enriched themselves with.130 People are social beings and society 
is, at best, a mechanism for the protection of the individual. Intervention is used to prevent 
tyranny of the majority. Under positive liberty, coercion becomes necessary to ensure order 
and control within society and through positive paternalism, we see the enactment of policies 
promoting good character. 
 
                                                        
122 See Smith, ‘J. S. Mill on Freedom’, and ‘Social Liberty and Free Agency’. 
123 Gray, Liberalism, p. 56. 
124 CW 18, p. 243. 
125 Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’, p. 64. 
126 Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, p. 246. 
127 Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, p. 31. 
128 West, ‘Liberty and Education’. Mill opposed governments becoming a driving force in the education of 
individuals. Individuals must determine their own prospects as ‘it was a grave hindrance to their development to 
make the government responsible for their education’ (p. 130). 
129 CW 1, p. 111. 
130 See Raphael Cohen-Almagor, ‘Between Autonomy and State Regulation: J.S. Mill’s Elastic Paternalism’, pp. 
557-582. Mill’s elastic paternalism ‘stretches from prescribing compulsory education to very personal matters 
such as preventing unripe marriage, prescribing birth control and discouraging divorce by mutual consent’ (p. 
559). 
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From the beginnings of human society, men have, in some way or form, been coerced to fulfil 
their human desires. As individual development progresses, we start to see ‘the beginning of 
that education of the conscience of which the end is conviction that the only true good is to be 
good’.131 When responsibilities to another are neglected, such as in parental obligations to the 
well-being of their children, external influence must be enforced as children have a need to be 
‘protected against their own actions as well as against external injury’.132 However, enforcing 
positive paternalism is not solely the state’s responsibility. Mill’s vision of the common good 
demands that ‘parents meet their obligation to educate their children’.133 The parental 
obligation to the child’s development ensures that education and opinion is as diverse as 
possible for the child’s maturation. Failure to educate your children was violating a rule not to 
be a nuisance to others, as neglecting their education would subsequently harm the best 
interests of others.134 Where there is ‘strong evidence as to the nature of the person’s 
hypothetical unencumbered choice’,135 paternalism is thusly justified. 
 
Even those who oppose paternalism, such as Berlin and Nozick, admittedly accept that 
paternalistic intervention, when used in cases which concern exclusively children, can bring 
positive outcomes. Berlin goes further in conceding that few may actually possess the freedom 
to choose the most worthy action to themselves and others as a mature adult.136 In the interests 
of all, ‘society has the duty to raise the educational hurdles in order to minimise such failures 
of judgement’137 and to thwart civic decline. The enforcement of sanctions served a moral end. 
Where parents fail in enhancing their child’s rationality, coercion or ‘suasion’ becomes a 
                                                        
131 G. F. Barbour, ‘Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good’, p. 154. 
132 CW 18, p. 224. See further D. A. L. Thomas, ‘Rights, Consequences, and Mill on Liberty’, where it is 
suggested that we would have a better understanding of Mill’s principle of liberty if we read it in relation to 
rights-based interests, ruling out external control or acting in accordance with utility. 
133 Ryan, ‘Mill’s Essay On Liberty’, in Alan Ryan, ed. The Making of Modern Liberalism, p. 262.  
134 The most recent study of which is Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, which notes this area has been surprisingly 
neglected, further stating that a central aspect of On Liberty is ‘the duty one owes to support one’s children, and 
further, not to produce those who cannot be maintained’ (p. 174). See further Scarre, ‘Children and Paternalism’ 
who claims that ‘adults must impose a comprehensive ‘system of purpose’’ on children (p. 123). See also 
Francis Schrag, ‘The Child in the Moral Order’. 
135 John Hodson, ‘The Principle of Paternalism’, p. 69. See Arneson, ‘Mill Versus Paternalism’ for a pessimistic 
account of paternalism. Paternalism will never advance the interests of the intended in the immediate instance, 
nor will the consequences better themselves in the long-term perspective (pp. 481-82). 
136 See Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 19. Berlin implies that compulsion is also a form of education. 
Education does not necessarily reach its highest point at a child’s maturity as we ‘learn the greatest virtue of 
obedience to superior persons’ (p. 19). This is not always achieved through ascendency into adulthood nor 
achieved by some in the entirety of their lifetime. Compulsion is justified on the grounds that ignorance and 
barbarianism is worse for us than the restraint imposed to curtail their actions. Ignorance can surface at any age 
hence the justification for paternalism in children as well as any individual possessing ‘cramped and dwarfed’ 
natures (CW 18, p. 265). 
137 Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, p. 55. 
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necessity. Education provides the means in which you can secure your well-being and when 
‘parents fail to appreciate that part of education’,138 positive paternalism, or parentalism, 
becomes an eagerly anticipated outcome. 
 
Critiques and Inconsistencies 
 
Cowling delivered perhaps the most recent and notable critique of On Liberty. Whilst he 
conceded that ‘the libertarian character of the great body of Mill’s expressions’ cannot be 
mistaken, Cowling has suggested that Mill was pessimistic of collectivism, a false prophet of 
liberty and one who masked his ‘agitated plea for the supersession of one style of politics by 
another’139 cosily under his confident entreaty for liberty. Rees notes that progress was really 
only the work of a select few and Mill sought to ‘promote and safeguard the conditions for the 
distinctive activity of this elite in face of the growing power of the mediocre mass’.140 Liberty 
‘is primarily there to safeguard their aspirations and interests’,141 contrary to countless 
interpretations. An enlightened individual has a greater capacity to cultivate good habits, 
elevating society as well as themselves. Letwin’s study of Mill focuses attention on what 
Raeder has denoted as Mill’s plea for a ‘Religion of Humanity’,142 claiming that ‘on the surface, 
On Liberty is simply an ardent and persuasive argument for the most unhindered 
individualism’.143 Mill’s conception of a spirit of liberty calls for education to enable each 
individual to act upon their own desires, removing any ‘lingering theological and metaphysical 
beliefs’.144 Likewise, ‘Mill is committed to argument and persuasion, and not force and 
coercion’. Mill’s liberalism never denied that some are more able than others, but he did not 
believe that ‘these wiser and nobler men have the right to compel or coerce others’.145 Ten is 
correct to note that Mill’s conception of individual liberty is not compromised because of a 
                                                        
138 Kurer, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Welfare State’, pp. 724-725. Kurer notes that ‘parents thus have faulty 
preferences’ (p. 725). State paternalism is a necessity for educational development, particularly in children. 
139 Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, pp. 97, 76. 
140 Rees, ‘A Re-reading of Mill on Liberty’, p. 115. The elite ‘could provide standards of conduct and act as an 
example of virtuous living’ but were only ‘a means to the education of the non-elite’ and not a ‘guardian of 
morals’ (p. 88). 
141 Holthoon, The Road to Utopia, p. 23. ‘Individuality will directly benefit the few and only indirectly the 
multitude’ (p. 21). 
142 See Linda Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity for an account reinterpreting Mill’s 
contribution to liberalism. Mill’s attempt to subvert Christianity had with it a motive of introducing a religion 
built upon his philosophical writings calling for it to be led by a moral order, spiritually embodied in society 
and, progressively, the individual. 
143 Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, p. 297. 
144 Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity, p. 50. 
145 Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’, pp. 50, 51. 
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mere preference of personality. Cowling’s playing down of Mill’s desire for experiments of 
living, varieties of character and customs of different people coming together is actually ‘the 
chief ingredient of individual and social progress’. Liberty possesses value for ‘the more 
civilised portions of the species’146 whereas the rest require suasion. 
 
Mill’s attempt to ground his commitment to liberty in utility has faced much scrutiny where 
many have noted that his project was doomed to failure as ‘the circle cannot be squared’.147 
Even Mill was consistently disappointed by utilitarianism, which ‘could never be exhausted by 
complete attainment’148 and did not allow us to orchestrate our own fate. Mill’s one very simple 
principle ‘cannot be overridden by other claims’149 such as that of utility. Moreover, his defence 
of freedom goes beyond that which utilitarianism can accommodate.150 Arneson suggests that 
Mill rejects paternalism in the private sector but champions it in the public, as the principle of 
liberty really only applies to self-regarding acts. Distinguishing between the private and public 
sector may assist in ironing out the discrepancies which riddle Mill’s work, ‘an eclectic mixture 
of ill-assorted elements, which tend to disintegrate under any sustained critical pressure’.151 
Mill’s liberalism was ultimately shaped by the notion that he ‘wanted our lives to be free, but 
he also wanted them to be good’.152 Hamburger’s chief study153 bridges the gap between those 
who claim On Liberty defends wholly liberal ideals,154 and those who categorise him as an 
aristocratic liberal.155 Semmel observes that Mill was the victim of a divided mind between 
                                                        
146 CW 18, pp. 261, 217.  
147 Steven Wall, ‘Introduction’, in Steven Wall, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism, p. 13. 
148 CW 1, p. 136. 
149 Collini, ‘Liberalism and the Legacy of Mill’, p. 243. 
150 See Glyn Morgan, ‘The Mode and Limits of John Stuart Mill’s Toleration’. Whilst ‘Mill’s conception of 
liberty is inadequately defended in terms of “individuality,” it is important to locate an alternative stronger 
justification for liberty’ which she grounds in security, which Mill labels as our most vital interest (p. 150). 
151 Gray, ‘Mill on Liberty, Utility, and Rights’, p. 84. Gray further argues that in Mill’s works, there exists an 
‘inability of his theory of liberty to give definite answers to questions about the restriction of liberty’ and one 
which ‘derives, rather, from an area of evaluative disagreement’ over the incorporation of a criteria of harm in 
Mill’s principle of liberty (p. 93). See further John Kilcullen, ‘Mill on Duty and Liberty’ for an account of the 
inconclusive results in Mill’s defence of liberty, noting liberty is a principle of ‘‘small-l’ liberalism’ (p. 300). 
152 Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand, p. 6. 
153 See Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control. 
154 See in particular Brink, Mill’s Progressive Principles, which explores Mill’s contribution to liberty, rights, 
utilitarianism and equality. 
155 See Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, R. P. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill, Karl Britton, John Stuart 
Mill and Alan Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism for some of the leading critiques of On Liberty. See further 
Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals for a critique based upon legal moral intervention which questions the 
credibility of Mill’s principle of liberty. Devlin claims ‘the state must know right from wrong and impose its 
view of the right’ (p. 12). See pp. 102-123 in particular. See further Stephen who argues that criminal law 
‘affirms in a singularly emphatic manner a principle which is absolutely inconsistent with and contradictory to 
Mr. Mill’s’ (CW Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 108). 
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Bentham’s rigorous teaching of necessity in the principle of utility and a path of virtue aimed 
at enhancing the noble worth of individual character.156 Mill indeed appeared to be in two 
minds when human development and progress were concerned157 and placed emphasis upon 
attaining virtue where ‘our activities and attachments flow naturally from our being’ and are 
not imposed upon us ‘from the outside’.158 
 
Collini’s critique of Himmelfarb adds to discussion on inconsistent readings of Mill’s essay.159 
Mill’s principle of liberty is absolute and all other principles are subordinate to moral freedom. 
Capaldi notes that after demanding such freedoms in On Liberty, Mill most famously and 
‘persistently pursued libertarianism’ where On Liberty was ‘the clearest expression of the 
libertarian moral perspective’.160 Mill strongly defends liberal values but does not evade 
inconsistencies between his thoughts on utility and liberty.161 It was anything but a plea for 
hedonism where for Mill ‘progress would spring from the supersession of hedonism by 
altruism’162 and a selfless devotion to the good. Mill allowed liberty in self-regarding actions 
as without such liberty, ‘there can be no ‘individuality’’ for Mill’s ‘defence of freedom is not 
in terms of utility, but of ‘utility in the largest sense’, i.e. individuality’.163 
                                                        
156 See Semmel, The Pursuit of Virtue. Mill rejected the liberalism that made happiness the end goal and 
favoured virtue as that which individuals seek. See further John Rees, ‘The Thesis of the Two Mill’s’ for a chief 
study exploring Himmelfarb’s conflict between On Liberty and Mill’s other writings, leading her to conclude 
that if any of Mill’s works are inconsistent with On Liberty, they are the work of the ‘other Mill’. 
157 See, for instance, Richard Friedman, ‘A New Exploration of Mill’s Essay On Liberty’, where he claims, 
parallel with Semmel, that ‘Mill was torn between the version of utilitarianism he was taught to believe by 
James Mill and something more ‘idealistic’ (p. 282). 
158 Donner, The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 150. See CW 18, pp. 263-
265. Mill provides an example of the branches of a tree, which represent individual choices, axioms which 
promote freedom through the ability to choose from a multitude of options in our lives. Freedom of choice is not 
a singular option. 
159 See Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’, who is equally dubious of Himmelfarb’s account where he fails to see the point 
of the alleged contrast of Mill’s works. Whilst ‘there is every evidence of a continued belief in individual 
liberty’ (p. 55), that which permeates the essay On Liberty is uniquely a ‘manifestation of his fear of the tyranny 
of the majority’ (p. 55). Mill notes in his Autobiography, in reference to On Liberty, that ‘none of my writings 
have been either so carefully composed, or so sedulously corrected as this’ (CW 1, p. 249). Arneson however 
sees value in comparing Mill’s works (Representative Government with On Liberty) noting that the former 
permits paternalism whilst the latter assumes anti-paternalism. Mill is portrayed as a defender of liberal values, 
adding that the benefit for understanding Mill’s principle of liberty through a comparison is ‘to throw fresh light 
on its character’, (‘Democracy and Liberty in Mill’s theory of Government’, p. 43). This ought to be given more 
consideration in light of the ambiguous nature of Mill’s theory today. 
160 Capaldi, ‘The Libertarian Philosophy of John Stuart Mill’, pp. 8, 18. The force of Mill’s unique principle 
means that ‘there can be no unqualified adherence to laissez-faire or any other economic doctrine’ and that such 
cannot take precedence over his principle of liberty (p. 8). 
161 See Hardy Jones, ‘Mill’s Argument for the Principle of Utility’. This is a useful account as to how and why 
Mill failed to establish a consistent formula in reaching his conclusions concerning the principle of utility. 
162 Jones, Victorian Political Thought, p. 37. 
163 Ten, ‘Mill on Self-Regarding Actions’, p. 37. 
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Ideas in Context 
 
On Liberty deals with the problem of liberty and the nature and limits of power which can be 
legitimately exercised by society over an individual, yet the lack of attention given to Mill’s 
historical thought is quite surprising.164 There is vast literature on Mill yet there have been 
astonishingly few historically grounded studies of his ideas in context.165 This raises the 
question as to what procedures we should adopt when attempting to arrive at the chief argument 
of a text. Equally so, what do these conclusions mean for our understanding of the ideas 
discussed, in this instance, throughout On Liberty. Contextually speaking, Mill was motivated 
to write On Liberty by his despondency at the social, moral and political decay of Victorian 
England. On Liberty becomes problematic however for historians when an ahistorical approach 
is adopted by the majority of studies.166 Whilst the text had a great impact on philosophers and 
political theorists, Mill achieved more than simply writing ‘a kind of philosophic text-book of 
a single truth’.167 Berger explores the relationship of concepts in Mill’s oeuvre, noting that his 
motivation for understanding the philosophers of the past, and their subsequent use today, ‘is 
the light they can shed, the insights that can be gleaned from them, for present concerns’.168 
Yet philosophical studies of On Liberty disregard considerations of broader contextual 
concerns for these do not matter as much as the concept or idea being discussed. Such 
approaches have tended to dominate many studies of On Liberty, studies which do not directly 
relate his ideas to the social and political context, nor do they necessarily acknowledge the 
influences upon Mill, or dare categorise him as a reporter of the social and political problems 
rather than a philosopher of liberty. A greater consideration of the contextual factors will reveal 
much as to the nature of the present concern philosophers and political theorists look to debate. 
 
                                                        
164 See principally Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, for a reading of On Liberty in light of Mill’s commitment to a 
number of other contextual concerns, such as his ideas on Malthusianism, feminism and education. See further 
Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, for a chronological exploration of the development of ideas behind On Liberty. 
Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, draws upon the historical context, particularly religion, in 
support of his claims that Mill’s belief in the necessity of control is incompatible with liberal ideals. See further 
Rees, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. See Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism, pp. 143-278 for a biography 
of Mill’s idea of liberty, Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, Reeves, John Stuart 
Mill. 
165 For instance, see Georgios Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad. 
166 The majority of studies of On Liberty are directed from a philosophical framework with surprisingly few 
written with concern for the historical context. They are concerned with Mill’s problem solely in On Liberty and 
its application, see Gray, Mill on Liberty, which scrutinises the substance of Millian liberalism. See further 
Donner, The Liberal Self. 
167 CW 1, p. 259. 
168 Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom, p. 296. 
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Taken systematically, these approaches are useful in terms of how they engage with the 
arguments of On Liberty. Historical enquiries ought to be seriously employed further in order 
to assess how Mill arrived at the theory of liberty he wrote of in 1859, as well as expanding the 
visibility of the text to those not necessarily specialists of Mill’s ideas. Where philosophical 
studies fall short, we must ‘turn to the argumentative context of their occurrence to determine 
how exactly they connect with, or relate to, other utterances concerned with the same subject 
matter’.169 Once we’ve understood the context, we can hope to understand with greater 
accuracy what an individual said and what their interests were in saying it. Through 
reconstructing differing temporal structures of the past, we are able to convert these into 
principles for historical enquiry.170 On Liberty places itself firmly in contemporary political 
philosophy debates. The philosophical studies of On Liberty appear in legal as well as political 
debates concerning accounts on the relationship between the intervention of law and the impact 
this has upon individual morality. Mill’s contextual fixations had a huge impact on the 
development of his thought. Analytic philosophers, through their attempts to understand Mill, 
fail to engage with the material and personal contexts of thinkers, where Mill is no exception. 
Whilst I do not aim to undermine this work, the need for further historical scholarship 
understanding how these terms developed is vital. This thesis chronologically traces Mill’s 
works from 1831 to 1900 to ascertain the theory of liberty Mill was exposed to before writing 
On Liberty as well as what happened after it was published. 
 
Very briefly, how have a handful of tailored readings summarised Mill’s theory of liberty? In 
the 1960s and 1970s, discussions on Mill’s earlier works were often sceptical that he 
maintained the same theory of liberty throughout his life. Whilst at one stage, Mill strongly 
approved ‘of Comte’s insistence that the improvement of society was contingent upon the 
moral and intellectual advancement of the people’,171 Robson suggested that as Mill grew 
older, he rejected much of the philosophy which previously appealed to him in the 1820s and 
early 1830s. He came to feel that it was not only unsatisfactory but dangerous. Whilst Mill 
maintained that society is to be scientifically reordered, Mill felt that this should be based upon 
‘a moral and intellectual revolution which in turn depends on freedom’,172 rather than based 
                                                        
169 See Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, which attacks philosophers who 
repeatedly ask the same question and fail to take into account the importance of the historical context, (p. 116). 
170 See Hartmut Lehmann, and Melvin Richter, The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts, where it is 
further noted that older concepts, such as democracy, freedom and even liberty, ‘denoted a new future-oriented 
perspective, that is, they become concepts in motion’ and are not stationary ideas as philosophers assume (p. 5). 
171 John Ellery, John Stuart Mill, p. 51. 
172 Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, p. 103. 
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upon a model proposed by Comte or the Saint-Simonians. Ryan insisted though that we must 
remember the major elements throughout Mill’s writings, stretching from his earlier works 
through to On Liberty, most of which preserve his concern for ‘diversity, spontaneity, and 
individuality’.173 Yet Ryan too concedes that part of his criticism of Bentham and other 
intellectuals was because they failed to mention any of the elements which for Mill are the ends 
of life, traits we must safeguard by giving people the space to experiment. 
 
By the 1980s, commentators had warmed to the idea that Mill’s theory of liberty never 
drastically changed. Gray noted that ‘there can be no doubt that Mill saw the argument from 
his earlier works through to On Liberty as ‘continuous with his project for a progressive theory 
of morality in which a revisable moral code is grounded in corrigible scientific theory’.174 
Semmel added that ‘there was an intimate articulation between the three great problems of 
social metaphysics – those of free will and determinism, virtue and happiness, and of order and 
progress – and his solutions to them, an interconnection that gave a decided shape and direction 
to his ideas, and formed not so much a system as a faith’.175 For Anschutz, it was as early as 
the 1830s where Mill established his fixed theory of liberty that he would work on his entire 
life. Mill’s project, unlike other thinkers, whose proposed reforms were ‘not only impossible, 
but if possible, would be bad, this plan, if it could be realized, would be good’.176 After all, 
‘much of what is most passionately felt in Mill’s political philosophy is threaded on this strand 
– the idea of a society of human beings fully and variously developed, morally vigorous, self-
determining’.177 
 
Himmelfarb has argued that Mill ‘looked to liberty as a means of achieving the highest reaches 
of the human spirit; he did not take seriously enough the possibility that men would also be 
free to explore the depths of depravity’178 and this is where a number of criticisms emerge upon 
the reception of On Liberty in 1859. Since the 1830s Mill held an optimistic view of the 
prospect of human development and this belief would remain with him for the rest of his life. 
Hamburger has discussed how Mill had a clear and relatively fixed agenda when it came to his 
theory of liberty. As suggested in this chapter, Mill had a number of attitudes which contributed 
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175 Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue, p. 187. 
176 Anschutz, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, pp. 51-52. 
177 Skorupski, John Stuart Mill, p. 338. 
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 31 
towards this theory and differing elements surface in his six earlier publications. Hamburger 
noted that we must read On Liberty ‘in light of Mill’s overarching purpose of bringing about 
moral regeneration’179 for this is what unites his works. Going back as far as Mill’s connections 
with the Saint-Simonians, we must consider Urbinati’s claim that Mill always maintained that 
individuals should be free from slavery and that greater opportunities to express your liberty 
be available to everyone.180 More recently, Claeys has added that the leading influence on his 
writing and intellectual maturity was his meeting with Harriet Taylor in the 1830s.181 As will 
be discussed later in this thesis, this encounter would have significant bearings upon readings 
of On Liberty in the 1890s. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This brief discussion underlines a number of divisions and lack of agreement in understanding 
Mill’s chief concern in On Liberty. Reading On Liberty as promoting positive or negative 
liberty strongly directs currents of interpretation. To read the text as one upholding positive 
liberty, it must fulfil a criterion of responsibly promoting social goods for all whilst also 
permitting state intervention in areas which promote the common good, such as social or 
political policy reform. A negative reading demands the absence of restraints upon the freedom 
of the individual. Moreover, ensuring that they are not hindered in any way so that they can 
have the avenue to freedom of religion, speech and action.  
 
Even so, the sheer number of ambiguous readings of On Liberty have made it difficult to assert 
which strand of liberty Mill saw as being more beneficial to social progress. With this in mind, 
the absence of a reception history of On Liberty in the nineteenth-century could not be more 
vital in current literature to establish how Mill’s text has been interpreted since its publication. 
Reading Mill before On Liberty demonstrates the flexibility with which Mill used the term 
liberty. Whilst this complicates the task of ascertaining what Mill meant when he used this 
term, it crucially shows how it meant considerably more for Mill than what many accounts 
presume. 
 
 
                                                        
179 Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, p. xi. 
180 Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, pp. 190-191. 
181 See Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, pp. 34-42 for a discussion on Taylor’s influence. Claeys noted that ‘few 
relationships have been so productive both of fruitful ideas and of painful controversy’, p. 34. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Reading Mill before On Liberty: Early Writings 1831-1859 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It was argued in the previous chapter that Mill’s theory of liberty is much more inconsistent 
and ambiguous than typically understood. Many studies stress the value that Mill places upon 
individuality, whilst other readings claim that Mill advocated a much more authoritarian form 
of governance, entrusting only the most cultivated minds to guide the majority. This chapter 
will explore Mill’s writings in the decades prior to On Liberty and the theories of liberty he 
engaged with before 1859. The writings considered in this chapter are broken down into earlier 
and later publications. Earlier publications include ‘The Spirit of the Age’ (1831), ‘On Genius’ 
(1832), ‘Bentham’ (1838), ‘Coleridge’ (1840). The later publications include the System of 
Logic and the Principles of Political Economy (hereafter the Principles) where the differing 
editions will be acknowledged where appropriate in order to evaluate the theory of liberty 
which Mill was working with at the time. Most treatments of On Liberty have inadequately 
evaluated Mill’s theory of liberty in his earlier writings and how his critics responded to this. 
The central focus of this chapter therefore is to consider a range of reactions to Mill’s earlier 
publications to understand the theory of liberty Mill was working with leading up to 1859. 
 
Mill covered a wide range of thoughts in these six publications. What united these theories was 
his concern over a society which was growing increasingly intolerant and divided. Mill’s theory 
of liberty was therefore dependent upon change in thought and opinion and this could only 
come through a renovation of beliefs. Using brief examples to further illustrate this, consider 
‘The Spirit of the Age’, an essay wholly critical of the condition of England, which Mill wrote 
to ‘point out in the character of the present age, the anomalies and evils characteristic of the 
transition from a system of opinions which had worn out, to another only in the process of 
being formed’ despite conceding that his discussion was ill-timed. In ‘On Genius’, Mill 
highlighted a defect in our mental training. The remedy of which can be found ‘in the distinct 
recognition, that the end of education is not to teach, but to fit the mind for learning from its 
own consciousness and observation’.182 The essays on ‘Bentham’ and ‘Coleridge’ 
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demonstrated the transition into an age where people led the way by opinion. All were indebted 
to Bentham and Coleridge for initiating a revolution in the ‘general modes of thought and 
investigation’.183 The System of Logic was Mill’s attempt to scientifically ground this theory 
of liberty, noting that ‘logic, then, comprises the science of reasoning, as well as an art, founded 
on that science’,184 the art of reasoning cultivates the individual. The Principles lastly 
reinforced this theory as Mill felt that the cultivation of mental faculties was dependent upon 
competition, warning that ‘to be protected against competition is to be protected in idleness, in 
mental dulness; to be saved the necessity of being as active and as intelligent as other 
people’.185 Without an active and engaged society, the threat of stagnation would increase and 
Mill had demonstrated in six seemingly contrasting works that this theory could be applied to 
all aspects of communal life. 
 
The primary and secondary material often reach different conclusions as to what influenced 
Mill’s earlier thoughts and if this changed, where this occurred. Mill noted that his mental crisis 
opened him to new influences.186 His re-evaluation of utilitarianism (adopted by his father and 
Bentham) led him to conclude that individuals must develop their own characters, thoughts and 
feelings above everything else.187 ‘Individuality’ therefore would resurface in a number of his 
works, forming a key component in his theory of liberty.188 But this does not mean he was 
strictly an individualist. Mill conceded in his Autobiography that he was convinced ‘that no 
great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a change takes place in the 
fundamental constitution of their modes of thought’.189 Mill’s theory of liberty in these six 
publications would be framed around this central premise but there are also variations and this 
will be addressed in this chapter.  
 
The four earlier writings which will be discussed in this section include ‘The Spirit of the Age’ 
(1831), ‘On Genius’ (1832), ‘Bentham’ (1838) and ‘Coleridge’ (1840). The later writings 
                                                        
183 CW 10, p. 77. 
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185 CW 3, pp. 794-795. 
186 For Mill’s discussion on his mental crisis, see CW 1, pp. 137-192. 
187 Durham noted that Mill’s grievance was that ‘Bentham’s mind was not representative of universal human 
nature’. Accordingly, Bentham was wrong for ‘his analysis did not include enough of the elements of life’. See 
Durham, ‘The Influence of John Stuart Mill’s Mental Crisis on His Thoughts’, p. 380. 
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include the Principles and the System of Logic. These essays and publications from the 1830s 
and 1840s outline the backdrop for Mill’s theory of liberty prior to 1859. Moreover, reading 
the immediate response to Mill in the newspapers and periodicals reinforces why we must be 
thoughtful when reading Mill in light of the historical context. As these reviews will 
demonstrate, we can read these publications in a number of ways and conclude conflicting 
understandings, ultimately revealing how controversial Mill was. 
 
In 1831, Mill wrote ‘The Spirit of the Age’. Here, Mill maintained that cultivated minds are 
the most adequate to lead society collectively forwards; commentators noted the need for 
universal equality, irrespective of class, gender or intellectual ability. By 1832, Mill had written 
‘On Genius’, an essay which explored cultural avenues as a means to express thoughts on 
liberty. ‘On Genius’ was the clearest articulation of the cultural divide that existed in England. 
After a brief period of six years, Mill wrote his two works on what he describes as ‘the two 
great seminal minds of England in their age’.190 The essays on ‘Bentham’ and ‘Coleridge’ 
explored those who influenced Mill’s utilitarian ideas as well as his broader thoughts on ethics 
and religion in society.191 By the 1840s, Mill had written the System of Logic and the Principles, 
two texts which discussed the issue of working class labour, wages and the organisation of 
industry. Emphatically defending worker’s rights, the Principles extended beyond addressing 
just economic concerns to inviting discussion from Mill’s readers on the urgent need to 
improve working conditions throughout society. 
 
EARLIER ESSAYS 
‘THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE’ 1831 
 
In 1825, William Hazlitt wrote The Spirit of the Age.192 A collection of eighteen essays, 
Hazlitt’s work explored the leading representatives of movements in thought and politics 
during his time. Just six years later in January 1831, Mill anonymously published the first of 
five articles, under the same title as Hazlitt’s work, all of which appeared in the weekly radical 
newspaper, The Examiner.193 Mill disclosed his social anxieties and his desire to move England 
                                                        
190 Westminster Review, Aug 1838, no 2, p. 468. 
191 CW 10, p. v. 
192 William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age. 
193 Also known as Political Examiner, The Examiner was a leading intellectual newspaper expounding radical 
principles. These articles appeared on the 9 and 23 Jan, 6 Feb and 13 Mar in two parts, 3 Apr and the 15 and 29 
May, again in two parts and all were published in 1831. Packe noted that ‘The Spirit of the Age’ expressed ‘his 
full adherence to the Comtist-Saint-Simonian philosophy of history’ addressing the dire condition of England, 
 35 
forwards to a better and more prosperous future, one which would be inclusive of all needs. 
Mill wrote to ‘persuade Englishmen to vote on the side of history’194 if they sought to avoid 
the consequences of almost certain revolution. For Mill, the defining feature of the age was 
one which was made up of a character which thwarted the march of intellect and his 
observations of Europe only added to this sentiment. These anonymous publications claimed 
that society was ‘pregnant with change’ and approaching a time where there would be a 
revolution in ‘the whole constitution of human society’.195 England needed to further its march 
of historical progress. Society was demonstrating the early signs of naturally bonding together 
in what Mill understood as distributing interests of the collective rather than individualism.196 
This is one of the first instances where we see clearly Mill’s theory of liberty as outlined earlier 
in this chapter. 
 
The greatest contributors to society were those who had ‘knowledge adequate to the formation 
of sound opinions’. England was in a state of ‘convalescence’197 and in need of well-informed 
individuals to drive the majority in the right direction. Writing favourably of Mill’s essay, the 
Morning Advertiser, a non-partisan newspaper, pointed out that ‘the character of the present 
age and the challenges this faces’198 requires greater investment from individuals. This plea for 
public expression of opinions and freedom set up much of Mill’s focus for the rest of his life. 
Mill reinforced his ideas for an improved society on the condition that no Whig nor Tory could 
command through personal authority, as ‘the young do not respect the elderly and where the 
poor do not respect the rich’. The Examiner added that ‘if the multitude of one age are nearer 
to the truth than the multitude of another, it is only in so far as they are guided and influenced 
                                                        
where ‘it was not hard to show the babble of voices, disunity, and lack of a firm faith characteristic of a dying 
critical epoch’. See Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, p. 98. 
194 CW 12, p. lii. See The Examiner, 9 Jan 1831. Mill noted that mankind are divided ‘into the men of the 
present age, and the men of the past’, p. 20. For the former, the spirit of the age ‘is a subject of exultation; to the 
latter, of terror; to both, of eager and anxious interest’, p. 20. Mill’s great concern is whether people understand 
their own age. Mill writes, ‘a knowledge of our own age is the fountain of prophecy – the only key to the history 
of posterity’, p. 20. We have a duty to influence the present age, specifically commenting on Robert Southey, 
Colloquies on the Progress and Prospects of Society as the ‘gloomiest book ever written’, p. 20. Southey was 
impatient for reform in his youth, criticising the condition of towns across England and promoting universal 
education, whilst shifting towards conservatism in his later years. 
195 The Examiner, 9 Jan 1831, p. 20. We have outgrown this age, ‘just as the same jacket which fit a man at six 
will not fit him at six-and-twenty’, p. 20. Almost every other nation has achieved a change in form of ruling 
government, ‘indications which tell of a more vital and radical change’, p. 20. 
196 See for instance Himmelfarb, The Spirit of the Age: Victorian Essays, particularly p. 51. 
197 The Examiner, 9 Jan 1831 p. 21. 
198 See Morning Advertiser, 12 Oct 1831, p. 3, which claims that politics is used to advance your status and 
quality of life further, such is ‘the obvious character of the Tories’. Mill encourages society to notice these 
differences in character so that they may trust the morally good and knowledgeable to lead the majority. 
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by the authority of the wisest among them’.199 It would be incorrect however to read this as 
illiberal, for this would be one of the reasons as to why Mill would later reject Bentham. 
Bentham’s theory of liberty was nowhere near as inclusive as Mill’s. 
 
‘The Spirit of the Age’ had shown itself to be an open but anonymous example of some of 
Mill’s earliest thoughts on liberty. Mill’s observations of other nations living in greater liberty 
led him to call for a society where ‘the uninstructed have faith in the instructed’.200 Mill claimed 
that men of the past adhered to the ‘blind guide’201 but people ought to be encouraged to form 
their own opinions. It becomes ‘one of the necessary conditions of humanity, that the majority 
must either have wrong opinions, or no fixed opinions, or must place the degree of reliance 
warranted by reason, in the authority of those who have made moral and social philosophy 
their peculiar study’. Whilst we ought to understand our own interests and duties first, Mill 
maintains that ‘reason itself will teach most men that they must, in the last resort, fall back 
upon the authority of still more cultivated minds’.202 From his earlier writings, Mill had shown 
his enthusiasm for people helping others in order to improve society and placed this 
responsibility upon the shoulders of more cultivated minds so that all could develop a sense of 
self-culture. 
 
As early as 1831, Mill felt that England required authority to fix opinions and form feelings.203 
Writing in The Examiner, Mill noted that ‘society, fortunately, has not so frequent need to 
unlearn, as to learn’,204 condemning aspects of society which exclude ‘the possibility of 
                                                        
199 The Examiner, 9 Jan 1831 pp. 20-21. Mill noted in a later article that the age of transition for the physical 
sciences has already passed, as with the great men of the sciences, ‘the methods by which they are cultivated so 
entirely preclude the possibility of material error when due pains are taken to arrive at the truth’, The Examiner, 
23 Jan 1831, p. 51. Whilst the sciences have a different nature of evidence to that of liberty and the social 
condition of man, Mill stresses they are connected systems of truth. The truths of political economy, however, 
‘may be brought down to the level of even the uninformed multitude, with the most complete success’, The 
Examiner, 23 Jan 1831, p. 51. Some ages are easier to achieve than others, where liberty and the social 
condition of man is perhaps the furthest away natural state. 
200 The Examiner, 23 Jan 1831, p. 50. 
201 See The Examiner, 13 Mar 1831, particularly p. 162 for a discussion on how the wealthy have had 
considerably easier and more available means to educate themselves more than other classes. Knowledge has 
always been in the reach of the upper class, yet it is this standard of knowledge which qualifies them to manage 
the affairs of his country. 
202 The Examiner, 23 Jan 1831, p. 52. 
203 The Examiner, 6 Feb 1831, p. 82. Mill’s preference for authority to rest in a cultivated character is something 
which most readers highlighted. A moral and social revolution must replace worldly powers with the most 
competent of judges, to push the boundaries of the capabilities of human nature, where Mill refers to the Greeks 
and their ruling of offices conducted by judges and gentlemen to administer the best ideas of their age, pp. 82-
83. 
204 The Examiner, 3 Ap 1831, p. 211. 
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material conflict of opinion among its teachers’.205 The maturity of Mill’s theory of liberty can 
be noted in how he distanced himself from the philosophic radicals who had claimed through 
Bentham that it was tyrannical to take an interest in someone else’s life. The need to develop 
our own opinions was fundamentally important. Mill had demonstrated little in favour of the 
wealthy, rule by such individuals was ‘the government of an irresponsible few; it therefore 
swarmed with abuses’ and such interests ‘naturally and properly engross every mind’.206 Many 
responses to Mill’s essay equally reflect thoughts of those troubled by the condition of England 
and Mill had given them a recipe to prevent disaster.207 
 
People could come to terms with the fears Mill had and by 1831, social bodies had established 
organisations that mobilised themselves around a focus of reforming society by encouraging 
greater liberty of thought and discussion.208 One of the great defenders of Mill’s essay came 
from the Poor Man’s Guardian, a radical weekly newspaper and passionate advocate of the 
rights of the working class. They encouraged greater opportunity for them to articulate their 
thoughts, freely and fairly, dismissing suggestions that Mill was not inclusive. Mill had 
arguably done more for the working class than most before him. The Poor Man’s Guardian 
notably endorsed ‘The Manchester and Salford Political Union of the Working Classes’ during 
the 1830s, advancing a movement focusing upon freedom of discussion. Additionally, they 
organised public speeches, where they sought to remind all of the problems affecting entire 
communities,209 mirroring Mill’s call for greater dialogue. 
 
Accordingly, the Poor Man’s Guardian noted that Mill’s essay added legitimacy to action ‘for 
the purpose of taking into consideration the propriety of petitioning the House of Commons to 
put a stop to prosecutions for theological and political opinions’.210 A movement which would 
resist oppression ‘until the working classes have an equal share in making the laws which 
                                                        
205 The Examiner, 15 May 1831, p. 307. Mill provides the example of the ‘Hindoos’ and ‘Turks’ in the modern 
age and ‘Christendom’ in the Middle Ages, where terror or religion is worse than aristocratic ascendancy. 
206 The Examiner, 29 May 1831, pp. 340, 341. 
207 In particular, see Poor Man’s Guardian, which called for management of state affairs to be distributed 
evenly. Contrary to the articles published anonymously in The Examiner, Poor Man’s Guardian called for 
equality for all, irrespective of intellect or class, dismissing any idea that some are naturally more inclined to 
lead than others. 
208 For instance, the Chartist movement, alongside the Reform Act (1832), Poor Law Amendment (1834), Whig 
legislation enacted in support of the working class and the London Working Men’s Association (1836). 
209 See the Poor Man’s Guardian, 27 Aug 1831, p. 61. These speeches and public events were met ‘with 
rapturous applause’, reflecting the speed in which social mobilisation was unfolding at the same time as the 
publication of Mill’s earlier essays. 
210 Poor Man’s Guardian, 17 Sep 1831, p. 84. 
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govern the lands’, the Poor Man’s Guardian utilised Mill’s ideas to raise awareness of the ‘den 
of thieves’ in Westminster. Money could not buy cultivated minds. By 1831, the Poor Man’s 
Guardian purposely targeted Lord Howick for ‘acting upon the atrocious principles of 
Malthus’, signifying a pivotal moment when the working class openly questioned the ability 
of government to increase liberty. The defiant attitude of the working class would persevere 
for as long as the number of ‘odious monopolies’211 of the government continued. Crucially, 
this unwraps the complex nature of ideas on liberty and freedom which Mill explored in ‘The 
Spirit of the Age’. The individual was fundamentally important to collective progress and the 
tyrannising of government ministers over the working class was detrimental to everyone. 
 
We have seen how collective progress sat at the centre of Mill’s theory of liberty in ‘The Spirit 
of the Age’. The politically radical Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register claimed that the band 
of oligarchs that oversee everyday life are those that have ‘waged war against the liberties and 
rights of man in almost every corner of the world’ seeking to ruin ‘every man who dared to 
raise his voice in opposition to theirs’.212 This failure of society to unite deeply frustrated Mill. 
Many of the working-class attitudes in the period were in fact developing Mill’s discussion 
from ‘The Spirit of the Age’. Even if they dismissed him as a result, they had used parts of his 
essay to develop their own discussion. Even then, few disagreed with Mill that the more 
involved the individual is, the more likely it is that they have an incentive to work in unison 
with one another. 
 
Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register had already warned of a tyrannous and oppressive ruler, 
reinforcing the need for restraints upon the power they can expel yet it seems that many missed 
the collective aspect of Mill’s essay. The Poor Man’s Guardian noted that Mill failed to speak 
to ‘the industrious millions and the friends of liberty and justice’.213 Cobbett’s Weekly Political 
Register further wrote that people ‘are no longer deluded by the foolish nonsense of Whig and 
                                                        
211 Poor Man’s Guardian, 27 Aug 1831, p. 62. Lord Howick (Charles Grey) was British Prime Minister from 
1830–1834. He is accredited with initiating the Reform Act of 1832, restricting child employment and 
abolishing slavery in the British Empire. The Poor Man’s Guardian would go on to attack Malthus, a man who 
inspired Mill, on the basis of property rights, labour and population control. On monopolies, this argument was 
put forward by Henry Hetherington, publisher of the Poor Man’s Guardian in 1831, where he lists a few such as 
education, the church and the corn laws. Mr Sutcliffe, a leading speaker for these meetings targeted the 
management of the East India monopoly in the same article. Mill, following his father’s footsteps, worked at the 
East India Company from 1823–1858. 
212 Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, 24 Dec 1831, p. 792. William Cobbett is credited with being an ‘able 
and determined’ figure in opposition to those oligarchs, the Whigs and Tories, who continue to suppress the 
liberties of the majority within society, p. 792. 
213 Poor Man’s Guardian, 25 Dec 1831, p. 223. 
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Tory, but are inclined to manage their own affairs themselves’ in order to restore England to 
the status of a ‘happy Republic’.214 Mill did not discourage people from developing their own 
character and this is an incorrect reading of his essay. From the early 1830s, Mill was concerned 
with intellectual stagnation, more so after hearing of events in Europe. For Mill, it was the art 
of combining which was crucial. 
 
These responses to Mill’s essay stressed a desire to expand the opportunity for people to 
influence and create legislation. The Examiner pointed out that discussion on reform ‘now 
forces itself upon the most inobservant’215 and that ‘there must be a moral and social 
revolution’.216 The Dublin Morning Register, a daily liberal newspaper, applauded ‘the new 
lights which the struggle for liberty of speech and freedom of thought have thrown over the 
field of politics’.217 The liberty of the press ‘was an unalienable right, which could not, under 
any pretext, be wrested’. The Poor Man’s Guardian had stated that ‘all the recent attempts to 
cripple the press are at variance with the true principle of liberty’.218 Without greater 
preservation of this freedom, the working class would never have an output for their thoughts 
and opinions.219 Mill’s essay had enlightened, educated and agitated the working class, for it 
provided them with an avenue to express themselves which was previously unheard of. 
Ultimately, it was ‘cheap’ knowledge, accessible and central for change.220 
 
‘ON GENIUS’ 1832 
 
‘On Genius’ appeared in quick succession after ‘The Spirit of the Age’. It was written 
anonymously and published in the Monthly Repository, a radical unitarian periodical.221 Mill 
                                                        
214 Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register, 24 Dec 1831, p. 794. 
215 The Examiner, 9 Jan 1831, p. 20. 
216 The Examiner, 23 Jan 1831, p. 52. 
217 Dublin Morning Register, 11 Jan 1837, p. 2. 
218 Poor Man’s Guardian, 27 Aug 1831, p. 62. 
219 Liberty for the working class was so vital to their subsistence, it was ‘like the air we breathe, and without 
which we die’. See the Manchester Guardian, 1 June 1822, p. 4. This was yelled out at a Westminster reform 
dinner where the liberty of the press was stressed as their only support during this time of change.  
220 An article of 17 Sep 1831 published in the Poor Man’s Guardian strongly argued for liberty of the press and 
was critical of those who had been imprisoned or punished for writing articles expressing the injustice people 
suffer. The article further wrote that they have been charged with ‘the glorious and immortalizing offence of 
giving what the people loudly demand, viz.: Cheap Knowledge’ and those who pursue this are ‘injured for the 
cause of liberty’, p. 84. 
221 See Monthly Repository, Oct 1832, no. 70, p. 649. This was a radical Unitarian monthly periodical, which 
wrote on education reform, extension of the suffrage and the removal of monopolies (Mill felt these were 
particularly disastrous to progress). Mill signed this article as ‘Antiquus’, meaning old or ancient, referencing 
the age of transition unfolding in England as discussed in his newspaper articles of 1831. 
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maintained that society thwarted the development of genius, claiming that an original thinker 
is ‘a man of genius’222 where ‘Originality says Genius’.223 Crucially however, genius was not 
out of reach for all, where ‘by the aid of suitable culture all might possess it’224 if we develop 
it within our own persons first. Yet Mill’s preference for a particular type of character could 
not be underestimated. Men of genius were rare, essential for positive change and vital for 
progress. Whilst it was inclusive of Mill to suggest anyone can develop a character of genius, 
without the appropriate conditions, many would fall short. What is crucial here is that more 
people needed to be given the opportunity to develop their originality. This is something which 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Mill wrote that ‘none of the controversies which fill the present age with flame and fury is 
comparable in interest.’ The most valuable part of our daily conduct ‘is the spirit in which they 
are done’. Genius is the faculty of thought itself, yet new truths do not infer philosophic genius 
any more than the action of discovering them as this is the only way to know something. We 
can know of something by being told of it by another individual, a manufactured truth. 
However, for us to know it we must put our mind in the state where the truth was found and 
verify it, that which Mill insists ‘by my own observation, or by interrogating my own 
consciousness’.225 Truths that we have been told are less important to know as ‘it requires less 
hardihood to attempt to do what somebody has done before’. This is a true exercise of the 
genius Mill refers to. The urge to act differently to discover on one’s own nurtures the energetic 
and vivacious character Mill sought, demonstrating parallels with his discussion in ‘The Spirit 
of the Age’. 
 
We have seen how Mill thought that reliance upon another individual or wider society would 
not spark originality, echoing the need for individual as opposed to social thinkers to diffuse 
                                                        
222 CW 1, p. 332. See Monthly Repository, Oct 1832, no 70, pp. 651-652 where Mill notes that ‘genius be no 
particular mental power, but only mental power possessed in a peculiar degree’. 
223 CW 1, p. 332. Packe emphasises how this essay was a plea for originality, one which looked back to 
Athenian democracy for ‘the Greeks, he said, considered wisdom not as a private luxury to be indulged in a 
select salon or in a precious cloister, but as a quality essential to success, a practical weapon of daily life 
available to all’. See Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, p. 133. Once this was available to all, then beliefs and 
opinions could be refined, underlying the equality element existent in Mill’s theory of liberty. 
224 Monthly Repository, Oct 1832, no 70, p. 654. 
225 CW 1, pp. 339, 329, 650-651. Mill seems to be encouraging a selfish way of enhancing genius rather than 
helping those who may need it by increasing their ability to become men of genius. We can read liberty in this 
regard negatively (perhaps also ignorant of those who may get left behind), for if they cannot better themselves, 
then there is little that can be done. Mill had conceded that most of the work conducted by man is ‘little better 
than trivial and contemptible’ (p. 329) and that men of genius are trusted with the responsibility of discovering 
new truths for the betterment of all and then diffusing this knowledge across society. 
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across society to prevent a march of intellect led by ‘the united efforts of a constantly increasing 
multitude of dwarfs’. After all, the exercise of the higher faculties is that which generates 
originality.226 Mill noted that there are few men of genius because ‘things have only been taught 
and learnt, but have not been known’. Truths should serve their purpose, to help individuals 
‘form to himself an intellect fitted to seek truth for itself and to find it’. 
 
By 1832, Mill’s growing concern over intellectual stagnation had resulted in his essay ‘On 
Genius’. An age where the spirit does not pervade the mind, one where ‘modern education is 
all cram’ with no room for impartial inquiry. Society has become ‘content to copy’ rather than 
to challenge and discover our own truths. In light of this, responses called for changes in the 
way society conducts itself, to ‘let the feelings of society cease to stigmatize independent 
thinking, and divide its censure between a lazy dereliction of the duty and privilege of thought’. 
We have a duty to strive for genius, which Mill calls for us to realize ‘in our own persons’ first, 
independently and without interference.227 
 
Bell’s New Weekly Messenger, a conservative newspaper, wrote enthusiastically of the 
progress made in literary publications. Literature was commended for ‘breaking down on all 
sides the banks of prejudice and superstition, and threatening the very topmost heights of 
Privilege, Exclusion and Despotism’. Mill’s essay had an immediate impact which encouraged 
people to act upon their own interests and desires whereby literature became a powerful means 
of developing characters of genius. It is noted that whilst we do not have a second Newton or 
Shakespeare, ‘we have innumerable lofty and exquisite imaginations’ of which ‘a host of 
newspapers, magazines and pamphlets’228 are duly responsible. Exploring the movements in 
                                                        
226 Monthly Repository, Oct 1832, no 70, pp. 650-653. See further Mill’s comments in this article concerning the 
mountain climber at Mount Blanc who uses the same muscles as the man who climbed before him. Whilst we 
can be encouraged to do as man did before us, this requires less exertion as we know what to do from previous 
experiences and are not discovering alternative ways to further knowledge and understanding. Mill suggests that 
conceptive genius is of an even higher faculty than creative genius. Mill notes that self-observation is 
imagination and the extraction of knowledge of truths from our consciousness may require analysis and 
induction, both of which are indicative of originality and a thinker of genius, applauding Newton and Locke as 
specific examples from history. 
227 See Monthly Repository, Oct 1832, no 70, pp. 650-659. Referred to as ‘mental gymnastics, eminently 
conducive to acuteness in detecting fallacies’, p. 656. These were all preparations for an active individual life. 
This education ‘formed men’ p. 657. Mill claimed that Christianity interfered in the development of man and 
brought in an age where ‘the doctrines and precepts of Scripture began to be studied’ and because of this, the 
spirit of individuals declined as people no longer conversed nor challenged one another. See Claeys, Mill and 
Paternalism, where it is suggested that ‘legislative action for collective self-improvement – of a non-coercive 
type, justified by Mill on loosely utilitarian grounds, that it was better to work nine hours than ten per day’, p. 
65. Clarification of the concept of interference would be crucial here. 
228 See Bell’s New Weekly Messenger, 1 Jan 1832, p. 1. 
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society in 1832, we can identify how essential literature was in shaping individual 
consciousness. Mill’s theory of liberty in his earlier essays had been instrumental in this. They 
had both emphasised the need for greater dialogue and freedom to develop individuality in 
order to help the collective and provided people with the opportunity and responsibility to do 
this. 
 
Echoing these lines of literature-based radicalism, theatrical productions are an additional 
means where social and political movements develop and gain momentum. The conservative 
Evening Mail noted that productions in 1832 portrayed the key character as a ‘good genius’, 
who turns evil into good and converts men who display folly to perform positive changes in 
society.229 The Morning Advertiser noted further that promoting the interest of the stage will 
help the community, ‘but no encouragement can raise the stage from its present degraded state 
while the system of exclusion is suffered to prevail’. These are two clear examples of 
absorption of Mill’s theory of liberty. In order to help the stage ‘quickly recover from the 
wretched condition to which it has been reduced by those who have had a patent to quack it’,230 
there must be universal encouragement for the growth of genius more than what is at present, 
‘dispersed through a thousand minds, scattered through ten thousand channels’. The 
similarities between what Mill had discussed and his reception are staggering. The support he 
received added momentum to this movement of social and political progress. 
 
We have seen how involved commentators were in discussing their own theory of liberty upon 
reading Mill’s first two essays. Alongside direct reference to ‘On Genius’, Bell’s New Weekly 
Messenger advertised a production entitled ‘The World turned upside down’, a dialogue 
concerned with ‘the necessity of “reform” on the sublunary planet’. One of the characters is 
called the ‘Genius of Reform’ and intervenes during the play to send people to ‘reform the 
world and themselves’.231 Genius was an integral tool in reforming society and rather than 
being associated with selfishness, it encouraged those with desires and passions to act upon 
them. The level of engagement with Mill’s discussion was astounding, not just in print but on 
the stage too, his readership echoed the same pledges he made in his earlier essays. Moreover, 
                                                        
229 See Evening Mail, 2 Jan 1832, p. 1. 
230 Morning Advertiser, 7 Jan 1832, p. 1. 
231 Bell’s New Weekly Messenger, 1 Jan 1832, pp. 1, 6. It was also stated that society has ‘grown weary of peace 
and civilization, Europe demanded a crisis’ to radically alter society, where for no longer should ‘kings, princes, 
and courtiers’ have all the riches, but that the turn of the working class was coming where they could equally 
have a ‘safe and comfortable journey towards the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, p. 4. 
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the link between the first two essays demonstrates that Mill’s theory of liberty never changed 
significantly, calling into question secondary commentators who differentiate between 
multiple theories in his early development. 
 
‘BENTHAM’ 1838 
 
By 1838, Mill had secured a pool of loyalists for his current and future writings. The essay on 
‘Bentham’ is Mill’s first public exercise of freedom in light of the recent deaths of both 
Bentham and his father, James Mill.232 This period marks the start of Mill’s independent 
exploration of ideas on liberty. The essay on ‘Bentham’ appeared in the radical liberal journal, 
Westminster Review, where Mill credits him as ‘the father of English innovation’ endorsing his 
reputation as one of ‘the great intellectual benefactors of mankind’. Bentham had helped restore 
faith in the laws that governed the land not through his own works, but ‘through the minds and 
pens which those writings fed – through the men in more direct contact with the world’.233 This 
depiction of Bentham persisted throughout Mill’s essay. 
 
We have seen how responses to Mill’s essay did not doubt the intellect and uniqueness of 
Bentham, but it becomes precisely this characteristic which renders him old-fashioned and out 
of touch. Mill encouraged people to dismiss Bentham, rejecting his view of human nature 
where we are not guided by self-interest but are driven by our desire for perfection.234 This is 
however rejected by the Leeds Times, a radical newspaper, which describes Bentham as the 
only proponent ‘of those truths which only now begin to be appreciated’ and refer to him as a 
‘political prophet’.235 The moderately liberal Morning Chronicle added some months later that 
‘the age of law reform and the age of Jeremy Bentham are one and the same. Bentham, after 
                                                        
232 CW 10, p. xvii. Bentham died in 1832 and James Mill in 1836. Williams added that ‘until his mental crisis in 
1826, Mill’s approach to the study of politics was that provided for him by Benthamism; the belief that human 
nature can be analysed in terms of pleasure and pain’. See Williams, John Stuart Mill on Politics and Society, p. 
19. After Bentham’s death, Mill’s theory of liberty could accommodate other principles, perhaps even those 
which clashed with utilitarianism. 
233 Westminster Review, Aug 1838, no 2, p. 469. Westminster Review was the official periodical of the 
philosophical radicals. Claeys has written that ‘to the Philosophic Radicals of the 1830s, Benthamism offered a 
reforming outlook which regarded legislation as a vehicle for social and political change’. However, in light of 
Mill’s mental crisis and subsequent revision of ideas, this all changed. See Mill and Paternalism, p. 21. 
234 See further Ryan, J.S. Mill who claimed that the ‘unclarity and remoteness of the principle of utility is 
perhaps the simplest opening through which to approach Mill’s doubts about Bentham’s philosophy of life’, p. 
54. Moreover, we must consider Ryan’s assertion that ‘Mill’s claim that ‘the greatest happiness principle’ is not 
of direct use in telling us what to do: much of the problem is knowing what does create happiness’, which 
implies that this can only be discovered through greater expressions of individuality. See Ryan, J.S. Mill, p. 54. 
235 Leeds Times, 29 Dec 1838, p. 6. 
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all, was understood by the public to be the father of the most important of all the branches of 
reform, the leading and ruling department of human improvement’.236 As Mill rejected 
Bentham, he still noted the value he brought to public discussion, giving a ‘voice to those 
interests and instincts’237 that had in previous times been neglected. Yet for Mill, Bentham’s 
theory of liberty lacked essential features. For others, Bentham was widely respected for his 
axiom on utility,238 with the Leeds Times noting ‘that all laws should be framed for the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number’. For Mill, however, this was inadequate for progress. 
 
Convincing the public would not be easy. The Leeds Times was first to challenge Mill’s 
criticisms of Bentham, calling for ‘political pilgrims’ to come together. Bentham is the ‘chief 
of moralists – this profound political economist’239 and for many, there were no obvious 
shortfalls in his work. The Morning Advertiser praised Bentham as ‘the great master of the 
science of legislation and of morals as bearing on legislation’.240 Bentham utilised the business 
of codification to provide a scientific basis to his ultimate goal of enhancing the happiness of 
the community and he achieved this by ‘not only reducing to a system and method the existing 
laws, but in so amending them as to make them capable of accomplishing their cardinal 
object’.241 Many felt Bentham exposed the defects in the English system of jurisprudence, 
something which no one before seriously considered doing.242 Mill however sought to add to 
Bentham’s utilitarianism, not undermine it. 
 
We have seen how Mill sought to expand Bentham’s system, not restrict it, in order to 
accommodate for his increasing concerns over the condition of England. The Examiner noted 
in 1830 that on ‘the evils existing in the Judicial System of his country’, Bentham makes ‘a 
full disclosure to the public of the most abominable system of fraud practiced by a superior 
class of men, who have the impudence to style themselves of an honourable profession’.243 
                                                        
236 Morning Chronicle, 4 Aug 1838, p. 6. 
237 Westminster Review, Aug 1838, no 2, p. 469. 
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243 The Examiner, 3 Jan 1830, p. 5. 
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Power remaining in the hands of the corrupt was a key concern for society and pleas for justice 
regularly fell onto deaf ears. The Pilot, a liberal newspaper, echoed the anger noted in The 
Examiner, writing that on reform associations in London, those who actually had a voice in 
elections was insignificant. Power ‘was not in the hands of a majority of the people, but in 
those of a few individuals, who neither represented the wealth, intelligence or independence of 
the country’.244 Liberty and freedom will never be until ‘popular rights and public privileges 
have more of a public investment’.245 This required contributions from all citizens and is 
precisely what Mill addressed in his earlier works, the art in working cooperatively. 
 
Commentators had taken note of Mill’s earlier essays and his insistence upon the need to work 
together. The radical periodical, London Dispatch, asserted that the sooner a coalition merges 
together, we will all ‘have the truth demonstrated, that the aristocracy have an interest adverse 
to that of the people; and the latter will be taught to rely on themselves, and not on any section 
of the aristocracy, for the attainment of good government’.246 Corruption impedes upon the 
moral health of a society and is a disaster for the cultivation of liberty and freedom.247 More 
people must have the opportunity to develop good characters so that they can enlighten those 
who are sceptical of progress. Accordingly, government intervention too may be required to 
coerce people for their own benefit as well as the community. 
 
Nonetheless, Mill and Bentham still had their opponents. The liberal Sheffield Iris noted that 
‘among those “incapable of forming an opinion” may be numbered Adam Smith, Bentham, 
Ricardo, Mill, Archbishop Whateley, Senior, Bowring, Lord Fitzwilliam, and many other 
foolish ill-informed individuals’.248 Other charges are directed at the irrelevance of Bentham’s 
work, with the liberal Bristol Mercury claiming that ‘it is not the fashion to quote Mr. Bentham; 
the man is popular – his principles are more so; but his works are not so universally read as 
they deserve to be’.249 Perhaps Mill’s essay had a greater impact than he is given credit. 
Praising Mill’s criticism of Bentham, Bell’s New Weekly Messenger added that as ‘great as 
Jerry was, death smote the great mortal at last’. It was further noted that the Westminster Review 
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was ‘a stupid publication’ for maintaining from the very start that Bentham was ‘the greatest 
of law-givers and the greatest of men’250 when he was, from their perspective at least, quite the 
opposite. 
 
By the late 1830s, it was noted that ‘oppression, although appreciated, has been tolerated; and 
coercion, although hated, has been permitted to work its purpose with impunity’. Public 
opinion is a ‘terrific engine’ for rousing a nation behind a combined effort. The Morning 
Advertiser, in rejecting Mill’s essay on ‘Bentham’, noted that social change would have begun 
much earlier in the nineteenth-century ‘had people wanted to listen to the doctrines of the likes 
of Bentham and co, or had their doctrines been more widely spread in earlier times even’. It is 
by the start of the 1840s where we can clearly see commentators detach from intellectuals and 
start to confront social injustice across society. As we turn to Coleridge, we will see that 
through bringing to the forefront of discussion an alternative means of expression, he 
maintained public interest and fired up society even more in the revolution against social and 
political inequality. 
 
‘COLERIDGE’ 1840 
 
In 1840, Mill wrote his essay on ‘Coleridge’, who had contributed ‘to shape the opinions of 
those among its younger men, who can be said to have opinions at all’.251 Known as one of the 
most important of the British poets, founding the Romantic movement with Wordsworth, his 
contribution to liberty in the nineteenth-century inspired the working class to use art and poetry 
as tools to express their opinions freely. The political library journal, the Dublin Monitor, noted 
that ‘his politics purified as his poetry grew thick’,252 encouraging his readers to form their own 
ideas. In this period, artistic expressions were used to address questions of liberty and freedom, 
not just by Coleridge but in a growing number of minds. 
                                                        
250 Bell’s New Weekly Messenger, 7 Oct 1832, p. 410. Skorupski argued that Mill’s chief criticism of Bentham 
focused on the idea that his ‘moral psychology is a collection of misleading or banal abstractions, uniformed by 
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Mill read Coleridge ‘in search of answers to the shortcomings of Benthamism’. See further Capaldi, John Stuart 
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Mill’s anxiety over events unfolding in Europe had become a public concern. The Morning 
Post, a conservative newspaper, noted that since the beginning of the nineteenth-century, the 
British have been occupied with Napoleon and hadn’t thought to concern themselves with ‘the 
great men who have been among us – men not conversant with war nor with mechanics, but 
only great in philosophy and poetry’. Of those most qualified in philosophy and poetry, ‘the 
most remarkable undoubtedly’ was Coleridge, ‘a comparatively unnoticed man’.253 
Commentators related Mill’s essay to Hazlitt and Birch, noting that acts of genius were 
indicative of how much liberty you had.254 Mill was applauded for revisiting this discussion on 
the liberation of culture from the grip of the aristocracy, where art and culture become a right 
and not a privilege. 
 
Thus far, Mill’s essay on ‘Coleridge’ related expressions of genius and individuality to acts of 
liberty. In light of this, the Morning Post printed the opening pages to Birch’s poem, which 
noted, ‘ye birds of liberty, mind not man, reveal me reason’ where an ariel flight from man on 
the ground to reason up above is used to describe current movements within society. As with 
Hazlitt, Birch sought ‘to affix a distinctive character to each, and to place before the minds of 
his readers a hasty review of the principal features in their individual history; of the monuments 
to which they owe their fame; and the causes from which has risen their decay’. The Morning 
Post observed that people are right to criticise social injustice for ‘excessive ideality seems to 
be the leading tendency of the writer’s mind, and in its excessive indulgence he loses sight of 
more sober realities’.255 Coleridge ‘seemed never able to disengage himself from the idea, that 
it was his duty at once to enlighten and astound the whole living race of mankind, besides 
leaving a handsome legacy for all generations to come’.256 Like Mill, Coleridge felt it his 
responsibility to cultivate good characters and inspire a moral revolution in society. 
 
Coleridge and Bentham have been referred to as ‘worshippers of Civilisation and 
Independence’. The Kendal Mercury, a liberal newspaper, added that ‘one may see in a very 
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strong light, the need which the great mass of mankind have, of being ruled over by a degree 
of intelligence and virtue superior to their own’. Responsibility therefore fell to ‘their superiors 
in culture’. Coleridge maintained there is a role for everyone; the Kendal Mercury added that 
‘the only possible remedy is a pure democracy, in which the people are their own governors, 
and can have no selfish interest in oppressing themselves’.257 Each of these works reinforced 
Mill’s chief concern found in his theory of liberty. For as long as people were intolerant, 
divisions between class and gender would continue to grow across society. With this came the 
prevention of freedom of discussion for certain groups and the consolidation of a regressive 
society. Mill’s main concern was that society would suffer as a result of a minority few. 
 
Responses went so far as to connect Mill and Coleridge’s thoughts on liberty to trade and 
commerce, feeding into discussion of the Principles. The literary journal, Durham County 
Advertiser, challenged any government policy acting upon ‘the accursed principle of 
deliberately injuring foreign manufacturers, if they can, even to the ultimate disgrace of the 
country, and loss to themselves’.258 Questions of generating positive trade and commerce came 
into fruition in the years leading up to the publication of the Principles and the events of 1848 
added to this sentiment. If ‘we are to become a great horde of manufacturers, shall we not, even 
more than at present, excite the ill-will of all the manufacturers of other nations?’ The ‘nation 
that cannot even exist without the commodity of another nation, is in effect the slave of that 
other nation’.259 State commodity and the corn-laws emerged as concerns driven by readings 
of Coleridge as well as Bentham and this would set up much of the debate we see in the 
1840s.260 For Mill, Coleridge had added something vital to discussion on the need for both 
private and voluntary agency and this would feed into discussion on cooperation with the 
publication of the Principles. 
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LATER PUBLICATIONS 
THE SYSTEM OF LOGIC 1843 
 
The System of Logic was chiefly read by public intellectuals and university students concerned 
with the study of logic, language, knowledge and scientific methods for understanding human 
reason.261 Whilst groups were drawn to the intellectual rigour of Mill’s work, unsurprisingly 
for the majority, the response was somewhat unenthusiastic and unconvinced. The radical 
Sunday paper, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper, claimed that ‘the notice of “Mill’s System of Logic” 
is as hard and dry as the work on which it discourses’.262 The Warder and Dublin Weekly Mail 
added that ‘to the light reader, it must be anything but enticing’, commenting further that Mill’s 
‘Logic is rather a dry topic for the present class of readers’.263 But this seems to have missed 
the point of Mill’s work, for it has often been associated in contemporary literature as the source 
of Mill’s conception of freedom, which we find in On Liberty.264 
 
Initial responses suggested that the text was concerned with municipal reform, with one 
reviewer noting that it was ‘talented, clear, and most interesting, and will amply reward for 
perusal’.265 In light of this, the Dublin Monitor claimed that the System of Logic was ‘a very 
excellent paper’ and one which ‘goes far to redeem the literature of our age from the charge of 
frivolity and superficiality’.266 Whilst circulation of the work brought with it periods of 
confusion and dismissal, it reveals the progressive nature of Mill’s political thought leading up 
to 1859. Mill’s thoughts on liberty were supported by scientific enquiry rather than something 
divine. Logic, after all, was an exercise in the art of evaluating evidence and shared beliefs to 
improve human progress. 
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However, Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper maintained that Mill’s arguments ‘will make little or no 
impression on the public mind, for there appears to be just now a general indisposition to stir 
in the matter, and a willingness to remain in status quo’.267 During this period, commentators 
regarded large towns and cities as ‘a sphere of action’. Developing individual morality ‘would 
speedily exhibit improvement’268 in other areas. The System of Logic acquired more general 
comments applauding its ‘varied and attractive contents’269 whilst assuring readers the author 
of such work ‘is an advocate for an unflinching reform’.270 It seems that by this stage, Mill’s 
theory of liberty was looked upon as being far more representative of all citizens than his earlier 
essays might have implied. With this came a revision of interpretations of Mill, individuality 
did not mean neglect of the community. 
 
Mill had used the idea of the ‘Art of Life’ to express precisely how we could each master our 
own lives.271 Whereas traditional interpretations of the System of Logic concluded that Mill 
was inconsistent, more recent accounts demonstrated a theory of utility consistent with 
liberty.272 But Mill felt that looking at life as art would cultivate character and rid society of 
diminished individual happiness and self-agency that compromised progress.273 In his 
inaugural address given at the University of St Andrews, he noted that when art is properly 
cultivated, ‘it trains us never to be completely satisfied with imperfection in what we ourselves 
do and are: to idealise, as much as possible, every work we do, and most of all, our own 
characters and lives’.274 Only when we begin to cultivate our individual faculties can we 
advance the march of human progress. As we will uncover in chapter 5, the institution of the 
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family will be instrumental in this for it provided greater opportunities for the cultivation of 
character.275 
 
The System of Logic had encouraged society to be their own master and to be more 
individualistic rather than social.276 This shift brought with it a new understanding of Mill’s 
theory of liberty. Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper noted that the aldermen, who have extraordinary 
powers, are ‘irresponsible to their constituents and to public opinion’. The biggest drawback 
of reform is that ‘they are put forth at a wrong season’ where it wouldn’t occur to those in the 
House of Commons as an urgent matter. The ‘privileges and constitution of these functionaries 
are utterly at variance with the principles of free institutions, without realising the advantages 
of the opposite system’277 and this had turned London into ‘the needy villain’s general 
home’.278 Ultimately, it was the System of Logic which Mill hoped would introduce a 
progressive stage of deliberation across society.279 Mill would still attract the attention of critics 
but it was the Principles which would endorse his position as a public intellectual. 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1848 
 
The Principles went through seven revisions until Mill’s death in 1873.280 Williams had noted 
that by comparing the first three editions of the Principles, we can see that ‘between 1848 and 
1852 his opposition to socialism is replaced by sympathetic discussion’.281 These adjustments 
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had shaped and refined his thoughts in the years leading up to On Liberty in 1859. It was 
undisputed that the Principles appealed to many people, impressing ‘the minds of men of the 
world and of legislature’. Prior to the publication of On Liberty, this was Mill’s acclaimed 
work. Discussions on political economy dominated newspaper headlines in the years 
surrounding 1848, with articles focusing on creating a fair relationship between labour and 
wages. The Morning Chronicle compared Mill’s contribution to that made by Adam Smith. 
Mill’s work treated ‘the social facts and ideas of the present age in the spirit which characterises 
the Wealth of Nations’ and was an ‘immediate and permanent success’.282 Bradford Observer, 
a liberal newspaper, added that whatever government holds power, ‘it was of the utmost 
importance that they should have the mass of the people imbued with sound principles of 
political economy and free trade’, speculating that if people did not rehearse themselves 
thoroughly in these ideas, ‘they would reach out to communism’.283 In this immediate period, 
the Principles was used to encourage improved relations between the government and society 
in communicating concerns of economic liberty and freedom. Levy had picked up on this 
discussion on the stationary state and economic growth in relation to the Principles, noting that 
‘when his writings on the stationary state are integrated with his views on socialism, social 
dynamics, liberty, and equality, it becomes clear that the stationary state provided Mill with a 
set of economic and social conditions which logically completed his vision’.284 The coherence 
of his system had proven attractive to many of Mill’s readers. 
 
By 1848, Mill was steadily moving towards a collective economy. Claeys has noted that ‘the 
drift of Mill’s thinking from now onwards would be towards extending cooperation among the 
working classes from profit-sharing to co-ownership’.285 This was a turning point in Mill’s 
support for cooperative production and echoed his relationship with the Saint-Simonians.286 
Moreover, Claeys has stated that ‘Mill’s premise from 1845 onwards seems to have been that 
the greater the workers’ share in the enterprise, the stronger would be their incentive to make 
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it profitable’.287 Capaldi wrote further that the Principles and Mill’s other economic writings 
all have one goal, ‘the encouragement and promotion of an entrepreneurial attitude among the 
working class, on the understanding that being entrepreneurial allows a space for the 
development of human excellence in other than monetary forms’.288 This idea of self-rule or 
self-autonomy is something which dominates Mill’s writings and this suggestion of partnership 
implies an equal distribution of responsibility, tying together the central argument of this thesis. 
 
The conservative newspaper, Bucks Herald, observed that ‘people believe the revolution in 
Paris is a communist movement. They know it to be like Owenism and St. Simonianism but 
like these two, it will soon make bankrupts of those who put it into practice, and convert a 
would-be Paradise into an actual Hell’.289 Reiterating Bentham’s comments that events 
unfolding in Europe should be watched and learnt from yet never imitated, Bradford Observer 
wrote that no revolutions must exist in England for ‘in this country those results could be 
obtained by moral peaceable means’.290 The Morning Post echoed these concerns by 
suggesting that it would be wiser ‘to seek domestic peace, rather than engage with what the 
continentals have in attempting to establish perfect systems of social order but to no success’. 
Mill’s theory of liberty in the Principles was framed around the idea of collective effort for 
individual development and many seemed to be supportive of this idea. Accordingly, the need 
to surrender individual liberties for the common good is something that Mill was sceptical 
about in the 1830s but by the 1840s, he had warmed to the idea and this was fuelled by his 
dismay at increasing inequality. 
 
To support this claim, the Morning Post outlined the connection between revolutionary activity 
and poor economic prosperity. Richard Cobden, writing for the Morning Post, noted that 
people should pursue ‘industrial occupations’ as opposed to political or social agitation for 
‘perpetual social agitation will delay the benefits to be deprived from any social system’.291 
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The only role the state could assume was to organise industry through ‘certain modifications 
of the law of partnership’.292 Cooperation would be crucial here. Mill had hoped, one day, that 
society could heal ‘the widening breach between those who toil and those who live on the 
produce of former toil’.293 By this point, Mill had clearly demonstrated his commitment to 
equality, both in a class sense but equally with regards to gender. 
 
Mill’s commentators focused their responses on moving away from ‘the deplorable habit of 
relying on the Government’294 for a society which could be built on individual interests and 
morals. The idea of self-management is also found in commercial society debates. In a social 
economy, it was believed to help steady the common interest with other countries in order to 
ensure a mutual and profitable exchange.295 However, whilst government intervention should 
not interfere with the natural laws that govern the economy, where it serves the well-being of 
the individual, it is permissible for it serves a proper end.296 
 
Debates on economic liberty and social mobility were motivated by concern over a growing 
population and the effect this will have on employment and wages. The Morning Chronicle 
picks out a striking chapter of Mill’s work on the stationary state, commenting that ‘the growth 
of capital and production has reached its limits, and a further increase of population would be 
but an increase of unemployed and hungry wretchedness’.297 Mill had warned after all that 
‘even in a progressive state of capital, in old countries, a conscientious or prudential restraint 
on population is indispensable, to prevent the increase of numbers from outstripping the 
increase of capital, and the condition of the classes who are at the bottom of society from being 
deteriorated’.298 
 
The clash between those supporting free trade and those who put their faith in a social economy 
became a very noticeable rivalry in the years following both the Reform Act of 1832 and the 
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Poor Law reforms of 1834. William Cobbett strongly supported a social economy and the 
rightful concerns that the state should have over maintaining a safe working environment, 
keeping wages at a fair living standard and ensuring good housing for labourers.299 The 
Morning Chronicle noted that political economy seems to treat these social ills as ‘incurable’ 
and turned their attention to Mill’s work in the sciences to act as a remedy for this contagion. 
 
Economically, Mill condemned ‘the principle of state guarantees of work and wages’ in 
preference of individual ownership. To those who claimed that cooperation is incompatible 
with individual ownership, ‘there has never been imagined any mode of distributing the 
produce of industry, so well adapted to the requirements of human nature on the whole, as that 
of letting the share of each individual (not in a state of bodily or mental incapacity) depend in 
the main on that individual’s own energies and exertions, and on such furtherance as may be 
obtained from the voluntary good office of others’.300 Louis Blanc professed ‘let the State be a 
model father. If it is not, there can be nothing but violence and injustice’301 because ‘the 
government overlooked the true principles of political economy’302 and directly interfered with 
labour. Echoing these concerns, Bucks Herald noted that whilst it is the duty of the state to 
facilitate the means of ensuring every man can benefit from his labour, ‘let a State beware how 
it goes beyond this, lest it strike at the root of the first principles of political economy’.303 
Economical regeneration was important, but so was ensuring ownership and respect for 
individual rights. 
 
Support for individualism endorsed the Principles and Mill’s critics were now concerned with 
attempts ‘to run down vested rights, and to interfere with that most sacred of all sanctities, the 
sanctity of property’. Property was a marker of economic standing and by 1848, it was a prize 
considered to be the most opulent, free from any state interference. ‘Freedom is our 
birthright’304 was proclaimed in the liberal newspaper Worcestershire Chronicle with the 
Morning Post adding that the true principles of political economy did not prohibit market 
                                                        
299 William Cobbett and Edwin Chadwick were two leading figures involved in calling for sanitary reform. See 
Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain 1842, which reveals 
the great extent to which issues of public health and sanitation had upon ideas of political economy. Earlier 
proponents of these ideas include Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Bentham. 
300 Morning Chronicle, 11 May 1848, p. 3. 
301 Bucks Herald, 8 Apr 1848, p. 4. 
302 Bell’s Life in London, 31 Dec 1848, p. 2. A weekly, anti-establishment newspaper aimed at the working 
class. 
303 Bucks Herald, 8 Apr 1848, p. 4. 
304 Worcestershire Chronicle, 7 June 1848, p. 3. 
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regulation but rather preserved rights whilst simultaneously increasing wealth.305 The argument 
widely adopted in support of a social economy argued that it would see society ‘divided into 
great social families, living together in one great building or village, contributing each their 
separate share of talent, capital, or industry, and dividing the resulting profits in production to 
their contribution’. On paper, this economic model combined elements of social living with 
individual ownership and developed out of a reading of Mill’s earlier works.306 The Principles 
was used to explain much more than just how society could construct their own functioning 
economies. It was used to deter people from revolution, to not remain idle but to not accept 
violence as the only means to induce reform. In this sense, Mill’s work corrected the path that 
English society was on, redirecting it towards the preservation of rights and freedoms, not their 
destruction. 
 
MILL’S REPUTATION IN THE 1850s 
 
The new analysis offered here clarifies divisions of interpretation we find in the secondary 
literature. Commentators had been engaged with Mill since the 1830s and they had come to a 
number of conclusions before they read his famous essay On Liberty. Critics cited the 
discrepancies in his six earlier publications, choosing to read them separately rather than 
collectively, failing to read them as texts concerned with a similar concern. The argument 
presented thus far does not undermine existing studies but seeks to contribute a comprehensive 
account of Mill’s theory of liberty. Mill’s works published before 1859 divided opinion and 
this opened Mill to controversy rather than clarity yet many recent readings of Mill often ignore 
the detail found in contextual debates as his works were published since the 1830s. 
 
The reception of Mill’s earlier publications demonstrates two vital points prior to the 
publication of On Liberty. Firstly, the reception from 1831 to 1859 unveils how engaged a 
number of political and religious periodicals were in Mill and his writings. Secondly, we can 
narrow this down further, to identify which works appealed to certain political, religious or 
independent groups. Accordingly, this clarifies the fate of Mill’s publications by showing how 
his reputation developed in the nineteenth-century. The reception of ‘The Spirit of the Age’ 
                                                        
305 Morning Post, 8 June 1848, p. 4. 
306 Bucks Herald, 8 Apr 1848, p. 4. Newspapers read Saint-Simon and Fourier as individuals seeking to resolve 
the problem of revolutions so as to prevent society turning into ‘hell’ rather than a ‘paradise’. Their leading idea 
was ‘the overthrow of the right of separate property, and of the separate enjoyment of its produce’. 
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was chiefly dominated by radicals and liberals. ‘On Genius’ interested responses by mostly 
conservative and radical unitarians. Mill’s essay on ‘Bentham’ provoked reaction from mostly 
liberals, both radical and moderate, with the odd conservative response for good measure. The 
essay on ‘Coleridge’ is the outlier thus far, in the sense that it was engaged with by a multitude 
of periodicals; not one political or religious journal dominated the reception in the period from 
1831 to 1859. The reception of the System of Logic was dominated by conservative periodicals. 
Finally, the Principles, met by mostly liberal observers, it was praised for preserving individual 
rights whilst supporting a social economy. After publishing the System of Logic and the 
Principles, Mill established himself as a public intellectual, but it was the latter of these works 
which appealed to a far greater audience. 
 
By 1859, the public had scrutinised Mill’s theory of liberty. The more learned readers would 
have read Mill’s essay on ‘The Spirit of the Age’ and ‘On Genius’ and noticed his unorthodox 
views on the role of the individual. Those who praised these two essays indicated approval at 
the need for a cultivated elite to guide the majority. ‘Bentham’, ‘Coleridge’ and the System of 
Logic were received by the public in very similar ways. Whilst they did not rouse suspicion as 
to what Mill’s intentions were, they were viewed as comparatively dry works. The political 
and social consequences would prove to be problematic for the reception of On Liberty. 
 
With the Principles, Mill established a reputation as the people’s intellectual. Mill admired 
both individualism and collectivism. Mill’s discussion on creating a better relationship between 
labour and wages spoke to everyone, it was a text which certified Mill as a thinker of the stature 
of Adam Smith. Mill’s critics connected the 1848 revolutions with economic instability, 
resulting in arguments against collectivism. On the other hand, promoting self-government and 
independence seemed far more appealing and this would prove a key reference point in the 
1870s when the debate on individualism and collectivism gained momentum. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Reconsidering On Liberty, 1859 - 1869 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The arguments found in On Liberty are similar to Mill’s earlier publications. However, the 
number of disparities in the reception of these earlier works compared with the essay of 1859 
suggests there is more to the reception of Mill than is currently detailed in the very few and 
brief historically ground studies. Consider Mill’s belief that Christianity is to blame for the 
increasingly submissive and obedient nature of individuals. This argument paved the way for 
his doctrine of individualism as well as his defence of the freedom of thought and discussion. 
This set the tone for a distinct set of arguments and challenges from religious groups and 
attempts seeking to tame the contents of On Liberty. Mill’s estimation of the value of 
individuality had agitated a number of his critics, particularly those who saw no problem in the 
existing relationship between the individual and the state. Each of Mill’s chapters had upset 
someone and often for different reasons. This chapter will explore the reception of the chapters 
of On Liberty to ascertain if, or how, Mill’s theory of liberty had changed since his earlier 
publications. 
 
The first four chapters of On Liberty dominated the reception in the first ten years; the one 
chapter which did not was Mill’s discussion on the applications of his theory. Responses briefly 
touched upon marriage and overpopulation, but this discussion did not really develop until the 
1890s. Readers were so captivated by Mill’s views on freedom of discussion and the worth of 
individualism, they often ignored some of the most important parts of On Liberty, those which 
implied a re-reading of the text in its entirety. The difficulty in finding a straightforward reading 
of On Liberty confirms the elasticity of interpretations as well as the potential scope of Mill’s 
intentions. As we have seen in the previous chapter, newspapers and periodicals published from 
1831 provided an invaluable and alternative reading of the reception of Mill’s works. These 
earlier pieces explored ideas such as Mill’s preference for cultivated minds and the importance 
of economic independence and social mobility. This chapter will consider the reception of On 
Liberty in the period 1859 to 1869. As we will see, this period unveils the controversial 
character of Mill. This not only revises our understanding of Mill's reading of liberty but 
enables us to identify moments in his chronological development that fostered more 
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provocative reactions. Ultimately, this revealed that the arguments of On Liberty needed to be 
watered down if people were to take them more seriously and that it was almost impossible to 
ignore Mill. 
 
INTRODUCTORY  
 
Despite Mill offering one very simple principle, the majority of readers who reacted to his 
essay attest how it was far from simple after all.307 In his introductory chapter, Mill noted that 
he sought to confine his discussion to civil, or social liberty, firstly providing an overview of 
the development of liberty. In April 1859, we can identify some of the earliest expressions of 
what we now frequently refer to as positive or negative readings of the text.308 For instance, 
the quarterly magazine, The National Review, which was co-edited by a liberal and a 
clergyman, noted that Mill’s use of the term was liberty ‘in its negative rather than its positive 
significance’ for it ‘implies that fresh and unconstrained play of national character, that fullness 
of social life and vivacity of public energy, which it is one of the worst results of such constraint 
to subdue or extinguish’. On Liberty was ‘in many parts a continuous wail over the tendency 
of the individual mind to succumb to the conventional prejudices of a social creed’.309 In trying 
to exclude the influences of one group, Mill had simultaneously paralysed the other. Bentley’s 
Quarterly Review, a conservative periodical, claimed that Mill’s principle is most effectively 
the absence of restraints on social opinion.310 Liberty is not so much a state of being but a right, 
one which ‘implies certain promises, guarantees, indemnities, reliable securities, against 
interference’.311 However, in light of the responses we will disclose in this chapter, the 
inconsistencies within his essay are revealed, as is the somewhat elastic liberty principle in On 
Liberty. 
 
                                                        
307 See further Himmelfarb, ‘Liberty: “One Very Simple Principle”?, pp. 531-550 and Clausen, ‘John Stuart 
Mill’s “Very Simple Principle”’, pp. 40-46. 
308 For some studies on this reading, see Habibi, ‘The Positive/Negative Liberty Distinction and J.S. Mill’s 
Theory of Liberty’, pp. 347-368. Also, Kristjánsson, ‘What is Wrong with Positive Freedom’, pp. 289-310 as 
well as MacCallum Jr., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, pp. 312-334. 
309 The National Review, Apr 1859, pp. 407, 414. The National Review is one of the few periodicals in the mid 
nineteenth-century which closely engaged with the development of Mill’s use of the term liberty, with particular 
focus on whether it was best expressed positively or negatively. 
310 See Bentley’s Quarterly Review, Oct 1859, for a thorough review focusing on a negative reading of On 
Liberty. Originally set up to rival the Edinburgh Review and the Quarterly Review, Bentley’s Quarterly Review 
did not enjoy much popularity and had low sales. 
311 The London Review, Apr 1861, p. 117. A quarterly periodical running from 1828, The London Review wrote 
on political and economic matters. 
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Initial responses associated On Liberty with liberty in a negative sense. The first attempt to 
situate On Liberty in the context of political and social discussions came from the Evening 
Mail, a sibling paper of The Times. It concluded that On Liberty was ‘an attempt to define on 
philosophical grounds the legitimate objects of government, whatever its form may be’. Mill’s 
intent then was to establish lawful bodies and determine their relationship with the rest of 
society. The Evening Mail added further that the purpose of On Liberty was to decipher what 
the government is to do for society. When ‘principles argued for by great political prophets are 
superseded over time’,312 On Liberty was initially seen as the text to redefine these values.313 
 
Thus far, critics have read On Liberty as an essay which expressed the relationships people 
should have within society and stressed the value of individual sovereignty. In light of this, the 
Evening Mail claimed that whilst legislators should aim to encourage the flourishing of 
individual natures, this is not the business of government. Adding further, they noted that self-
protection is the only condition in which ‘mankind are warranted to interfere, either by legal 
penalties, or moral coercion, in the shape of public opinion, with the liberty of action of any of 
their number’. Mill’s preference for self-protection justified ‘society in punishing an individual 
for the harm that he does, but even for abstinence (in some cases) from good that he might 
do’,314 so that individuals are encouraged to refine good traits. 
 
Readings of the introductory chapter of On Liberty raised significant questions for Mill’s 
theory of liberty. Firstly, for Mill’s liberal critics, On Liberty was wrong to legitimise 
interference on the basis of correcting ill-founded opinions as this is a tyranny and infringement 
upon the overall health of society. Secondly, commentators raised the issue of how we are to 
remedy unsound opinions if society is not to interfere with the freedom of another. After all, 
the Evening Mail read On Liberty as a text with a vague hope of success in ‘neutralizing 
                                                        
312 Evening Mail, 4 Mar 1859, p. 7. Evening Mail was first published in 1789 by the Walter family, a year after 
the first publication of The Times. Walter II, before his son Walter III took over in 1846, sought to publish the 
news before any of his competitors, which brought in impressive sales and great power. Walter II was 
innovative in his revised attitude towards theatre advertising and reviews of productions and maintained 
neutrality in party politics all his life. At the appointment of Walter III as chief editor in 1846, the newspaper 
faced a great difficulty in balancing Walter’s personal position as an MP with accusations of partiality in 
political matters. The paper was eventually sold in 1908. 
313 Bury Free Press further wrote that ‘it is far safer and far more honourable to move in harmony with great 
principles than parties’. Party politics is never a reliable nor constant practice to put your faith in and for this 
reason, opinions formed in accordance with your own morals will serve you better in the long-term (28 May 
1859, p. 4). A weekly centrist newspaper. 
314 Evening Mail, 4 Mar 1859, p. 7. 
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intolerance by claiming “public opinion” as a part of the defensive armoury of society, to be 
employed for the sole purpose of “self-protection”’.315 
 
However, the suspicion surrounding Mill’s essay did not result in particularly damaging 
reviews. The Cheltenham Mercury, a liberal newspaper, claimed that Mill’s discussion of 
social freedom and independence urged readers to be much more cautious in exercising 
authority over another individual and to be aware of the boundaries of interference.316 The local 
newspaper, Man of Ross, and General Advertiser, too claimed that Mill’s emphasis upon self-
protection essentially compelled one another to live well so that it is good for others and was 
deserving of the name freedom. Moreover, On Liberty was an attempt to accentuate the 
relationship people have with one another, encouraging mutual respect for self-governance, 
one where politics nor society should corrupt or interfere.317 From this angle, it seems that all 
Mill really did was remind people of the importance of social relations alongside those with 
the state, yet, as we will see, his essay would never be read that simply. 
 
Mill had claimed in his introductory chapter that ‘the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection’.318 The liberal literary magazine, The Athenaeum, noted that even 
‘those who still think that the honour of God is to be upheld, meaning that their own religious 
opinions are to be enforced by the State, also maintain that such upholding is necessary to the 
protection of society’. The popularity of Mill’s principle seemed to supersede the boundaries 
of the political as well as the religious. The protection of social rights is dependent upon ‘the 
                                                        
315 Evening Mail, 4 Mar 1859, p. 7. See further Stegenga, ‘J. S. Mill’s Concept of Liberty and the Principle of 
Utility’, pp. 281-289. Stegenga discusses how, from a utilitarian point of view, interference would be 
permissible if greater happiness was the result. 
316 Cheltenham Mercury, published between 1855 and 1903, advocated administrative reform, rather than 
political, and unsectarian education. It was a liberal newspaper and was representative of ideas stressing the 
importance of the family. Its editor, W. H. Dixon, favoured articles which applauded good causes rather than 
discussing the means to reform society. Ella, Dixon’s daughter, described him as a knight of the inkstand after 
his career in editorial work. Cheltenham Mercury directly refers to the introductory chapter of On Liberty, 
responding positively to Mill’s discussion on social freedom. The absolute freedom of opinion, freedom to 
unite, the freedom to pursue our own good, which Mill discusses in this chapter are all worthy features of any 
society and this is one of the most enriching parts of Mill’s essay.  
317 See Man of Ross, and General Advertiser, 23 June 1859, p. 3. 
318 CW 18, p. 223. See The Athenaeum, 26 Feb 1859, p. 282 for a discussion on the idea of self-protection and 
what it entails. The Athenaeum was a literary magazine published in London between 1828 and 1921. See 
further Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, May 1866, p. 614 and The Athenaeum, 1 June 1867, p. 725. See the 
British Quarterly Review which criticises the vagueness of Mill’s argument when he claims that no restriction 
upon individual liberty is acceptable except for the purposes of self-protection. In such instances, ‘who shall 
define the limits of what is morally justified by ‘self-protection?’ (Jan 1860, p. 181). The British Quarterly 
Review was published between 1845 and 1886 and practiced religious conservatism. 
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rule of society, acting for its own protection by opinion’.319 However, intervention would not 
only deter vice and dangerous doctrines, but protect society by helping individuals to help 
themselves. 
 
We have seen how the introductory chapter of On Liberty resulted in a sudden increase in 
discussion concerning the individual and their relationship with others. The monthly Catholic 
periodical, The Rambler, noted that this consistent struggle between liberty and authority, 
protection and neglect, is marked by ‘the establishment of definite rights and immunities, 
wrung by the subjects from the governing few with the view of protecting themselves against 
abuses of power’. Mill had exposed new and larger dangers to liberty. Of those dangers, The 
Rambler claimed that tyranny of the majority is precisely that which is ‘manifested either in 
the acts of the public authorities, or in the social intolerance habitual to a majority’. In instances 
where we are socially intolerant, ‘our ideas of our neighbour’s good may justify our 
remonstrating with, or counselling him’320 but never compelling him nor threatening him if he 
acted indifferently to someone of good character. Of course, social intolerance does not only 
come from the majority. Others were quick to point out the least educated faction of the clergy, 
whilst small, it secures a great mass of power.321 In searching for characters of genius, he had 
completely overlooked an abundance of small-minded characters developing around him. 
 
In light of these inconsistencies, responses were outraged that Mill had implied that the 
majority were intolerant of new ideas or opinions. The sectarian British Quarterly Review 
challenged Mill, asserting that an increase in the liberality of law, which has come from the 
liberality of society, has emerged precisely because ‘society is more tolerant among us than it 
ever was, that our laws have become more liberal than they have ever been’. Every single 
person can express their individuality more than they have previously been able to. Initial 
reactions to Mill’s claim that society curbs liberty noted that he was unsound and sought to 
intimidate individuals into abiding by his creed. The British Quarterly Review refused to 
                                                        
319 The Athenaeum, 26 Feb 1859, p. 282. 
320 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, pp. 64-65. The Rambler was a Catholic periodical which ran from 1848 to 1862. 
It sought not just to encourage acceptance of Catholics but to foster an understanding that free enquiry be 
tolerated. Mill was anxious that social intolerance was so powerful that it would ‘induce men to disguise their 
opinions, and to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion’ (Saturday Review, 19 Feb 1859, p. 213). 
Saturday Review was a London weekly newspaper running from 1855 for almost a century, ceasing publication 
in the late 1930s. Its contributors included Stephen, Walter Bagehot and Lord Salisbury before he became Prime 
Minister in 1885. 
321 See Saturday Review, 19 Feb 1859, p. 213. Writing further, the clergy had secured a large following but have 
received no social penalties for dismissing all beliefs which did not correlate with their own. 
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approve of the extreme individuality Mill discussed in On Liberty. After all, ‘to make society 
intelligent, is to make it its own leader’. The evidence given in light of these reactions focused 
on the claim that ‘society can no longer be a mere instrument in the hands of its great men – it 
has in itself too many of the elements of greatness for that’.322 But society needed to be more 
tolerant of irreconcilable beliefs and attitudes for all opinions, whether true or false, contribute 
towards the process of knowledge. 
 
Despite Mill’s warning, the radical newspaper, the Leader, commented that society was far 
more tolerant of different opinions and that Mill should be ‘the least alarmed at the growing 
ascendency of society, by reason of its mass, over all separate classes, cliques, and individuals’. 
Critics had noted the sense of distrust Mill enforced between individuals and whilst they did 
not outright reject him, they were becoming increasingly suspicious of his apparent desire to 
force people to stand on their own two feet. In reviewing the plurality of liberty, the Leader 
added that intellectual power ‘belongs more to society than individuals; it is inherited from 
generation to generation; it increases with mankind’. If On Liberty suggested society in 
England was nothing more than an unruly mob, this greatly undermined the credibility of his 
claims. Mill had already been charged with intellectual elitism after his essay ‘On Genius’ and 
by 1859, Mill was still seen to exhibit ‘confidence in a select few, and his mistrust of the bulk 
of society’.323 For Mill’s critics, individualism contributes little to those he neglects, the 
majority that are apparently less intellectual and less cultivated. Mill’s essay was in response 
to what he saw as the increasing power of the masses over individuals. Alongside this was his 
concern over intellectual stagnation having witnessed this in neighbouring Europe. To prevent 
this spreading to England, Mill maintained that everyone should be more active members of 
society. 
 
OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Chapter 2 of On Liberty discussed the value of freedom of opinion and public expression, 
where Mill encouraged people to challenge one another in order to prevent a loss of meaning 
                                                        
322 British Quarterly Review, Apr 1859, pp. 547-548. They added further that ‘no great man can now be great 
alone – he is sure to have his compeers’. 
323 Leader, 2 Apr 1859, p. 436. Cowling asserts that it is Mill who is intolerant, noting the inaugural lecture at St 
Andrews which actually pardoned ‘moral indoctrination’. See Mill and Liberalism, p. 117. 
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to their beliefs.324 The controversy surrounding Mill’s religious views, or lack of them, meant 
that his critics always had something to undermine Mill as the philosopher of liberty. Mill had 
targeted Christianity on the grounds that it does not encourage its believers to challenge or 
question Christian doctrine; the clergy instead told worshippers what they read was scripture 
and truth. He wrote that Christianity ‘is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates 
submission to all authorities found established’ and gives to human morality ‘an essentially 
selfish character, by disconnecting each man’s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-
creatures’.325 In response, the conservative newspaper, Belfast News-Letter, claimed that On 
Liberty contained ‘much that is good and beautiful, but also contains much that is erroneous 
and subversive to Christianity’.326 Mill’s attack on religion was so radical that it couldn’t be 
overlooked even by those with no faith. Mill was intentionally pushing the boundaries of 
religious toleration. This criticism would prove to be the incentive for many critical responses 
which dominated the period of the first ten years. 
 
Despite the number of criticisms directed at On Liberty, we see the emergence of several 
readings asserting that Mill’s essay provided those with unorthodox views the justification they 
needed to maintain their beliefs.327 Secular periodicals exploited On Liberty to further advance 
their goal of complete separation of church and state. The independent Shrewsbury Chronicle 
stated that there must be no discrimination based upon belief, or equally a lack of it, and the 
state should not finance the church and the latter must have no say in governmental matters. It 
was further argued that for as long as minds are controlled by ‘military and bureaucratic 
absolutism in its alliance with priest-craft’,328 reform will be unattainable. However, 
accusations were met by those who defended the church when Christianity was targeted. Rather 
                                                        
324 On Liberty was understood as a nineteenth-century equivalent of Milton’s Areopagitica (The Examiner, 24 
Dec 1859, p. 4). Areopagitica was a seventeenth-century work which strongly defended freedom of the press 
and the right to freedom of speech and expression. See further Brink, ‘Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of 
Expression’, in Ten, ed. Mill’s On Liberty, pp. 40-61. 
325 CW 18, p. 255. 
326 Belfast News-Letter, 13 Oct 1859, p. 4. Belfast’s first newspaper, the bi-weekly paper was particularly active 
in the 1780s and 1790s as a mouthpiece for radical Presbyterianism in Northern Ireland. In the early 1800s, it 
was politically conservative, speaking mostly to the Protestant land owning elite. From 1829 it vehemently 
opposed Catholic emancipation. 
327 See Baum, ‘Freedom, Power and Public Opinion: J.S. Mill on the Public Sphere’, pp. 501-524. Baum noted 
that ‘according to this civil libertarian reading of Mill’s theory, freedom of thought and discussion is maximized 
when there is no active censorship of controversial ideas, by either the state or the ‘moral coercion’ of prevailing 
opinion’, pp. 501-502. 
328 Shrewsbury Chronicle, 7 Oct 1859, p. 3. Shrewsbury Chronicle is one of the oldest newspapers in the UK, 
with its first publication dating back to 1772. One of their most prominent journalists was Thomas Frost, a 
radical writer from a working class background. In the 1840s he was active in the Chartist and Owenite socialist 
movements, reviving the Communist Chronicle despite having very little money and working for radical liberal 
newspapers for much of his life. 
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than protect faith by directly responding to Mill, they often fixed their criticism on ineffective 
government and used this to comment how governance from the church would resolve all social 
and political problems. The radical and evangelical newspaper, Montrose Review, proclaimed 
that the government deserved their reputation as ‘unbecoming the character of any genuine 
reformer’329 and for this reason, people should return to their faith. 
 
Thus far, Mill’s criticism of Christianity has revealed how symbolic On Liberty became for the 
non-believer. However, the faithful were quick to respond and sought to damage Mill’s 
reputation. The negative reviews which followed noted two values which they claimed On 
Liberty did not endorse but could be found in faith. The two values were inclusiveness and 
charity.330 Initially, Christianity seemed to be winning the race. The Examiner noted that ‘we 
should follow the Christian precepts, which allow for the wide range of self-development, 
intellectual and moral’.331 For individual minds to be enlarged and strengthened, thoughts must 
be expanded to cover a number of subjects, rather than being restricted to one or two ill-
informed ones. The Kendal Mercury dismissed Mill’s anxiety that ‘free and daring speculation 
on the brightest subjects, is abandoned’.332 Belief in a God was intellectual laziness as far as 
Mill was concerned, bringing the wrath of the church down onto his head. This was despite 
keeping his Three Essays on Religion (and Autobiography) for posthumous publication.333 
                                                        
329 Montrose Review, 13 May 1859, p. 6. 
330 Mill is later charged with founding his argument against the morality of Christianity upon ‘a grievous 
misconception of the true character of gospel morality’ (Dublin University Magazine, Oct 1859, p. 400). The 
Rambler further charges Mill with distorting the facts of the development of Christianity (See The Rambler, 1 
Mar 1860, pp. 376-385). Dublin University Magazine wrote further that through doing so, Mill alienates a group 
of individuals who have a belief that Mill does not uphold. 
331 The Examiner, 20 Aug 1859, p. 533. 
332 Kendal Mercury, 26 Feb 1859, p. 3. 
333 Mill wrote three essays on religion. Two of these were written between 1850 and 1858, ‘On Nature’ and ‘On 
the Utility of Religion’. The third, ‘On Theism’, was written between 1868 and 1870. All were published by 
Helen Taylor, Mill’s stepdaughter, in 1874, a year after Mill’s death. ‘On Nature’ argued that people should not 
follow nature, we should ‘alter’ it where we can. For Mill, following nature is not employing your faculties of 
reason, ‘conformity to nature has no connection whatever with right and wrong’ (CW 10, p. 400). Mill wanted 
to improve humanity, and this meant changing nature, for imitating it was ‘the wickedest of men’ (CW 10, p. 
402). For Mill, little had been written on the usefulness of religion and this is an issue he took up in his essay 
‘On the Utility of Religion’. Mill wrote that ‘we are in an age of weak beliefs’ determined by a ‘wish to believe’ 
caused by ‘disinterested feelings’ (CW 10, p. 403). Building on his earlier publications, ‘The Spirit of the Age’ 
and ‘On Genius’, Mill was agitated by restraints on the free expression of character as well as the lack of use of 
the mental faculties. Like his previous essay on religion, Mill wanted people to act against ‘nature’ by 
employing their reason. Religion posed too much a risk to the development of individual characters to assure 
Mill that it posed no great threat. In the introduction to his final essay, ‘On Theism’, Mill stated that he looked 
at religious doctrines as a problem of scientific inquiry (see CW 10, p. 431-434). Mill’s final essay was 
concerned with the problem of God, where he listed several reasons, at the time of writing, as to why there is 
less conflict between believers and unbelievers. These developments have ‘rendered possible an impartial 
estimate of the doctrines and institutions of the past, from a relative instead of an absolute point of view’ (CW 
10, p. 429). Like his father, James Mill, John Mill believed that all legitimate beliefs must be grounded on 
evidence and ‘On Theism’ was Mill’s scientific examination into the existence of a God. However, whilst Mill 
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Despite Mill’s inconsistencies, it was not disputed that the liberty of thought and discussion 
and expression of public opinion would help us understand and further our knowledge.334 The 
strict conservative New Monthly Magazine wrote ‘that the chapter on liberty of thought and 
discussion is stringent in the extreme on the evil of silencing the expression of an opinion – 
which evil, it is contended, amounts to robbing the human race’335 of the freedom to discuss 
and challenge one another. They added that Mill’s characters of genius ‘are, ex vi termini, more 
individual than any other people – less capable’.336 In light of this, the degree to which Mill 
stressed the ideas of On Liberty renders it controlling and undemocratic as some people may 
simply desire not to be different. Whilst Mill’s claims were too radical to be employed in 
society, this didn’t mean that they ought to be dismissed altogether. The liberal-conservative 
newspaper, the Saturday Review, defended On Liberty, claiming that Mill’s call for characters 
of genius did not force a system of hero-worship. Mill did not want the strong to coerce less 
able individuals. On Liberty rather appoints individuals of genius to the position that they are 
justly entitled, ‘in order that the world may be shaken out of the self-satisfied mediocrity into 
which it is so much disposed to settle down’.337 
 
                                                        
maintained that religious views should be scrutinised, he noted the important role religion plays in society. Mill 
felt that religion would be better served if people directed their desires towards the general good. He wanted ‘a 
morality grounded on large and wise views of the good of the whole’, CW 10, p. 421. See further Alan P. F. 
Sell, Mill and Religion: Contemporary Responses to Three Essays on Religion. Robert Carr stated that the three 
essays were Mill’s attempt ‘to apply the canons of scientific induction to religion’. See Carr, ‘The Religious 
Thought of John Stuart Mill: A Study in Reluctant Scepticism’, p. 475. See Raeder, John Stuart Mill and the 
Religion of Humanity, pp. 87-144 for a discussion on Mill’s consistency between the three essays and the 
development of his thoughts on religion. See also Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, pp. 42-
54 for a consideration of how On Liberty played an important role in Mill’s agenda for moral and social reform. 
Also, Lou J. Matz, ‘Mill’s Philosophy of Religion’ in Miller, ed. A Companion to Mill, pp. 279-294. During his 
lifetime, Mill had the reputation ‘as an outspoken apologist for religious liberty, an admirer and critic of 
Christian morality, a sceptic on miracles, and an advocate that utilitarianism could be established as a religion’, 
p. 279. 
334 The Rambler did not comment in detail upon this chapter, noting just that Mill gives us four conditions in 
which he infers it is necessary to the welfare of society to allow liberty of thought and discussion. First, opinions 
may be false but public discussion is one of the few means to disprove them. Second, an opinion may be partly 
true and partly false, though a dissenting opinion may contain the truth which would complete the popular half-
truth. Thirdly, a received opinion should be vigorously challenged to prevent it becoming mere prejudice of an 
opinion of habit. Lastly, the meaning of the received opinion may be lost or obstruct the furthering of even 
greater truths. See The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, pp. 65-66. 
335 New Monthly Magazine, Apr 1859, p. 473. They added, ‘if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error’ (New Monthly Magazine, Apr 
1859, p. 473). This journal was published between 1814 and 1884 and was intended as a Tory competitor to the 
Monthly Magazine. 
336 New Monthly Magazine, Apr 1859, p. 476. 
337 Saturday Review, 12 Feb 1859, p. 187. 
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Critics took issue with Mill’s discussion on tolerance in his introductory chapter to On Liberty 
and such problems resurfaced when people engaged with chapter 2. Mill’s great disservice to 
the argument in favour of toleration was his ‘anxiety to prop it up with the rotten buttress of 
the duty of scepticism’. Mill’s case for greater public expression was a plea for liberty as ‘an 
inculcation of duties rather than a requisition of rights’. The Protestant and Unionist outlook 
of the Dublin University Magazine criticised Mill for reproaching individuals by ‘not allowing 
their faith in the collective authority of the party, the sect, the church, the class of society to 
which they belong’. They must abandon all of this if they are to have any hope of satisfying 
Mill’s principles. Ultimately, Mill had failed to distinguish the different natures of the subjects 
of opinions. Mill elevated truth to a higher platform but he should have been more cautious not 
to bend the balance of truths with falsehoods and he should ‘not persecute by way of propping 
up truth’.338 Mill wanted respect for the opinions of others as much as ‘emotional elasticity’.339  
 
Thus far, responses have stated that Mill improperly persecuted society by subduing the rights 
of the collective over his doubts of sustainable eccentricity within a community. The quarterly 
liberal-conservative periodical, The London Review, wrote that the most just way society can 
tackle the unlawful persecution of thoughts and opinions is to ensure ‘that every man has an 
absolute and irrefragable right to treat any doctrine as he thinks proper; either to argue against 
it, or to ridicule it’.340 Persecution after all subverts the opinions of everyone. Even in a court 
of law, these criminals find themselves used as scapegoats to crush the opinions of the working 
class.341 Mill is too premature in discussing liberty of thought and discussion but On Liberty 
                                                        
338 Dublin University Magazine, Oct 1859, pp. 387-390. This review from Dublin University Magazine is the 
most thorough in comparing On Liberty with Christian ethics. Adding further, this inculcation of duties ‘is when 
they with whom reside power, authority, influence of any genuine kind, understand that the rights of other men 
constitute their own duties, and that in conceding such rights they are doing no less justice to themselves than to 
others’. See further the Saturday Review, which notes that ‘duty to oneself means either prudence, or self-
respect, or self-development’ where none of which make a man accountable to his neighbour. Breaches of the 
duties arising out of the social ‘are the only proper subjects for punishment, either legal or social’ (12 Feb 1859, 
p. 187). The London Review notes that within religion, ‘churches are founded upon the right of every man to 
join whatever sect he most approves’ but there is no advantage in attempting to classify individuals into sects 
when trying to encourage an acceptance of differing opinions across society (Apr 1861, p. 141). The different 
natures of opinions which Mill fails to distinguish are complicated by men who ‘refuse to allow the sense of 
their own fallibility, individual or collective, to shake’ (Dublin University Magazine, Oct 1859, p. 390). 
339 The London Review, 13 Mar 1869, p. 243. They added that ‘the purport of the discussion is to determine 
what portions of our lives may be governed by State rule, by actual penal law; what portions may be 
legitimately subjected to the influence or discipline of social opinion; and what portions should be wholly 
exempt from the first’. The elasticity and adaptability of the law should protect the interests of the individual.    
340 Fraser’s Magazine, May 1859, p. 537. Fraser’s Magazine was a conservative journal, in circulation from 
1830 to 1882. 
341 See Fraser’s Magazine, May 1859, pp. 533-537. See further The Examiner, 27 Aug 1859, p. 549, which 
challenges this claim by writing that of every legislative change in recent years, ‘instead of imposing a heavier 
social tyranny, has added to the liberty of thought and discussion’. The Examiner ran from 1808 to 1881 and 
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was instrumental in raising this concern. From this angle, it can be reasoned that Mill did indeed 
seek to protect the defenceless but the problem in its reception was the lack of commentary 
supporting On Liberty as the work of an honest liberal with unquestionably good intentions. 
Mill needed to more obviously represent all interests and understand that society and its future 
was made up of more than a select few. But this view needs to be revised for the theory of 
liberty Mill outlines in his earlier essays was considerably more inclusive than critics of On 
Liberty allow. 
 
If the liberty of thought and discussion is to be respected across society, the conservative 
Fraser’s Magazine contended that men of letters have a responsibility ‘to defend the weak 
against the strong, and to uphold the poor against the rich’. On Liberty did not encourage 
intellectual and cultivated individuals to sympathise with those from any class other than their 
own, nor is the freedom of all Mill’s first concern. Unfortunately, Mill’s principle of liberty 
did not remove the ‘gross iniquity’342 practiced by a minority elite. However, Mill never sought 
to take opportunities away from individuals, only to add. The Saturday Review argued that 
injustice conquers because of such flaws, for it counteracts the true definition of the liberty of 
thought and discussion, which they define as ‘the liberation from the bondage of words’ 
resulting ‘in the liberation of speech’.343 Once someone has won freedom of thought for 
themselves, they naturally desire it for others. Bentley’s Quarterly Review picked out Mill’s 
estimate as resting ‘at the foundation of his appeal for immunity from all accountableness to 
their judgement on behalf of those who do use their reason’.344 Liberty is dependent upon the 
prevalence of strong and practical opinions. Reponses to this would have important 
implications for contemporary readings of Mill’s work. 
 
 
 
                                                        
was led by brothers John and Leigh Hunt to reform both government and journalism. They felt that literature 
was as important as politics and their paper is named after the eighteenth-century Tory mouthpiece. A very 
successful newspaper, circulation was over 7,000 by 1812. It was critical of the government, incurring multiple 
charges of political libel as a result. 
342 Fraser’s Magazine, May 1859, pp. 536-537. For a critical reading of this chapter, see Henry M. Magid, ‘Mill 
and the Problem of Freedom of Thought’, pp. 43-61. Magid notes that ‘Mill recognizes the need for intellectual, 
and perhaps moral, qualifications for admission to the arena of free thought and discussion’, p. 55. For this 
reason, ‘it is not possible to justify absolute and unlimited freedom of thought; nor is it possible, in Mill’s terms, 
to justify limitations on freedom of thought’, p. 43. 
343 Saturday Review, 27 Feb 1869, p. 272. 
344 Bentley’s Quarterly Review, Oct 1859, p. 447. 
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OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL-BEING 
 
Mill’s fundamental claim in chapter 3 centred around individuality as one of the elements of 
well-being.345 Mill contended that individual spontaneity is a good in itself, essential to social 
and individual progress and an opponent of conformity. Mill’s claim that there is a growing 
problem with the little value that society places upon spontaneity of conduct was central to 
public debate. The Rambler noted that the individual ‘should be free to use and interpret past 
experience in his own way, instead of having some customary rendering imposed upon him’, 
adding further that ‘conformity to custom, merely as custom, even though it may happen to be 
good, involves no practice of the faculties, no moral choice’. On Liberty is directed at ‘those 
who possess known landmarks and unalterable methods for the guidance of life and the 
discipline of the soul, as by those to whom all questions of the kind are still open’.346 The real 
danger throughout society resides in a uniform type of character. By advocating individuality, 
The Examiner suggests that ‘there is a sense in which selfishness is not a weakness, but the 
highest virtue’.347 It demonstrates the courage to break free from the crowd in order to bring 
the greatest of rewards for the individual. 
  
Mill’s Christian critics chose to ignore or respond very briefly to the chapter on individuality, 
reflecting their dismissal of the opinions which Mill offered. It was difficult to interpret Mill’s 
writings in a way which portrayed him as an advocate of faith, Christian perspectives exhibited 
how Mill’s scandalous book couldn’t be taken seriously without compromising belief. Writing 
in 1865, the Morning Advertiser suggested that Mill can enter parliament, but he is not favoured 
by Christians.348 Is it right that Mill should stand as an MP in Westminster whilst being ‘the 
most insidious and dangerous enemy’ of religion? On Liberty had demonstrated that it was not 
inclusive of religion, resulting in the Morning Advertiser claiming that ‘no Christian man can 
vote for him without seriously compromising his own character as a believer’.349 The Rambler 
                                                        
345 See Riley, ‘Mill’s Greek Ideal of Individuality’, in K. N. Demetriou and A. Loizides, ed. John Stuart Mill: A 
British Socrates, pp. 97-125. 
346 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, pp. 62-66. 
347 The Examiner, 20 Aug 1859, p. 533. See further Albert William Levi, ‘The Value of Freedom: Mill’s Liberty 
(1859-1959)’, pp. 37-46. Levi notes that ‘the argument is distinctly and unmistakably Aristotelian. The external 
inducement to such acts as are not congruent with our feelings and our character renders us passive and not 
energetic’, p. 41. 
348 Mill served as an MP for Westminster from 1865 to 1868 for the Liberal party but was not re-elected in 
1868. Instead, he moved to France where he later died in 1873. 
349 Morning Advertiser, 8 June 1865, p. 5. Morning Advertiser was founded in 1794 by the Society of London 
Licensed Victuallers. It was a paper devoted to trade interests rather than supporting a particular political party. 
It is England’s oldest continuously produced newspaper. 
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added that the ‘Catholic faith places a man in the best position for forming a sound ethical 
code, and extending it to new cases and exigencies as they arise’.350 This presented a problem 
for those who were torn between the comfort of their faith and the appeal of an individual who 
appeared to have a plan in place to reform society. This further led to allegations that rather 
than uniting society, Mill divided it.351 The problem for Mill was that the more frequently it 
was read, the more open it was to attack. 
 
Mill’s worries of an increasingly conformist society dominated the reception of chapter 3 of 
On Liberty. We have seen how suspicious readers were, often noting that ‘the spirit of progress 
and improvement may co-exist with the loss of individuality’.352 The Examiner asserted that a 
certain amount of assimilation is necessary for the complete development of individuality 
which is no different to the theory of liberty Mill expressed in his earlier writings. People 
needed to be immersed in society with its differing traits and opinions in order to understand 
what they as an individual value, cherish and believe. Yet Mill’s radical enforcement of 
individuality had encouraged distrust and uncertainty of On Liberty. The London Review added 
that Mill ‘should have avoided overstocking the market’ with such a forceful plea for 
individuality that ‘seems to be aggravating itself into a disease’.353 It is foolish to suppose that 
every single person who seeks to invite themselves into the heart of public life will only act in 
accordance with one another. Reactions put forth the counter-argument that living as a 
community is the surest way to live, rather than dispersing every individual as far from one 
another as possible. 
 
By 1861, Mill had developed a reputation as a ‘terrible tyrant’.354 No one felt that the pursuit 
of discovering truths would be affected by focusing on the community alongside the individual, 
nor was it felt that this would hinder individuality despite Mill’s caution at ‘the gregarious 
                                                        
350 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, p. 62. 
351 See Thilly, ‘The Individualism of John Stuart Mill’, pp. 1-17. Thilly reads Mill’s third chapter as calling for 
the need to strike a balance between the individual and society, he noted that ‘there is something of lasting value 
in the individualistic doctrine; and ‘oversocialization’ is no less to be dreaded than individualistic anarchism’, p. 
3. 
352 The Examiner, 27 Aug 1859, p. 548. 
353 The London Review, 19 Sep 1868, p. 345. However, for an account which revises this reading of Mill, see 
White, ‘Conceptions of Individuality’, pp. 173-186. White notes that ‘Mill’s account of individuality can be 
detached from his élitism, if it is not true that only a few are able to determine their own plan of life without 
succumbing to the pressures of custom and public opinion’, p. 174. White adds, ‘if we lower the demand, the 
cultivation of individuality may be able to become a universal ideal’, p. 174. 
354 The London Review, Apr 1861, p. 119. 
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imitativeness of mankind’.355 The potential evils caused by individuality are never discussed 
by Mill but The National Review warned that the social indifference which Mill favours ‘will 
result, not in individual vitality, but in individual indifference’.356 No one completely thinks 
for themselves as the bulk of our knowledge is received through interacting with others; 
isolation from a particular type of character in society from our early years would be the only 
means to fulfil Mill’s agenda.357 
 
Whilst Mill’s theory of individualism was continually targeted in the first ten years of the 
publication of On Liberty, this does not mean his ideas were not absorbed into public 
discussion. In considering the capability of the majority in achieving the highest faculties, Mill 
divided society. The Saturday Review claimed that denying ‘that there may be now living 
amongst us some eight or ten men of the first order, of whom two or three may ultimately be 
actually what they are potentially, would surely be rash’. When we consider a handful of people 
that we know, when asked to explain their character or personality, each one will certainly 
display such distinct features that are in many ways completely opposite, no two will be the 
same. Genius referred to someone who is a ‘vigorous, lively talent – combined with the habit 
of looking at things with your own eyes, and drawing your own conclusions’.358  
 
Human faculties develop within the individual, whether they are in a community or whether 
they are isolated but the social arrangements within society provide individuals with immense 
scope for the development of character. Mill is misguided in declaring that originality is 
ceasing to exist.359 Further responses from the Saturday Review stated that questions of how 
far he shall express his opinion, what he should read next, whether he should practice a 
religious doctrine ‘are questions which he is left to settle – not nominally, but practically – for 
himself’.360 Despite acknowledging the merits of individualism, it was proving difficult for 
                                                        
355 The London Review, 13 Mar 1869, p. 243. It was not felt by critics that individual characters would disappear 
through the process of social assimilation but simply class types, ‘to some local or social organisation’ (The 
National Review, Apr 1859, p. 394). 
356 The National Review, Apr 1859, p. 401. 
357 See Saturday Review, 27 Feb 1869, p. 273. It notes that from our earliest years, society has ‘been pouring 
into our minds opinions, ideas, prejudices, thoughts; what is peculiar to ourselves is for the most part merely the 
combination and form in which these are held’. 
358 Saturday Review, 19 Feb 1859, p. 214. 
359 The National Review suggested that individual character is not fading away but concedes ‘that there has been 
a loss of social intensity of character’ (Apr 1859, p. 395). 
360 Saturday Review, 19 Feb 1859, p. 213.
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Mill to persuade a majority of periodicals that his theory was the key to happiness and 
freedom.361 
 
Despite this criticism, the chapter on individuality spoke directly to the working class. Whilst 
radical ideas had been brewing long before 1859, On Liberty was what the working class 
needed to legitimise their movement for reform. This sudden realisation that they should be 
treated equally ultimately encouraged them to be more vocal of their opinions. But this moment 
of validation for Mill was short-lived. The politically radical Birmingham Daily Post was quick 
to express their resentment that Mill had debated against secret voting. This act would 
predominantly punish the working class and unveiled the deceit behind Mill’s allusion to his 
supposed ‘enforcement of the necessity for a large measure of reform’.362 The early philosophic 
radicals were notable for strongly backing the secret ballot as it was the fairest way to ensure 
there was no intimidation when voting, nor financial incentives or moral influences forced 
upon the electorate363 but Mill had now appeared somewhat elitist again. 
 
By 1868, Mill had been accused of being a ‘meddlesome’364 member of Westminster for telling 
people how to vote and what sort of character they should vote for. In response to Mill, critics 
noted that ‘this is a moderate age. It is not ton – it is not intellectual - it is not the thing, to be 
excited or exaggerated in any way’. The Islington Gazette, which chiefly published only local 
                                                        
361 See Ladenson, ‘Mill’s Conception of Individuality’, pp. 167-182. Ladenson considers where Mill abandons 
utilitarianism in chapter 3 but equally where he is consistent, concluding that we may suppose that ‘it is an 
unassailable philosophical defense of the freedom to act upon one’s opinions’, p. 179. See further Reeves, John 
Stuart Mill. Mill was ‘a second-rate utilitarian, but a first-rate liberal’, p. 49. 
362 Birmingham Daily Post, 8 Feb 1859, p. 2. Founded by the proprietor of the Birmingham Journal, John 
Frederick Feeney and John Jaffray in Dec 1857, Birmingham Daily Post established itself for the next 85 years 
as a leading liberal unionist newspaper aimed specifically at the business and professional classes. Jaffray was 
replaced by John Brunce in 1862, who was not only a founder of the National Liberal Federation, but ensured 
the newspaper played a major role in the reform movement in Birmingham. In the 1868 elections, three Liberals 
were elected in Birmingham and no Tories, which was assisted by the radical William Harris. 
363 See the article on the ballot from one of the early philosophic radicals and Mill’s father, James Mill, written 
in the Westminster Review, which encouraged secret voting on the premise that candidates are judged upon 
fitness for legislating. This is to prevent the use of intimidation, bribery or corruption to gain popular support. 
Until the ballot act of 1872, voting was a public activity and saw high levels of violence, bribery and corruption. 
Secret voting was seen as hugely important in the struggle against the aristocracy. 
364 Marylebone Mercury, 14 Nov 1868, p. 2. Articles for the Marylebone Mercury were written by William 
Hazell and George Watson. This newspaper was published weekly with a liberal outlook. William Hazell was a 
Liberal MP, a social reformer and a women’s suffrage supporter. George Watson, the founder, had also founded 
Family Mirror, a liberal periodical (1856-57) and though it failed, it represented his interests, both women’s 
suffrage and the family unit. Watson secured a second contract to continue publishing the feminist magazine, 
Alexandra Magazine & Women’s Social and Industrial Advocate alongside Marylebone Mercury. Jointly, 
Hazell and Watson printed the Women’s Signal and the Women’s Gazette (both were weekly feminist 
publications; the former was a magazine and the latter, a newspaper) to continue to address female political and 
economic interests. By 1887 they were managing 6 weekly publications, 32 monthly and 5 quarterly. 
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news, stated that On Liberty described an entirely impoverished and regressive society. These 
reflections were deeply similar to Mill’s earlier work, ‘The Spirit of the Age’, an essay 
unequivocally critical of England. The Islington Gazette noted that these were reasonable fears 
and whilst ‘society plants a hedge of thorns around this moderate society to keep all locked 
inside, including great minds’, a moderate society is considerably better than an overwhelming 
one. In light of this, very few could comprehend the value of On Liberty but they did not 
dismiss it; Mill was too unpredictable to ignore.365 
 
On Liberty had shown itself to be a work so radical that it could not be left unchallenged; it 
had awoken a working class consciousness which felt that Mill was attempting to explore the 
means of enhancing freedoms but simultaneously, how to take them away. Mill had a growing 
number of critics as more of his essay was read and engaged with. Despite this, he had a handful 
of loyalists who kept his reputation from collapsing under criticism. The liberal newspaper, 
London Daily News, proclaimed that On Liberty presented nothing less than a just and 
representative society for his ‘sympathies are ever with the suffering and degraded’. It was 
further claimed that Mill’s preference for ‘a social state where the virtues, even though coarser 
in grain and less brilliant in lustre are more widely diffused’ did not mean the sacrifice of 
working class rights. It was further argued that the ‘democratic virtues of energy, self-control, 
and self-respect’ are not sacrificed in On Liberty and contrary to depictions of Mill as an 
advocate of oppression, Mill ‘belongs to the party of movement’,366 inclusive to all. Whilst 
Mill’s ambition in writing On Liberty was challenged by his critics, attempts to demonstrate 
how it would protect social freedoms emerged in equal force, revealing the scope to which it 
could be interpreted and utilised. 
 
Even so, Mill’s chapter on individuality had closer links to society than many of his critics 
understood. Of commerce, the conservative Sheffield Daily Telegraph wrote that it caused 
‘great uneasiness among those entrusted with the government of the country’.367 Associations 
                                                        
365 Islington Gazette, 2 July 1859, p. 2. The Islington Gazette added that when Mill next treated the subject of 
social liberty, that he does so in the context of 1859. This is not only to help society relate to the issues he writes 
of, but to stress ‘this remarkable feature of society as it now is’ as it is not so despondent as Mill implies. 
366 London Daily News, 30 Aug 1859, p. 5. Founded in 1846 by Charles Dickens, the first editor, London Daily 
News was initially intended as a radical rival to Morning Chronicle. Dickens soon after handed management to 
his friend John Forster who ran the paper until 1870. It was further argued that Mill’s faith in his liberal creed 
made it possible to foster individual rights. Creating a community where each individual has mastered self-
control and self-respect will ensure his ideal for the good of the community. 
367 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 24 Oct 1868, p. 9. For two leading examples of journals reflecting the progress of 
the British socialist movement as well as trade unions and the cooperative movement, see the peer-reviewed 
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played a significant role in the working class movement during this period. Their frequent 
meetings and annual conventions were held in major cities around the country and were cited 
in articles by the chief newspapers of the period.368 The response was perhaps unsurprisingly 
positive. One of the leading Northern newspapers, the liberal Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 
claimed that in the 1850s, the people who exercise power ‘are not always the same people with 
those over whom it is exercised: it is not the government of each by himself but of each by all 
the rest’. What this led into was Mill’s discussion on the exercise of power and the broader 
question of when interference upon another is rendered legitimate or intrusive. These debates 
gained momentum at a time when parties were ‘as timid on reform as the next’369 and anti-
capitalist sentiments within specifically working class newspapers became more popular. For 
many, On Liberty certainly had its flaws but it was also proven to add something crucial to the 
cooperative and trade union movement which ultimately gave the working class a lifeline on 
which they could rebuild and push for reform. They were no longer willing to accept that 
decisions for them must be taken by someone else and sought their own autonomy. In light of 
this, many turned to the question of when liberty can be curtailed and if so, under what 
conditions.  
 
 
                                                        
journal of statistics, the Journal of the Statistical Society of London (1834) and Transactions (religious or 
political affiliation unknown) by the Manchester Statistical Society (1833), which published social and 
economic research. Dublin Daily Express argued that On Liberty revealed Mill’s obvious socialistic doctrines. 
Mill subtly called for the fall of the aristocracy if his argument for freedom was to be achieved. It was written in 
light of the 1867 reform bill (Dublin Daily Express, 5 June 1866). This was a unionist and conservative 
newspaper, particularly popular with the landed gentry and Protestant clergy. 
368 See Bradford Observer, as well as Birmingham Daily Post, Liverpool Daily Post (a non-partisan daily 
newspaper), Manchester Guardian and the weekly liberal Leeds Mercury. Alongside these major newspapers, 
socialist journals subjected new ideas to scrutiny, reporting on lectures and debates, where each journal had a 
primary focus. For example, The Economist (a weekly classical and economically liberal magazine) assumed the 
role of guarding laissez-faire liberalism, the Bee-Hive (a radical trade unionist weekly journal) researched social 
science and its relationship with the organised labour movement, the English Women’s Journal (a monthly 
feminist magazine) discussed women’s participation in debates on sanitation and the Law Magazine and Law 
Review (a quarterly legal journal) covered legislative expertise on issues of social reform. 
369 Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 19 Feb 1859, p. 2. Published from May 1858 by the Hodgson family for just 
over a year, the newspaper was taken over in late 1859 by the Newcastle radical Joseph Cowen Jr. who believed 
the paper pulpit was the best way to spread his radical creed to the masses. As a result, he received financial 
investments to make his paper ‘The Times of the North’. By 1873, journalist James Clephan launched a 
campaign on sanitary improvement drawing upon the social upheavals he witnessed in his youth. From the 
1860s, George Jacob Holyoake, one of the most radical journalists in the nineteenth-century, focused the 
newspaper on expanding the cooperative movement. The pamphlet on ‘reform’ in The Manchester Manifesto, 
further challenged the rule of political parties and their lack of motivation to enact reforms. They supported the 
sovereignty of the individual whilst conceding this was not an easy concept to define, it assumed importance 
due to the persistent liberal abuse of institutions in England. In what direction is liberalism heading when people 
can be persecuted and have their rights as an individual taken away? Social upheaval rather than isolationism 
was the preferred strategy, distancing themselves from Mill’s rhetoric. 
 75 
OF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
Chapter 4 of On Liberty engaged with the question as to when authority can legitimately limit 
individuality as well as further questions surrounding the sovereignty of the individual.370 In 
light of this, The National Review claimed that Mill’s objective in On Liberty was not to discuss 
a moral penalty for an individual on a charge of interference, but ‘that portion of it which social 
custom or political law is justified in inflicting for the purpose either of retribution or 
restraint’.371 The Rambler added that in light of Mill’s notion of self-regarding actions, a person 
who is grossly deficient in self-regarding virtues is still ‘amenable to society in respect of the 
spontaneous and natural consequences which flow from his conduct, viz. the displeasure, 
contempt, and avoidance of his neighbours; but not in respect of positive penalties’.372 Even if 
you consider Mill’s classification of self-regarding and other-regarding acts a morally artificial 
one, it was felt to be quite a justifiable position to hold that ‘the only legitimate ground for 
social or political penalty ought to be an injury to society or the state’.373 
 
However, if an individual is too deficient in his duty to himself, compelling him to act in a 
certain way which may bring about greater goods for the individual and society is permissible. 
Whilst the deficiency of any individual may be a direct result of the neglect in providing an 
early childhood education, enforcing a penalty is still appropriate. However, the monthly 
conservative periodical, Universal Review, noted that when the state feels the need to interfere, 
it generally does so in the wrong place and for this, you cannot punish an individual ‘for failure 
in duties which it has never taught them to provide’.374 In providing a clear distinction between 
authoritative interference and the preservation of liberty, The Rambler noted that ‘for the 
merely contingent or constructive injury which his conduct may cause to society, it is better 
that society should bear the inconvenience than that the principles of liberty should be 
infringed’. If society is at fault in failing to provide an education, it is equally at fault as the 
                                                        
370 New Monthly Magazine chose not to review this chapter of Mill’s work, writing that this section ‘has to deal 
with knots of an almost Gordian intricacy’ (Apr 1859, p. 477). 
371 The National Review, Apr 1859, p. 404. 
372 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, p. 68. 
373 The National Review, Apr 1859, p. 404. See further Ten, ‘Mill’s Defence of Liberty’, in Gray and Smith, ed. 
J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, pp. 212-238. 
374 Universal Review, Apr 1859, p. 242. For a discussion which compares Mill and Humboldt on positive state 
action, see Andrew Valls, ‘Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm 
von Humboldt’, pp. 251-274. For those who have little or no desire to develop their character, Mill noted that 
‘when the condition of any one is so disastrous that his energies are paralysed by discouragement, assistance is a 
tonic, not a sedative’, CW 3, p. 961. 
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citizen who has been deficient in duty. After all, ‘ill-judged attempts at the coercion of conduct 
generally end in a strong rebound in the contrary direction’375 and considerations to mediate 
should be cautiously weighed up. The National Review did not dispute that Mill felt strongly 
that people be left alone, ‘but virtually on condition that they shall not coalesce into a society 
and have a social or political life that may react strongly on the principles of individual 
action’.376 
 
So, how did Catholic periodicals in particular relate Mill’s theory of liberty to chapter 4? The 
Rambler labelled it a flawed theory for any Christian to adhere to as it is the ‘absence of 
accountability to any temporal authority’. Christians are accountable directly to God and 
coercion to aid individual development could only come from the church, for this would reveal 
the ‘intrinsic superiority of falsehood which they had formerly embraced’.377 The Rambler 
added that ‘coercion succeeds only when it produces higher moral results to the persons 
coerced than were attained under toleration’. Clashing over how to resolve this impasse, the 
expediency of coercion implied that the majority can be enlightened only by the appropriate 
teachers, which incidentally are only those who represent faith and are God’s servant first. 
 
However, deciding where to place limitations on liberty engaged more than just Mill’s Catholic 
critics. The Critic, a conservative magazine, claimed that Mill’s essay ‘never discovered that 
all freedom is in the first instance a moral and religious energy’. They added that limits ought 
to be placed upon interference from the state and society as faith can provide greater support. 
Mill maintained that the laws which forbid marriage until it can be proven that a parent can 
provide for their children do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state. Yet through 
maintaining this position, Mill sacrificed ‘every moral consideration, every spontaneous 
impulse, every ordinance of God’. The Critic condemned Mill’s treatment of liberty and 
                                                        
375 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, p. 68. 
376 The National Review, Apr 1859, p. 404. 
377 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, pp. 68-69. Dublin University Magazine noted that Mill ought to have 
distinguished between comparative and absolute injustice when claiming that Christianity was dangerously 
stifling opinions and in warning society of the dangers of immoral and impious opinions (Oct 1859, p. 392). See 
further the Christian Remembrancer, a High-Church monthly periodical, which considers Mill’s principle of 
liberty in relation to toleration, noting that whilst they agree with Mill on the conditions in which control can be 
exercised for the good of an individual, they profess the difficulty in defining what is meant by harm and dissent 
from Mill in calculating intent as well as the degree of harm inflicted (July 1859, pp. 177-200). Published 
between 1819 and 1868, Christian Remembrancer was a monthly church periodical, encouraged by the editors 
of the British Critic. 
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labelled it as something which ‘is not much more than hackneyed’378 continuing to threaten 
Mill’s reputation. 
 
Despite the inclusive and progressive image the church sought to build, Mill was concerned 
they would continue to extend their power and influence to a point of social and moral decline. 
On Liberty had outraged the Catholics, a community which Mill believed was committed to 
conformism and guilty of eroding individuality. Yet the Shrewsbury Chronicle praised Mill’s 
attack as what society needed to wake up and realise attempts made by the church ‘to regain 
supremacy over the minds of men which may lead to desperate measures in those rulers who 
rely on this church for support’.379 Religious writers impacted upon the reception of On Liberty 
in two ways. Firstly, it split readership between those with faith and those without. Secondly, 
much criticism was directed at Mill for his denunciation of the church and this engaged a new 
group of supporters. The Dublin University Magazine asked of the church, ‘why is my liberty 
judged of another man’s conscience?’380 What are we to have obedience to when such 
obedience crushes the abilities of human faculties? Such docility would surely bring with it a 
greater likelihood of the same type of pinched character that Mill disliked. 
 
The publication of On Liberty had brought with it a real test of faith for Catholics, Protestants, 
Unitarians and Evangelicals (these were the four religious factions which engaged with Mill 
and On Liberty). Through ridding society of sin and wickedness, a pledge for social reform 
would be more successful. Those who abused their power, acted corruptly or immorally, were 
sinners and as a Christian, it was their duty to intervene. The Montrose Review emphasised that 
Christian intervention on the basis of their moral duty to God came as a result of their ‘serious 
objections to Parliamentary conduct because of the abuses of power and true anti reforming 
character’. Politics was branded as a place where ‘the grossest jobbing; the most extended 
system of peculation of public funds is going on’ and where worst of all, ‘individual liberty is 
unknown’. Individual liberty would diminish sin yet too much individuality would result ‘in a 
dictatorship and total loss of liberty’.381 Many saw the public engagement of Mill’s essay as an 
                                                        
378 The Critic, 22 Oct 1859, pp. 390-392. See British Quarterly Review, which objected Mill’s claim that 
individuals with genuine opinions and convictions are being tyrannised by the majority. The majority do not 
have genuine opinions due to a ‘mere indolent love of quiet’ or a ‘moral cowardice’ but this does not 
automatically mean they tyrannise (Jan 1860, p. 194). 
379 Shrewsbury Chronicle, 7 Oct 1859, p. 3. 
380 Dublin University Magazine, Oct 1859, p. 407. 
381 Montrose Review, 13 May 1859, p. 6. George Troup was the editor of this Scottish Newspaper, he was also a 
committed member of the evangelical branch of the Church of Scotland, supporting anti-slavery and the 
temperance movement. Previously associated with Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine he was briefly editor of the 
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opportunity to stress the need to restore Christian ethics, to mediate between excess and 
deficiency and preserve the individual in a way that catered for all. 
 
Mill’s argument for moral improvement was not grounded on Christian ethics. The Rambler 
had claimed that it extended discussion concerning the laws of parental discipline which 
delegitimise coercion. Adding further, when employing punishment to direct the behaviour of 
a child, we ought to bear in mind that whilst ‘ethical principles do not change, the applications 
of those principles may vary with changing circumstances and relations’. The Rambler 
criticised coercion as it cannot possibly have the desired outcome to satisfy both Mill and the 
Christians. No legal or social coercion, nor moral suasion can be used in persuading another to 
act in accordance with their duty, even if it ‘could be ensured that all censors should be saints 
and men of genius, the evils inseparable from restraints would remain’.382 In this regard, no 
one in society has authority to infringe upon the freedom of another; both Mill and Christian 
readers would need to revise their arguments. 
 
We have seen how chapter 4 of On Liberty raised the issue of church and state relations. Mill’s 
discussion on the limits of authority over the individual was also read as an argument approving 
of laws forbidding marriage until both parties can demonstrate they have the means of 
supporting a family. The Leader argued that as long as those who wish to marry ‘have brains 
and limbs’, no one ought to question their ability to provide subsistence. The desire to provide 
for a family would in turn sustain industry as it remained the duty of each party to know in 
themselves how they are to provide for their children. It is not, however, the duty of the state 
or of society to interfere. The Leader added that Mill would have ‘the State require and compel 
the education, up to a certain standard’,383 disputing claims that Mill had an educational 
prejudice. The remarkable transformation of Mill’s public image highlights the extent to which 
he was controversial. The Critic even likened Mill to a ‘fanatical Malthusian’, with a creed 
                                                        
Liverpool Weekly Telegraph and the Montrose Review. Troup also wrote anti-corn law pamphlets and used his 
position at Scotland’s first daily newspaper, the North British Daily Mail, to campaign for greater awareness to 
Glasgow’s slums. By the 1860s, Troup became friends with the trade unionist George Potter and they were 
brought closer by the issue of a nine-hour working day. 
382 The Rambler, 1 Nov 1859, pp. 73, 62, 75. It is argued that in the early years of childhood, punishment is 
often the best means of succeeding in moral improvement. However, as the child passes into his youth and 
ultimately adulthood, punishment becomes an increasingly less advantageous means of managing the moral 
development of an individual. A point is ultimately reached where there are detrimental consequences for both 
the child and the parent when punishment is inflicted. 
383 Leader, 2 Apr 1859, p. 436. On Liberty was also described as a lengthy discussion which sought to ingrain in 
each of us a mentality ‘embracing all our social duties’, emphasising that Mill was an advocate for equality as 
every individual brought something unique to the prospect of human progress. 
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which thought that ‘little babies are a nuisance, and that big babies should spend all their time 
in what the Scotch called argle-bargling’.384 Mill’s essay had covered a great deal of ground. 
 
Thus far, Mill was criticised by both religious groups and those who challenged Mill for his 
thoughts on the family. Christians claimed that God gave everyone an assortment of gifts to be 
used to effectively develop individuality. On Liberty had stated that religion created an 
identical type of character. The Saturday Review responded that Mill failed to consider ‘the 
very parts of history in which great men were greatest, and in which individual energy was 
most highly developed, are just those periods at which the sentiment of obeying God was most 
powerful’. In catering for those who may not have already developed a distinctive character, 
religion nurtures those through the practice of faith to direct desires and passions. The Saturday 
Review added that the individual can only be awoken by religion. Faith in God’s will ‘in every 
action of life is the highest aim of human existence, far from being a slavish one’ and for this 
reason, it is ‘the noblest conception of life that any mortal creature can form’.385 For Mill, the 
individual would be awoken by developing a unique character and increasing their 
individuality and this could only happen when individuals direct their emotions and desires 
towards the general good for all mankind. 
 
The immediate responses to On Liberty demonstrate the difficulty in deciding when limits on 
interference have been met and where they can go further.386 Putting aside the many reactions 
of pure outrage, Mill’s argument was also interpreted as a defence of liberty against despotism 
of custom rather than against political tyranny. Fraser’s Magazine reflected upon society, 
noting that there is a ‘determination of society to exercise arbitrary sway over individuals’. 
Moreover, the mass of society is in a state of social slavery, each ‘bound under heavy penalties 
to conform to the standard of life common to his own class’. However, Mill’s theory of 
individuality would not release people from this social servitude. The argument for improving 
                                                        
384 The Critic, 22 Oct 1859, pp. 391, 410. 
385 Saturday Review, 19 Feb 1859, p. 214. Even if people understood God’s will incorrectly and acted in 
accordance with the will of the Devil, they are still developing a character and not crushing it. Human nature is 
corrupt and exercising the wrong will of God is somewhat to be expected but this does not mean that 
individuality is suppressed in any way. 
386 See Barry S. Clark and John E. Elliott, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Justice’, pp. 467-490. They argued that 
Mill’s position on freedom and government intervention was reliant on ‘a theory of justice to synthesize 
morality and expediency’, p. 483. They further wrote that Mill’s critique of government intervention was 
inextricably linked to economic prosperity and Mill’s celebration of free markets. In ‘many arenas of economic 
life, therefore, governmental action is likely to be inferior to free enterprise in contributing to productivity and 
material prosperity’, p. 484. 
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society could only come from within society and not by building our character in isolation 
through fear of what the community might do to it. The art of life which Mill discussed in his 
earlier essays surfaced again through the reception of On Liberty: ‘if society were more lenient 
to eccentricity, and more inclined to examine what is unusual than to laugh at it’, conduct 
would show itself to be more reasonable than all are led to believe. Challenging Mill’s thoughts 
on the need for greater individuality, Fraser’s Magazine noted that ‘our greatness is collective, 
and depends not upon what we do as individuals, but upon our power of combining’.387 This 
idea of uniting, of merging together, is crucial to understanding immediate responses to On 
Liberty. It seemed to his readers that Mill was seeking to build walls between those he was 
satisfied with and those he was not; the reception of his essay proves that his critics were 
determined to knock these walls down and encourage greater mobility between class but not 
gender. 
 
We have seen how Mill’s essay resulted in both praise and criticism upon publication. The 
reception in the first ten years are twofold. Firstly, there are claims that the value of liberty is 
lost if not protected by law and secondly, we must be wary of those who are in a trusted position 
to interfere and the abuse of power this might bring. The early reception of On Liberty did not 
stress the importance of individuality and liberty. It did however generate a multitude of 
different responses and raised questions over Mill’s use of provocative argument. Many 
claimed that On Liberty had neglected members of society, patronised others and ignored those 
who had an opinion or belief that Mill disagreed with. Together with the arguments Mill 
discussed, we must also consider the ideas which On Liberty did not uphold. We see little 
discussion from critics on the worth of the individual, whether Mill’s individuality is indeed 
the best course of action society ought to take or whether it is deeply unsound. Showing how 
On Liberty wasn’t simply a text exploring the nature of limits which could be legitimately 
exercised over an individual, it generated aggressive debates that perhaps Mill never 
anticipated, or perhaps ones he subtly encouraged. 
 
So, where does the reception of chapter 4 leave us by 1869? We have a basic interpretation of 
how people read liberty for Mill, but this is rarely developed further than a passing statement. 
The Church of England supporting Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette claimed that Mill’s liberty 
principle is only worthwhile if it is ‘liberty protected by laws’ and not something which permits 
                                                        
387 Fraser’s Magazine, May 1859, p. 527. 
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frenzied revolts which may bring harm to the individual and society. Whilst it does not 
distinguish between different types of interference, the implication is that coercion is 
legitimate. The Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette further commented that at the rate things are 
going, ‘we shall have reached that stage of advanced liberalism which Mr. Mill, in his Essay 
on Liberty, anticipates with so much alarm, wherein the intolerable despotism of the multitude 
tramples down all other freedom but its own’.388 Social control is vitally important to ensure a 
harmonious society. So, On Liberty did permit intervention in order to ensure liberty for all. 
The implication of this is that those who revolt do so because they do not know any better. To 
quell revolutionary activity, people may need to be coerced to keep their behaviour and actions 
in check and this was something critics felt Mill wrongly supported. 
 
Yet despite the inconsistencies and ambiguities in On Liberty, Mill is undeniably clear when 
noting which forces can be employed to suppress individual liberty and under what conditions. 
For the Evening Mail, legal intervention is the only satisfactory force which Mill discussed as 
a force ‘employed by society to crush the liberties of its individual members’.389 Whilst law 
may indeed protect the liberties of individuals, it may equally be subject to abuse and tyranny 
by those enforcing it. In such cases, the Newcastle Daily Chronicle raised the question of how 
is the ‘tyrant Society to be guarded against – to be limited and kept in bounds, so that human 
development in its richest diversity – as Wilhelm von Humboldt expresses it – may be 
answered?’390 The difficulty concerning Mill’s arguments and claims was not that people 
rejected his thoughts on intervention, they targeted specifically the means in which Mill 
proposed we do this. This reflects absorption of his ideas rather than rejection and Mill’s 
loyalists in the following decades would prove instrumental in bridging the gap between these 
two readings. 
 
Discussion on whether social punishment should be used to deter tyranny became increasingly 
common in light of On Liberty. Whilst concern for people tyrannising over one another was 
important, Bradford Observer posited that ‘perhaps greater dangers are to be guarded against 
by men, tyrannising over themselves’.391 That same year, Mill had written that public opinion 
                                                        
388 Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 24 Nov 1859, p. 3. See further Wollheim, ‘John Stuart Mill and the Limits of 
State Action’, pp. 1-30. Once power was in the right hands, any further limitations upon freedom were 
unnecessary. Wollheim describes how Mill’s principle never solves the issue of legislation, but it was not meant 
to, and goes on to defend him against criticisms which focus on whether action can only harm ourselves. 
389 Evening Mail, 4 Mar 1859, p. 7. 
390 Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 19 Feb 1859, p. 2. 
391 Bradford Observer, 27 Oct 1859, p. 7. 
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would serve a critical purpose as it ‘rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance to 
society’.392 Stifling any opinion is wrong as it prevents the possibility of discovering further 
truths. The liberal newspaper, Sheffield Independent, admired On Liberty as the only work of 
such nature – ‘a peg on which to hang a powerfully argued apology for liberty in its fullest and 
most absolute sense’.393 This in turn helps to explain the two extremes in which On Liberty 
was received. The only work on liberty of its day, it needed attention, and liberty in an absolute 
sense encouraged confrontation. 
 
APPLICATIONS 
 
Discussion on whether the application of Mill’s principle of liberty were regressive, or indeed 
a social offence emerged by those seeking to discredit On Liberty as well as those hoping to 
ground a safe application of it.394 There was little rejection of Mill’s claim regarding the laws 
forbidding marriage until it is proven that all can be provided for and this does not exceed the 
legitimate powers of the state. Instead, we see an adjustment to the application of this fixed 
ethical principle as the expediency of law restraining marriage depends more on whether this 
would create a greater social evil than what they would otherwise seek to prevent.395 The 
National Review wrote that the one social offence Mill discussed with sustained outrage is that 
of ‘early marriage on the part of men unprovided with certain means of supporting a family – 
the social crime of contributing to over-population’.396 Echoing previous claims that Mill was 
a fanatical Malthusian, this demonstrated one of the few instances where Mill and his critics 
agreed on an issue of social importance. 
 
Mill’s preference for all to refine their characters has been so far closely related to his concerns 
over subsistence within the family. Unlike Mill’s consideration of marriage and the family, his 
love of knowledge and truth resulted in accusations of ‘educational prejudice’.397 Mill was right 
                                                        
392 CW 18, p. 233. 
393 Sheffield Independent, 14 May 1859, p. 9. 
394 The Examiner, 20 Aug 1859, pp. 532-533. This article explores two applications of Mill’s theory, of 
education and marriage. The London Review commented briefly on the application of On Liberty, noting that ‘he 
is responsible for them; we are not’ and such difficult questions are only made worse by Mill’s lack of 
explanation. In so far as ‘not teaching respect for the opinions of others, the essay may almost be said to teach 
nothing else’ (13 Mar 1869, p. 244). 
395 A law preventing marriage should depend more upon local circumstances and feelings over whether or not 
two parties can provide for a child. See The Examiner, 20 Aug 1859, p. 532. 
396 The National Review, Apr 1859, p. 413. 
397 Dublin Review, July 1869, p. 75. An influential Catholic periodical published from 1836 until 1969. It was 
intended for a large audience by discussing Catholic opinions and non-religious matters. 
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to call for widespread education yet this was challenged for being unsustainable and exclusive 
to those who meet Mill’s requirement to educate others. If Mill’s agenda had been less radical 
and controversial, it may well have been received quite differently. Whilst the response to 
Mill’s discussion on applications is brief, it does help situate some of the reactions to Mill 
based upon the previous four chapters in On Liberty. For Mill, marrying someone and having 
children without the means to support them (such as providing them with an education), was a 
social crime. Education and toleration provided the anchor for much, if not all of Mill’s 
discussion within On Liberty. If these two principles were satisfied, the rest would fall into 
place. As we will see in the following chapter, the responses which Mill’s theory of liberty 
received from both critics and admirers challenge contemporary readings on the chief argument 
of On Liberty. These debates unveil both the complex nature of his work but equally how 
misunderstood it has been since 1859. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, On Liberty was reviewed extensively in the newspapers and periodicals 
between 1859 and 1869. Whilst a number of reviews merely skimmed over the surface of Mill's 
work, they demonstrate an active engagement with the ideas that Mill brought to public 
discussion. The diversity of debate On Liberty provoked shows that it was too radical to leave 
unchallenged and too important to ignore. It demanded to be read. Within the first ten years, 
On Liberty had proven its usefulness in representing radical politics and working class 
movements, outraging religious bodies yet simultaneously encouraging a greater relationship 
between religion, society and developing individual characters. Further readings reveal the 
reaction to Mill's socialism, encouraging gradual change in the democratic system rather than 
some of the radical suggestions proposed by newspapers. It was hoped that paying greater 
attention to the liberties of individual men would create a more harmonious community, where 
men are not hesitant in pursuing their own interests. 
 
This chapter has considered the reception of the individual chapters of Mill’s On Liberty. The 
introductory chapter was dominated chiefly by liberal and religious responses; articles were 
often written by clergyman or those supporting Catholics. Chapter 2 (Of the Liberty of Thought 
and Discussion) was widely discussed in conservative circles, particularly between strict and 
liberal conservatives. However, there was also growing interest amongst protestants and 
unionists and some radical periodicals. This particular chapter of On Liberty appealed to all 
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walks of political and religious life. Chapter 3 (Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of 
Well-Being) was clearly the most widely discussed. This is also the first-time feminist 
periodicals (newspapers and magazines) openly cited and responded to Mill’s argument. Both 
liberals and conservatives commented, as did radical trade unionists, legal journals, non-
partisan as well as classical and economic liberal periodicals. Chapter 4 (Of the Limits to the 
Authority of Society over the Individual) was dominated by articles from conservative 
periodicals along with those writing on behalf of the Church of England and other High-Church 
periodicals. Chapter 5 (Applications), Mill’s discussion on the application of his argument, was 
the least engaged with chapter but most interpretations came from Catholic periodicals. 
 
If we compare Mill’s earlier essays and publications with On Liberty, his 1859 essay was as 
controversial but less concise and for this reason, Mill was frequently challenged. The 
reception that Mill received rendered him a unique figure to the public imagination. Outraged 
by most, challenged by the rest and ignored by some, Mill’s case in On Liberty covered such a 
mix of debate that it was difficult to not challenge or question him. Despite the controversy 
surrounding On Liberty, there are two reasons as to why he had as many critics, challengers 
and admirers as he did. Firstly, Mill was an admired public figure and his ideas were of great 
social and political importance. By ensuring On Liberty was not hard to come by, reviews 
shared no geographical bounds, nor were they only replied to by representatives of one class, 
party or religion. The commentaries were extensive and considered almost every page and 
every word. In light of the different nature of responses to On Liberty, Mill naturally appeared 
more attractive at times to a particular group or person. If it wasn’t the anti-Catholic radicals 
or the working class, it was advocates for heightened legal power or the minority who wanted 
greater liberty and equality. These critics were some of Mill’s most effective representatives in 
spreading his ideas. 
 
Secondly, the majority of those that criticised Mill and On Liberty absorbed his ideas as they 
attacked them. This can be most effectively seen in chapter 3. Mill’s critics responded with a 
passionate defence of the ability of humankind to develop their faculties whether in a 
community or isolated from the crowd. We can see from the responses that many shared similar 
anxieties as Mill but clashed with the answers he had settled on. The scale of Mill’s intellectual 
achievement can be understood in relation to how his critics went about challenging On 
Liberty. Mill’s ideas influenced an understanding of the world around him and awoke an 
individual consciousness. Countless replies fell into the trap of using his rhetoric when they 
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sought to dismiss his ideas, reflecting not only the importance of what he had written but also 
the burst of life On Liberty put into debate on ideas such as liberty and freedom. 
 
As we will see in the following chapter, Mill’s ideas engaged the attention of other leading 
intellectuals. Together, they sought to make sense of the purpose of Mill’s essay, to revise 
controversial arguments in On Liberty and to defend Mill when he was fiercely under attack. 
In the following decade, Mill’s theory of liberty would be used to address further the question 
of when we can interfere with the liberty of another. Moreover, we see the emergence of 
discussion concerned chiefly with the defence of toleration. This will have a great impact on 
readings of On Liberty in the 1880s and 1890s when debate concerns the family and collective 
liberty most prominently. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Limits of Toleration 
1870 - 1880 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter revealed how comprehensively On Liberty was discussed within the first 
ten years of its publication. By the 1870s, responses attempted to discern what role the 
government should serve, it any at all. How was society meant to protect the individual? Was 
it permissible to interfere with the liberty of another in order to help them help themselves? 
The central claim which emerged suggested that law was justified in enforcing a shared 
morality. Since its publication, this would become the most devastating and sustained attack 
upon Mill’s essay. In a somewhat Hobbesian tone, Mill’s critics stated that people needed to 
be kept in hedges, to be contained from violating the liberty of others. This response 
demonstrates two points of reception: absorption as well as rejection. 
 
We have seen in the first ten years how Mill had been attacked from a number of commentators 
such as the Catholics, who launched a major attack on his theology. Whilst this weakened the 
reputation Mill had established by 1859, it did not do enough to prevent readers from discussing 
his essay nor did it really result in any major attacks. If anything, it was his controversial 
character which encouraged a response from a variety of critics. However, one of the most 
significant reviews of On Liberty was the publication of James Fitzjames Stephen’s Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity in 1873. Mill’s apparent individualistic agenda didn’t quite fit with Lord 
Palmerston’s Liberal party politics of the 1860s and Stephen seized the opportunity to provide 
society with a new identity focused on force and constraint. On Liberty came under renewed 
scrutiny as a result; it generated debates on paternalism and revealed the first of Mill’s loyalists 
who sought to preserve Mill’s reputation and represent On Liberty as a defence of toleration, 
one inclusive of all people and all opinions. 
 
We have seen how Stephen’s account of On Liberty claimed that Mill permitted too much that 
ought to be prohibited. Accordingly, On Liberty appeared to tolerate more than what most felt 
was acceptable. Yet for Mill, intolerance prevented people from considering different values, 
ideas and perspectives, all of which were vital to progress. This also addressed the question of 
 87 
why the state should be entrusted with promoting a tolerant and free society; for Mill, this was 
in order to provide equality to those who lacked it. Despite criticism, Mill was a strong 
champion of equality, believing that if people were more tolerant, society would prosper and 
progress. Toleration was essential for the advancement of a plural society, the compromise 
needed between differing political, social or moral values. This argument in relation to the 
reception of On Liberty will subsequently be addressed in this chapter. 
 
LATER EDITIONS OF MILL’S EARLY PUBLICATIONS 
 
By the 1870s Mill had written widely on progressive ideas. The System of Logic and the 
Principles went through an incredible eight and seven editions respectively until Mill’s death 
in 1873. We know that the first edition of the System of Logic circulated in relatively small 
circles in comparison to his other works (chiefly intellectuals and university students), yet also 
that it was not as eagerly read as Mill might have anticipated. Some however read the System 
of Logic as advocating social and political reform. We also know from the first edition of the 
Principles that circulation was significantly more widespread. The benefits of this for Mill 
were twofold: a larger readership was encouraged to participate in discussion and Mill’s work 
had addressed concerns which everyone could relate to on some level. This brief section will 
discuss the chief developments of these two works, noting the changes in their editions and 
what this meant for the development of Mill’s theory of liberty. 
 
The System of Logic 
 
Mill published a total of eight editions of the System of Logic, the last published a year before 
his death in 1872. The Academy stated that Mill formulated ‘the method with peculiar 
distinctness and estimate with caution and candour the extent of the philosophical beliefs that 
could be attained by it’.398 Whilst it was not given as much attention as his other works, it was 
not ignored.399 The first edition of the System of Logic appeared in 1843.400 It was met by 
several criticisms (Mill himself referred to these criticisms as being of controversial character), 
                                                        
398 The Academy, May 1873, p. 193. 
399 See The Examiner, 4 Feb 1871, Cambridge Chronicle and Journal, 18 and 25 Feb 1871 and Pall Mall 
Gazette, 4 Feb 1871. See ‘Stebbing’s Analysis of Mill’s Logic’ and ‘Killick’s Students Handbook of Mill’s 
Logic’ for further discussion on the role Mill’s work assumed in the decades after its publication. 
400 There were eight editions in total. The second edition was published in 1846, third 1851, fourth 1856, fifth 
1862, sixth 1865, seventh 1868 and the eighth, 1872, a year before his death. 
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from writers such as Bain, Dr. Whewell and Archbishop Whately. Mill would revise this work 
for the following thirty years until his death. The reception of the 1843 edition demonstrated 
how Mill’s text engaged minds in debate on liberty and freedom and by the 1870s, we see 
debate encourage self-legislation. The need to hold people to account and muster good 
government became the new rhetoric of progress, marking a decisive shift from the language 
used so prominently in the 1850s and 1860s. 
 
Unfortunately for Mill, the reception of the System of Logic in the 1870s was met with as much 
confusion and uncertainty as the first edition. Strong criticism came from Stanley Jevons, an 
economist and logician who noted that ‘Mill’s authority is doing immense injury to the cause 
of philosophy and good intellectual training in England’401 for his writings are so illogical that 
they represent all that is bad in philosophical developments of the period. The Observer, edited 
by both liberals and conservatives, noted that ‘his logic has nothing in it that is not in the Human 
Understanding and the Novum Organon’.402 Jevons led an upheaval which aimed to publicise 
the apparent inconsistency of Mill’s work and ultimately raised ‘the standard of insurrection 
against Mill’s logic’.403 Yet as we have seen, many criticisms were founded upon a mis-reading 
of the text altogether and for this reason, it is difficult to ascertain a clear reception of Mill’s 
theory of liberty in these later editions. 
 
Moreover, there was very little engagement with the System of Logic during the period between 
1843 and 1870, when disapproval appeared to halt further discussion. So, what does this have 
to do with Mill’s later writings on liberty? Mill’s writing style was the target of critics and the 
Exeter and Plymouth Gazette, a conservative newspaper, subjected Mill and his theory of 
liberty to far greater scrutiny. They argued that ‘the chapter on “Evidence,” in Mill’s “Logic,” 
did more than anything else to lead him into the false and treacherous “freedom” of an utter 
denial of Christianity’.404 The suspicion surrounding Mill’s faith, or lack of it, only further 
harmed his reputation as an intellectual and his critics were now beginning to make connections 
between his religious assault in On Liberty and his other works. Despite this, The Examiner 
remained one of Mill’s few allies. They described how, in the System of Logic, they found no 
discrepancies and it remained one of the key texts on scientific progress, far better than any 
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other work at the time. They added that Mr. Jevons fools himself in his ‘pettifogging verbal 
criticism’ and he shows ‘an amusing conception of the function of a teacher when he assumes 
that his whole duty is to cram text-books, with all their imperfections, into the heads of his 
pupils’.405 Mill’s supporters emphasised his influence on young students; his revised works 
were a ‘pure stream of correct thought’406 and demonstrated the value of challenging one’s own 
opinions in order to edge closer to the truth. Mill’s works were now read as championing the 
need to scrutinise opinions in order to develop an informed judgement. 
 
By 1873, the System of Logic was seen to be concerned with the individual. The Western Daily 
Press, a liberal newspaper, noted that Mill did more than just speak about wealth, commerce 
and wages. Mill had shown ‘that prosperity depended more upon the mental and moral qualities 
than upon these outward things’. In addition to this, Mill ‘dealt out even-handed justice to all 
classes’ where ‘many measures of reform were advocated in this book which had since become 
the law of the land, and the foremost men in the land were working for the reception of the 
remainder as established law’.407 The early reception of Mill’s works unveiled how he sought 
to reform legislation and advance the cause for equality, yet as Mill’s idea of tolerance was 
closely examined, critics would alter their reading of him. The System of Logic had initially 
dissatisfied readers for being inconsistent and elitist, yet by 1873, critics had noted an 
underlying focus on developing the faculties of the individual (more so after reading Mill’s 
discussion on free-will and human nature in book VI). The scope of subject and the problems 
which Mill observed in his writings could all be resolved by cultivating individual development 
and the Principles would be no different. 
 
The Principles of Political Economy 
 
By the 1870s, discussion on political economy often involved criticism of trade unions and 
their usefulness for economic development. Moreover, by rewriting, almost in its entirety, the 
chapter on property in the third edition of 1852, Mill downplayed most objections to a socialist 
system yet Mill’s discussion on land and property indicated the extent to which he championed 
equality; his writings on socialism essentially scorned society for failing to adequately 
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distribute between classes. Mill’s conception of socialism, after all, was itself a combination 
of individual liberty, shared interests and equal participation. Whilst condemning the labouring 
classes as unfit and incompetent to make any decisions regarding the community of ownership, 
Mill maintained that the greatest possible freedom was in relation to ownership of property, 
individually or communally. The conservative, pro-Church of England newspaper, Leamington 
Spa Courier, noted that ‘it must never be forgotten that a nation, just as much as an individual, 
is bound to give value for all it receives’.408 In contrast, Cork Examiner, a Catholic newspaper, 
added that ‘principles of political economy declare that there should be no monopoly’ for it is 
more beneficial to society to have multiple contributors to the markets as opposed to a single 
market and the exploitation this can bring. After all, political economy is the ‘science of the 
accumulation of wealth’.409 It seems that Mill’s earlier comments on the value of collectivism 
had been noted. The liberal newspaper, Burnley Gazette, had condemned trade unions for their 
‘unwise and unjust interference with capital’. Cairnes added that ‘the simple process of leaving 
people to themselves’410 would be most expedient. Echoing Mill’s concerns in 1859, leaving 
people to manage themselves would not only prove to be the most utilitarian outcome but it 
would likely usher in a period of economic prosperity and stability. 
 
The Principles was met with praise from the start. Discussion on the need to establish a fair 
and just relationship between labour and wages had surfaced prior to 1848. The later editions 
of both texts reveal much continuity in the manner in which they were received. The System of 
Logic was eyed with suspicion and frustration. The Principles was met with increasing levels 
of support, for Mill had directly addressed a concern most in society could relate to, the risk of 
a stationary state and a lack of economic growth. Workers needed to be happy and in order to 
sustain that, they needed to have liberty, exercised through their individuality. In this regard, 
the later editions of the Principles sanctioned more state intervention than On Liberty had in 
1859. As the brief reception of these later editions demonstrates, Mill and his commentators 
would agree on some key points; the need to educate society and ensure people were genuinely 
free, balanced by an intuitive yearning to unite society. 
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The Principles had initiated discussion specific to the balance between individuality and 
collectivism that didn’t have the ‘baggage’ On Liberty seemed to carry with it. The Westminster 
Review noted that there was a growing competency of ‘all classes to learn by practice to 
combine and labour for public and social purposes’. In light of this, people will still work harder 
for individual benefit as opposed to the communal good, so ‘why should it be more difficult to 
persuade a man to dig or weave for his country than to fight for it?’411 Ultimately, the Principles 
was impressive and sought to influence legislation in securing ‘freedom of industrial enterprise 
and of contract, as the one and sufficient solution of all industrial problems’.412 Freedom was 
essential, yet the use of restraints to direct action would more directly resolve industrial 
problems than if people managed it themselves. Helping people to help themselves was 
becoming an appealing option. 
 
The claim that the community is of greater importance than the individual resurfaced in light 
of Mill’s later publications. The Westminster Review noted of the Principles that ‘while still 
repudiating the tyranny of society over the individual which most Socialistic systems involve, 
he came to look forward to a time when the division of the produce of labour will depend less 
on the accident of birth, and it will be more common for all to labour strenuously to procure 
benefits that shall not be exclusively their own, but will be shared by the society of which they 
are members’.413 Critics previously claimed that Mill failed to convince his readers that he 
wanted to break down the barriers of social mobility but this is an attitude he always held. By 
early 1874, however, critics noted Mill’s thoughts on the importance of the community in 
cultivating good individuals. 
 
Burnley Gazette noted that ‘you have to maintain what you believe to be the just rights of 
industry, and sometimes, as you know, you do things which many people do not approve, and 
which, probably, when you come to think more cooly of them, you may even doubt the wisdom 
of yourselves’.414 Mill had not suggested that we interfere with individual choice per se. After 
all, this was one of the core features in developing unique characters. By 1879, responses noted 
that the Principles ‘is directly applicable to the working classes for they are most concerned 
with labour and capital’.415 The Academy praised Mill’s work for restoring ‘to political 
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economy that natural connexion with the general science of society and art of government 
which it had almost lost in the hands of Adam Smith’s successors’.416 The value of collective 
involvement spanned all aspects of daily life and much of Mill’s success was because he 
‘humanised it’ for he ‘showed that its principles were the beneficent necessities that guarded 
human wellbeing, that they were, in fact, the laws of nature’.417 
 
Accordingly, this fundamentally underlines Mill’s sanctioning of cooperatives, which grew 
from the 1820s via his reflections on Coleridge. Mill had commented that for those who cannot 
help themselves, the state can play an integral part. The extent to which men are proprietor of 
themselves indicates the scale of modern growth; after all, the ‘government can do something 
directly, and very much indirectly, to promote even the physical comfort of the people’ and to 
‘teach the people what is in theirs’.418 Stressing the need for independence of thought, self-
autonomy taught ‘the working classes the value of honesty & intelligence to themselves’, 
initiating a great ‘moral revolution in society’.419 Mill’s support of paternalism become 
apparent here for he noticed that the working-class not only needed to be educated to a higher 
standard but given the independence to manage their own interests.  
 
In promoting worker cooperatives, Mill noted ‘the association of the labourers themselves on 
terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, 
and working under managers elected and removeable by themselves’.420 For Mill, cooperatives 
both enhanced productivity and reduced inequality without the need for excessive and 
potentially regressive state interference. The power of combining not only increased 
productivity but encouraged people to self-govern in a way which not only considered 
individual interests but also those of the community. It is vital to read Mill’s plea for 
individuality in this manner; making the working-class their own master gives them the 
freedom to cooperate with others, indispensable for the type of individuality Mill champions. 
For Mill, participation in cooperatives was an expedient way for a greater majority to work 
together for the shared interests of the community, something he unpacked in the Principles. 
 
                                                        
416 The Academy, May 1873, p. 193. This is perhaps the clearest attempt to read Mill’s theory of liberty in the 
System of Logic and the Principles in conjunction. 
417 Western Daily Press, 19 May 1873, p. 3. 
418 CW 10, p. 156. 
419 CW 15, p. 546. 
420 CW 3, p. 775. 
 93 
So, if we look exclusively at the Principles, by the late 1870s, Mill had developed a reputation 
as a man of sound values and not overly invested in the affairs of Westminster. It was Mill’s 
brief spell though as an MP in the 1860s and failure to be re-elected which possibly saved this 
reputation. Leamington Spa Courier had noted that ‘the principles of Political Economy 
enunciated by modern politicians are erroneous’,421 and ought to be replaced by the principles 
as explored by writers such as Smith and Mill. Commentators praised Mill’s work for giving 
‘workmen a direct interest in the business they were engaged in in the shape of a percentage 
on the profits’.422 Mill’s reputation was somewhat safe by the early 1870s, but he required the 
defence of his loyalists from this period onwards to preserve his title as the prophet of liberty. 
 
JOHN MORLEY AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION 
 
The later reception of the System of Logic and the Principles paved the way for John Morley’s 
defence of On Liberty. We have seen emphasis on developing the individual within the 
community, the need to distribute evenly between social classes and perhaps most relatable to 
Morley, the importance of keeping social reform and party politics separate. As with Mill, 
Morley did not oppose state intervention, permitting it when it can help those unable to help 
themselves. In 1874, he wrote his work On Compromise. Published as a series of five essays, 
On Compromise originally appeared in the fortnightly liberal magazine, The Fortnightly 
Review, ‘to consider, in a short and direct way, some of the limits that are set by sound reason 
to the practice of the various arts of accommodation, economy, management, conformity, or 
compromise’.423 Morley considered whether we should ever hold back opinions and whether 
we ought to conceal our thoughts. The Examiner noted that Morley’s aim was to find out ‘one 
or two of the most general principles which ought to regulate the practice of compliance’. On 
Compromise addressed the decisiveness of political parties and the need to mediate between 
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their interests. More importantly, Morley added to On Liberty, stating that there was a need to 
ensure both liberty and state power were always balanced, an idea which would appeal to many 
more than Mill’s essay had in 1859. 
 
The Examiner provided one of the most comprehensive and engaging responses to Morley’s 
work in relation to On Liberty. They compared it to the ‘Character of a Trimmer’, a 
seventeenth-century piece written by the statesman and politician, George Savile, Marquis of 
Halifax. In Halifax’s work, these trimmers ‘mediated between the extremes, as being at once 
the ballast and the rudder of the vessel of the State, preventing it from capsizing when pressed 
too heavily on one side, and from shipwreck when propelled too violently in one direction’. 
Morley outlined a doctrine of moderation on discussions of liberty, freedom, restraint and 
protection that maintained a balance of power, serving all interests. This would mediate 
between ‘unbound tyranny and extravagant liberty’, for each one needed to be tamed if progress 
was ever to be achieved and this was an issue taken up by Mill’s critics in 1859. 
 
Thus far, it seems that Morley had achieved something with his essay which Mill had not. 
There is something problematic that comes with unlimited freedom: the freedom to do wrong, 
the freedom to harm others, to be a nuisance and cause offence. As The Examiner added, 
Morley sought to ascertain ‘whether there are any exceptions to the doctrines of ‘Liberty of 
Discussion’ as laid down by Mr. Mill’.424 Alongside this, the Saturday Review observed that 
society was so intolerant that men ‘should be so strong in speaking out their minds one way as 
to be ready to burn or embowel the man who speaks out his mind another way’.425 In his earlier 
publications, Mill had expressed the need for freedom of expression and thought and Morley 
had continued this by exploring the limitations of tolerating the opinion of another. 
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We have seen how the problem of intolerance (particularly religious), played a key part in 
Mill’s works and this is something we see cross over to Morley’s essay.426 It was also 
something that gained attention from a number of periodicals. The Athenaeum noted that if an 
atheist accepted an invitation to a country house belonging to those of faith, it is not his duty 
to go to church on Sunday morning. The atheist, ought, under the circumstances, to say ‘I shall 
not go to church with you and your family, and I shall not do so because I am an atheist, and 
hold your religion to be an abominable and degrading superstition’.427 Like Mill, Morley 
warned of an increasingly hostile society, reluctant to accept opinions which were not 
orthodox. In light of this, The Academy noted of Morley that ‘parts of the present essay may 
be read as a sighing confession that it is growing very hard to be a consistent Liberal’.428 This 
may explain why commentators felt Mill was inconsistent too. 
 
Works such as On Compromise addressed if there are exceptions to free discussion and whether 
an individual can coerce another opinion. Yet there is something problematic in forcing people 
to form an opinion and this is noted in responses to Morley. People should not feel they cannot 
decide for themselves. Making up our minds seemed to be a lost art, Morley himself had a 
personal grievance with this, leaving university after a dispute with his father who insisted he 
become a clergyman. Even so, responses from periodicals such as The Athenaeum contended 
that they were unable to ‘agree with Mr. Morley either in his premises or in his conclusion’,429 
with The Examiner adding that his notion of the positive duty of making up our minds ‘savours 
perhaps too much of a rigid dogma’.430 The Contemporary Review, a quarterly magazine 
intended as a church-minded counterpart, noted that if Morley maintains ‘“history is a huge 
pis-aller,” where is the storehouse in which he looks for our sanctions or our 
encouragements?’431 Morley’s essay had naturally built upon On Liberty. It added to the 
material discussed in 1859 but was less argumentative and ‘more distinctly a pièce 
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d’occasion’,432 yet he could not quite persuade readers of the appeal of self-autonomy and free 
choice. 
 
Upon reading Morley’s essay, compromise became ‘the recognition by upright and intelligent 
persons of their occupation to a greater or less extent of a common ground, the boundaries of 
which may be extended or left undisturbed without derogation to good feeling or self-respect 
in either case’.433 However, for the majority not felt to be upright nor intelligent, Mill’s support 
for paternalism would provide them the opportunity to help themselves, creating a greater sense 
of equality within society. By 1874, critics were asking ‘how far and under what circumstances 
the minority ought of their own free will to abstain from speaking out their whole mind’ and 
‘how far the individual does right in yielding to the uninformative pressure of the majority, and 
being restrained thereby from expressing his own thoughts and living his own life’.434 For the 
first of these points, Mill would likely answer ‘never’, unless it causes harm to another; for the 
second, Mill would likely remind them of the lack of progress accountable due to uniformity. 
There was an air of hesitancy in people speaking freely, for many were too concerned with 
offending or insulting another, even if this assisted progress. Yet individual intolerance was 
not the greatest threat for Mill and Morley; social intolerance was guilty of keeping many a 
prisoner in their own mind and until they were able to exercise their liberty, there would be no 
progress. 
 
Accordingly, the Saturday Review observed that England was in ‘an age of great insincerity’ 
as men and women do not speak freely as they are fearful of the repercussions. It is ‘one of the 
weak points of our political system that it has a tendency to lead public men to an imperfect 
utterance of opinion, and thereby to an imperfect formation of opinion’.435 The Athenaeum 
added that Morley’s grievance ‘is that the majority of men are indifferent to truth, and amenable 
only to the lower and baser considerations of expediency’.436 Moreover, the ‘impossibility of 
inspiring men who do not exactly know or particularly care what they think about’437 revealed 
the crucial role of state or individual coercion/suasion in encouraging people to expand their 
interests and challenge their beliefs so they can develop a unique character. Echoing Mill’s 
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concerns in On Liberty, the Saturday Review wrote that men have ‘no distinct opinions. They 
come to say whatever is the right thing to say, if not with any fervent belief in it, yet at least 
without any unconscious unbelief’. People had never been encouraged to think outside of what 
the norm was; for this reason, progress was a foreign language, to be stationary was the new 
fashion. 
 
The extent to which people were prevented from freely expressing their thoughts and opinions 
was becoming increasingly clear. The Saturday Review noted that men ‘do not profess their 
genuine opinions, but such opinions as they think are likely to be acceptable to the electors, at 
any rate to the electors of their own party’. Society had a long way to go if their chief concern 
was that not all men could freely declare honest opinions; for Mill, an equal anxiety was that 
women were consistently ignored. This closely ties in with Mill’s discussion on truth 
throughout his works; the lack of truths are due to people saying what others want to hear and 
not being honest, perhaps in fear of the many who are intolerant. At least this would encourage 
them to compromise, satisfying Morley’s objectives. This extended beyond the realm of 
politics too. The Saturday Review added that those ‘who disbelieve in Christianity do not 
openly profess their disbelief’.438 Specifically discussing Socrates and Christ, two figures who 
were both put to death because of what they proclaimed, Mill noted that ‘history teems with 
instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed for ever, it may be thrown back 
for centuries’.439 
 
What Morley showed is that we have an intellectual responsibility to express our opinions. 
This is something both Mill and his commentators agreed with. The Examiner noted that ‘to 
put off forming clear opinions about a subject till it is ripe for legislative action is absurd for 
many reasons, but chiefly for this, that it is by the force of opinion that great changes are 
accomplished’.440 The Contemporary Review further called for the genuineness of thought or 
belief, writing that ‘a man’s profession or belief, or his acquiescence in the teaching or 
profession of beliefs by others – whether the belief be political or religious – should be 
absolutely sincere’.441 After all, it has become something of a national sin ‘to carry out half-
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accepted principles to their legitimate practical conclusions’.442 Mill had championed the need 
to express sincere opinions and by the 1870s, his readers seemed to take seriously the threat 
this posed to both the community but also individually. However, society was still not as 
inclusive as Mill would have hoped and collectively, they were intolerant towards women and 
men, particularly on electoral matters and social expectations of women as wife and mother in 
the private sphere. Despite three reform acts in the 19th century (1832, 1867 and 1884), women 
could not vote and even by 1884, just under half of the male population were excluded too. 
 
INDIVIDUALISM TO PATERNALISM 
 
By the 1870s, paternalism was considered to be the best mediator between tyranny and liberty. 
Mill maintained that many people (he noted the young and mentally unsound) are unable to 
make rational decisions, resulting in accusations that ‘Mill evidently does not see that “current 
opinions” have more vitality in them than he suspects. That they are a social power has clearly 
never struck him’.443 Mill felt that the ‘growth of social equality, and of a submission to public 
opinion, should impose on mankind an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion and 
practice’.444 However, the conservative publication, Saint Paul’s Magazine, noted that ‘a man 
who will neither enter unintellectual society nor consort with anyone who differs from him in 
opinion, practices an unconscious self-indulgence analogous to the care of a valetudinarian for 
freedom from disturbance and for an equable temperature’. They added further that ‘in 
precisely the same spirit, religious bigots and other leaders of cliques and coteries confine 
themselves to the society of those who echo or share their opinions’. This repeated Mill’s claim 
that individuals needed to be different. However, critics stated that Mill subtly asked for 
‘voluntary self-seclusion’.445 Mill had long warned of the dire consequences if one continued 
to partake in a community which had fixed, unyielding beliefs and a further anxiety of his was 
the impact this had on the community. 
 
We have seen earlier readings which claim that liberty is only liberty if protected by laws. By 
1879, this had not changed. The individual was not free to do as they liked and if they did, 
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intervention was permissible on the grounds of protecting liberty for all. Dundee Evening 
Telegraph, a liberal and reformist newspaper, noted that liberty is the ‘full protection to every 
man who is doing right – protection in his person, in his property, and in his reputation’. They 
added, however, that liberty is not ‘freedom to do wrong’.446 Shetland Times, a local 
newspaper, added that ‘it is essential to liberty that men should be subjected to the restraints of 
law; and where this interest is limited by a wise regard to the best interests of the State, there 
men are free’. It added further that ‘the highest degree of civil liberty is enjoyed where natural 
liberty is so far only abridged and restrained’,447 necessary and expedient for the safety of 
society. Man ‘is a social being, needing help above and around him, and unable to evolve any 
sound conception of liberty unless trained also in the school of law’.448  
 
The liberal newspaper, Manchester Evening News, wrote that ‘people had been following 
dreams of liberty created out of their own foolish ideas, they had not only failed to obtain 
liberty, but had brought upon themselves ruin and desolation, and their liberty had ended in 
smoke and flame’. Every man was ‘afraid of his neighbour – every man disposed to shut up 
his neighbour in prison because he was afraid of him’. Liberty whereby ‘every man allowed 
his passions to run as they would was no liberty at all’.449 In this sense, liberty needed to be 
curbed first and foremost by the individual; if and when this was not fulfilled, the state or 
society had an obligation to intervene and restrain behaviour that was deemed a nuisance. The 
interests of the state were dependent upon people making not just any choice, but a wise one. 
 
Dundee Evening Telegraph reasoned that the liberty to exercise our desires is when the 
individual can sit ‘under his own vine and under his own fig tree, with none to make him 
afraid’. The desire for restraints was greater than ever to stop those ‘plucking his neighbour’s 
fig tree’450 as he sees fit. Manchester Evening News observed that liberty ‘began in a man 
getting free from himself – from his own passions’.451 Shetland Times noted that whilst civil 
liberty can stress the importance of individual decisions, it ‘is not freedom from restraint. Men 
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may be wisely and benevolently checked and controlled, and yet be free. No man has a right 
to act as he thinks fit, irrespective of the wishes and interests of others’. Contrary to Mill’s 
recommendations, a majority of responses emphasised their concerns at permitting too much 
liberty and perhaps it was better for everyone if this was curtailed in order to keep bad 
behaviour in check. Necessary force could be applied, and this transcended the realm of self-
regarding and other-regarding actions. 
 
The recurring argument that government is there for the good of the people dominated 
responses to Mill. Shetland Times added that ‘the life, liberty, and property of no man should 
be infringed upon, except by process of law – that every man who respects and obeys the laws 
has a right to protection and support – and that all that is valuable in civil institutions rests on 
the intelligence and virtue of the people’.452 The point of being free is not to have unrivalled 
opportunities to act in any manner you see fit. Liberty permits control and the monitoring of 
individuals for a more harmonious community. For this reason, the claim that ‘there must be a 
screw loose somewhere’453 in On Liberty became an increasingly widespread interpretation of 
Mill’s essay. 
 
Debate surrounding On Liberty in the 1870s condemned acts which were unconstitutional and 
subversive of morality. Social duties or freedoms were discussed in terms of whether you have 
a legal or moral right.454 Responses discussed the rhetoric of legal moralism with regards to 
what is permissible, further reflecting the problem of intolerance. What is not to be tolerated is 
that ‘individuals or cliques, clubs or parties shall take into their hands the power of secretly 
dooming men to death and suddenly executing the vengeance thus privately decreed’.455 The 
enforcement of a legal code is necessary for the protection of liberty, even if there is a strong 
case that the introduction of something of this nature may itself be a liberty-limiting principle. 
 
However, the Western Gazette (non-partisan until 1886 when it was sold to the conservatives) 
condemned the need to build boundaries and hedges around individuals as well as social 
groups, claiming that part of the struggle for progress is because ‘the tendency of modern 
                                                        
452 Shetland Times, 15 Sep 1873, p. 4. 
453 The Examiner, 7 Dec 1872, p. 1197. 
454 See Warder and Dublin Weekly Mail, 15 July 1871, pp. 6-7. Furthermore, see the following conservative 
newspapers, Carlisle Patriot, 5 Oct 1877, p. 3, Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, 7 Jan 1876, p. 3 and 
Bolton Evening News, 22 Nov 1871, p. 4. 
455 Bolton Evening News, 22 Nov 1871, p. 4. A daily newspaper publishing local news. 
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legislation is to interfere with individual liberty’, as opposed to protecting and enhancing it. 
The article later conceded though that interference can be permitted in specific cases, for 
instance, in situations where a parent fails in their responsibility to educate their children. 
Failure in this responsibility enables the state to take ‘children by force and send them to 
school’.456 Yet persecution must be mediated for there is a ‘tendency of this facile repressive 
legislation to make those who resort to it, neglect the more effective, humane, and durable 
kinds of preventative legislation’. It is wrong for the majority to resort to enforcing law simply 
because they can, after all, ‘only on condition of liberty without limits is the ablest and most 
helpful of “heroes” sure to be found’.457 
 
We have seen how responses absorbed and differed with the ideas of On Liberty. Many claimed 
that if needed, the state or another individual can legitimately interfere in order to foster good 
moral convictions. Others, however, such as the Dewsbury Reporter, which chiefly commented 
only on local news, maintained that the government has no right to exercise coercion in matters 
affecting the liberty of the subject. Coercion ‘was not in accordance with individual liberty, 
and with his and their individual convenience, and not in accordance with their interests’.458 
There is, therefore, a ‘need to affirm the expediency of legislating for the proper reception, 
detention and management’ where ‘society has a right to interfere with the liberty of another 
until it is safe for the public and until their reclamation’.459 Accordingly, this resulted in 
discussion as to what the best form of government was, responses inspired by both On Liberty 
and Considerations on Representative Government. 
 
Mill himself had noted that ‘one of the greatest dangers, therefore, of democracy, as of all other 
forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of 
class legislation; of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the immediate 
                                                        
456 Western Gazette, 1 Apr 1870, p. 3. Hodson however noted six categories which permit paternalistic 
intervention. These are ‘ignorance, emotional stress, compulsion and undue influence, mental illness, 
nonrationality, serious harm’. See Hodson, ‘The Principle of Paternalism’, pp. 61-62. See further Edward 
Sankowski, ‘“Paternalism” and Social Policy’, pp. 1-12. Sankowski notes, ‘for those below the age of legal 
adulthood, Mill concedes and even seems to approve many “paternalistic” interferences with liberty. He seems 
to regard this period of life as providing society’s chance to instill characteristics which are among the 
conditions making later paternalistic interventions unjustifiable’, p. 6. See further Himmelfarb, On Liberty and 
Liberalism, pp. 116-120 where it is suggested that Mill adopted a far more interventionist strategy when it came 
to parental responsibility. 
457 The Fortnightly Review, Aug 1873, pp. 240-241. 
458 Dewsbury Reporter, 6 Dec 1873, p. 7. 
459 Oxford University and City Herald, 12 Mar 1870, p. 4. 
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benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole’.460 Subsequently, the 
chiefly conservative daily newspaper (though at times supportive of liberal policies) Pall Mall 
Gazette, wrote that democracy ‘has, as such, no definite or assignable relation to liberty’ adding 
that governments interfere in accordance with ‘the size of the country, the closeness with which 
people are packed’. They added that liberty can mean mere absence of restraint. Secondly, it 
can suggest the absence of an injurious restraint, conveying a more negative reading of liberty 
as freedom from external restraints upon our own actions. Thirdly, liberty was understood as 
the virtue of obedience. Rhetoric concerning discipline, order and stability was being discussed 
considerably more by this period and often at the expense of calls for greater liberty.461 These 
three readings show that liberty and order are not just mutually compatible, they are two halves 
of the same coin. 
 
Consequently, the monthly Methodist publication, Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, observed 
that ‘the right of punishment, they say, arises from necessity’ adding that the central question 
for society is not how to increase liberty, but rather to decide whether there is a social 
responsibility (if there is no moral one) and whether it is right to impose a system of control 
upon people. This fed into debate on the type of individualism Mill was often seen to be 
championing. After all, Mill felt that the opportunity to exercise your liberty could be curtailed 
if you failed to prove that you could be entrusted with this responsibility. The Wesleyan 
Methodist Magazine echoed this sentiment, writing that ‘responsibility is nothing else but the 
confiscation of the freedom of the feeble for the benefit of social order’.462 The imprudent few 
were simply not entitled to the same level of liberty as those who would make a meaningful 
contribution to society. This would prove to be a crucial line of disagreement between Mill and 
his critics. 
 
This new age of legislating for oneself was met with optimism for it ensured undemocratic and 
unrepresentative bodies would not represent the will of the people. The Dewsbury Reporter 
claimed that self-legislation would solve a number of problems. Government ‘were the 
                                                        
460 CW 19, p. 446. 
461 Pall Mall Gazette, 12 Dec 1872, p. 10. See further Cohen-Almagor, ‘Between Autonomy and State 
Regulation: J.S. Mill’s Elastic Paternalism’, pp. 557-582. Cohen-Almagor argued that in considering the 
boundaries of state interference and paternalism, ‘both might introduce dangers to the citizens’ well-being and 
to democracy itself’, p. 559. Moreover, democracies should sustain both private and public liberty. A lack of 
involvement and neglect of civic duties ‘would encourage undemocratic trends and opinions’, p. 580. 
462 Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, Feb 1874, pp. 152-154. They further asked ‘are our judges, our magistrates, 
our courts of law, right in establishing and enforcing a system of repression, when the persons against whom 
that repression ought to be applied are mere pieces of irresponsible machinery’, (p. 152). 
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representatives of the people, and legislated for the people, and therefore they could only exist 
by the will of the people, and if they did not act in harmony with the wishes and will of the 
constituencies they represented, when the time for election came round again, they turned them 
out and sent men who would truly represent them’.463 The government must incur all 
accountability if they neglect their duty to the people. Ultimately, ‘a man must be suppressed, 
not as guilty, but as an obstacle’.464 
 
If everyone is capable of legislating for themselves, there ought to be no coercion ‘because the 
people of this country either are, or ought to be, prepared to form an opinion for themselves’.465 
Reiterating Mill’s encouragement for the formation of sound opinions, people should be able 
to decide for themselves what was according to their necessities, desires and circumstances. 
The liberal newspaper, Wiltshire Times and Trowbridge Advertiser, added that ‘society has no 
right to discourage’466 experiments in living, sharing Mill’s concern. Law was not to subvert 
the will of the people, for ‘no law in the nineteenth-century could be recognised in England 
that abrogated the liberties and privileges of the people’.467 The justification of coercion or 
persuading someone to act in a certain way requires more than simply an interest in the 
collective. 
 
As we have seen, Mill’s thoughts on individuality were heavily scrutinised in the 1860s. 
Responses ranged from dismissing Mill’s plea as a rigid and unshakeable form of individuality, 
through to those who celebrated the prospect of an abundance of individual and eccentric 
characters. By the 1870s, this charge had extended to claims that Mill felt compelled to ‘wall 
in the sacred fire’; those whose intellect and virtue he approved. Critics felt that Mill found it 
impossible ‘to mix with the multitude and not lower the pitch of one’s own faith and self-
respect’.468 The Examiner noted that ‘almost every human being, quite every class of human 
                                                        
463 Dewsbury Reporter, 6 Dec 1873, p. 7. 
464 Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, Feb 1874, p. 153. 
465 Dewsbury Reporter, 6 Dec 1873, p. 7. 
466 Wiltshire Times and Trowbridge Advertiser, 5 Dec 1874, p. 3. In fact, the more competent could do more to 
help others, ‘by way of being helpful, of opening up alternatives, of maximizing dignity’. See Claeys, Mill and 
Paternalism, pp. 219-221. 
467 Dewsbury Reporter, 6 Dec 1873, p. 7. 
468 Saint Paul’s Magazine, Dec 1873, p. 689. For a counter argument, see Cohen, ‘Paternalism That Does Not 
Restrict Individuality: Criteria and Applications’, pp. 309-335. In some cases, you could restrict conduct 
without reducing the individuality of that person. Those who were able to demonstrate eccentric characters did 
not require any further ‘help’. What Mill would refer to as blind adherence to custom would permit interference 
for adhering to custom is not an exercise of choice for it does not require the use of our faculties. You are not 
expressing your individuality, it is merely the ‘ape-like one of imitation’, CW 18, p. 262. 
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beings, requires more or less coercion and restraint as astringents to give him the maximum of 
power which he is capable of attaining’. A young man who is educated and has his behaviour 
kept in check will have a more vigorous and original character than a young man who is entirely 
left to his own devices. The character of any individual needs to be formed, which may in turn 
require restraint, if they are to ultimately develop unique qualities later in life. Mill required 
‘that all shall restrain themselves from injuring anyone whose conduct has in no way injured 
them’. However, this ‘does not require that men should not rise up against oppression’.469 
 
Mill and his critics agreed upon restraining the behaviour of those who were a nuisance to 
another and drunkards resurfaced as an example demonstrating the complexity in establishing 
boundaries between interference and non-intervention. The liberal newspaper, Western 
Morning News, commented specifically upon prohibitory laws, arguing that ‘it was an 
infringement upon personal liberty’ and opponents turned to chapter 4 of On Liberty, 
contending that ‘the only conclusion from the argument in that chapter was prohibition. The 
health of the people was the supreme law, and the liquor-seller could not plead personal liberty 
unless he could show that his traffic had in it no risk of damage’.470 
 
Mill’s work raised an important debate as to whether one can prevent harm, for instance, the 
harm that a drunkard might pose. Considering this, The Fortnightly Review claimed that ‘you 
must have authority, and yet must have obedience’ for Mill’s doctrine of liberty supports a 
much more considered view of intervention. Dismissing the argument that ‘if the majority has 
the means of preventing vice by law, it is folly and weakness not to resort to those means’, The 
Fortnightly Review contended that the doctrine of liberty requires a much broader view to 
weigh up whether human coercion or pro-active regulation has received greater justification as 
a means of interference. Once this issue was resolved, it would become clear the extent to 
which individual freedom could be interfered with. 
  
Yet On Liberty alone fails to satisfy these specific yet crucial questions as to whether we are 
to enforce morals. However, at minimum, it ‘does emphatically recognise the right of the state 
to enforce that part of its moral code which touches such acts as not self-regarding’. The weak 
link in Mill’s doctrine was his failure to address if ‘any opinion or any serious part of conduct 
                                                        
469 The Examiner, 7 Dec 1872, pp. 1198-1199. 
470 Western Morning News, 29 Sep 1871, p. 4. 
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be looked upon as truly and exclusively self-regarding’. On Liberty was proving inadequate to 
fight the corner of liberty in the modern world. Instead, it was being used as a reason for why 
we should employ force and coercion, shaping the majority of responses to Mill’s ideas in the 
second half of the nineteenth-century. 
 
Even amongst those who were resolute that force should not be used to counter vice, there is a 
shift towards permitting the coaxing of people down a particular path to bring out their best 
character. For instance, passing a law to condemn drunkenness can control ‘impatient natures’. 
However, this is not to forget the possibility that you could have done better, perhaps ‘to leave 
that law unpassed, and apply yourselves sedulously instead to the improvement of the 
dwellings of the more drunken class, to the provision of amusements that might compete with 
the ale-house, to the extension and elevation of instruction, and so on’. In this regard, law is 
still compatible with Mill’s principle, it didn’t take away the freedom to enjoy one’s liberty, 
yet ‘whilst liberty cannot improve people, compulsion or restraint can’.471 These responses to 
On Liberty indicated a growing feeling that intervention can work in conjunction with Mill’s 
essay, perhaps sympathising with the idea that Mill was a paternalist. 
 
By the 1870s, theories of legislation dominated discussion, suggesting that perhaps Mill’s 
fundamental aim in On Liberty was to describe the way in which legislation could compliment 
his wider theory of liberty and ensure his call for collectivism and unity was acted upon.472 
Those who sought to control the expression of another were the source of intolerance and this 
was one of Mill’s sharpest criticisms of society, for it hampered people from expressing their 
individuality. People are discouraged from being themselves because of social intolerance, 
which forces people to conceal their feelings and forfeit opinions. By the 1870s, this became a 
central focus of public debates, drawing attention to those groups which had always been 
excluded from freely expressing their thoughts, such as women. This is a concern which 
motivated much of Mill’s work and will be expanded upon briefly in the conclusion of this 
thesis. After all, Mill placed great value on individual autonomy and claimed that it was wrong 
to subdue the expression of another. 
 
                                                        
471 The Fortnightly Review, Aug 1873, pp. 238-250. 
472 In mind here is Arneson’s claim that ‘paternalistic restrictions always decrease a person’s autonomy’, in 
‘Mill versus Paternalism’, p. 481. This is an incorrect generalisation and fails to consider readings of Mill as a 
paternalist. 
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JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN 
A RESPONSE TO ON LIBERTY 
 
Perhaps the most notable criticism of On Liberty came from Stephen’s 1873 Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity. The level of support Stephen received proved disastrous for the reception of Mill’s 
essay.473 Critics found in Stephen’s work the gaps that needed to be filled in On Liberty. 
Stephen had addressed ‘some of the fundamental questions in political ethics’.474 Moreover, 
their responses were becomingly increasingly specific. For instance, the British Quarterly 
Review, The Athenaeum and Fraser’s Magazine all noted Stephen’s chapters on ‘Spiritual and 
Temporal Power’ and ‘Liberty in relation to Morals’ as those of the greatest importance to 
consider when reading On Liberty.475 Accordingly, Stephen represented ‘at once fairly and 
forcibly, one side of a question which has already been dealt with from the other side by Mr. 
Mill’.476 The British Quarterly Review noted that Stephen was astounded ‘by the lack of self-
consistency in some of the current political doctrines of the day, and he rushes forthwith to the 
construction of a new system for himself’.477 Commentators approved of Stephen’s claim for 
greater exertion of force.478 Compared to Mill, Stephen received fewer negative reviews; those 
who objected did so on the grounds that too much force might lead to the tyranny of one over 
another but this was often noted as a passing comment rather than a criticism. 
 
Contrary to On Liberty, Stephen’s essay ‘is in some measure a healthy and much-needed 
protest against the abuses of Liberalism’.479 Whilst Stephen was very sceptical about human 
progress, Fraser’s Magazine applauded his revolutionary trinity of Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity and argued that ‘there is more true freedom in Mr. Stephen’s principle than in Mr. 
Mill’s’ for his ‘expression is closer to the facts and less likely to mislead’.480 The Observer 
                                                        
473 See K. J. M. Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist, who noted that ‘the 
obsessive individualism at the heart of On Liberty at the same time appealed to and repelled Stephen’, p. 122. 
474 Smith further noted that Stephen, newspapers and periodicals picked up on ‘Mill’s diagnosis of an 
intellectually declining nation, malnourished by an inadequate diet of liberty and individuality’ (p. 167). This 
engaged them more closely in the debate. See Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian 
Rationalist. 
475 See British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256, The Athenaeum, 17 May 1873, p. 628 and Fraser’s 
Magazine, July 1873, p. 92. 
476 The Athenaeum, 17 May 1873, p. 627. 
477 British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256. 
478 Kirk noted that force ‘arms the sanction which lies behind whatever good men do’ and is ‘the corrector of 
our vices’. See Kirk, ‘The Foreboding Conservatism of Stephen’, p. 574. 
479 British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256. 
480 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 92. See further Kirk, ‘The Foreboding Conservatism of Stephen’, p. 573. 
Kirk noted ‘the fundamental internal error of J. S. Mill’s politics is just this: he thinks that society can be ruled 
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echoed earlier claims that Stephen’s work ‘is a protest against unconscious and popular cant. 
It is an assault on the common-place of journalism – an attack on Liberalism, and the political 
creed of the majority of men who believe that they are on the side of the enlightenment’. For 
Stephen, ‘all modern politics are pervaded with the idea that liberty in itself, and apart from 
the ends for which it is employed, is good and meritorious, that men are in some important 
sense equal, and that true morality recognises all mankind as brothers’.481 
 
Mill had defined liberty with regards to two broad yet encompassing points. Firstly, the idea 
of self-protection and secondly, that actions can only be legitimately interfered with when they 
concern the interests of other people. Fraser’s Magazine argued that ‘it is really impossible 
that any act of any man should concern the interests of no one but himself’482 adding that Mill’s 
essay was more than just paradoxical. These two points ‘are so vague as to be capable of 
meaning anything or nothing according to the sense assigned to the qualifying terms’. The 
Observer asked ‘what sane man, for example, ever contended that Liberty per se was good?’ 
They added further that liberty of action is often noxious, and all morality which invokes its 
sanction to restrain license demonstrates this fact’. Moreover, ‘there is no society which ought, 
or can, or does, act up to the ideal of freedom preached by men such as Mr. John Stuart Mill’.483 
Fraser’s Magazine questioned ‘what objects are included within the ‘self-protection’ of 
society?’ probing further whether this idea of the self compromises ‘future generations as well 
as the present’. More so, ‘does protection mean protection against vice and disease as well as 
violence?’484 Critics would continue to discuss these points for decades to come. 
 
The freedom to do as one likes can be easily taken advantage of, challenging the universality, 
meaning and vigour of Mill’s principle. Mill hoisted the flag of liberty so high that it opened 
his work to even greater scrutiny. In attempting to demonstrate the value of liberty, Mill 
managed to damage its meaning entirely. It was the politically conservative Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine which contested Mill’s theory of liberty. They stated that restraint is 
suitable, for ‘age is a ground of exception, and children are not free to do as they please’, 
                                                        
by discussion. But the tremendous impelling power in all societies is force’ and for this reason, Mill actually 
restricts the liberty we have. 
481 The Observer, 18 May 1873, p. 2. 
482 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 88. 
483 The Observer, 18 May 1873, p. 2. 
484 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 88. It was added that the legislature may well claim, in the name of self-
protection, that it is the wisest but ‘by limiting ‘protection’ to protection against crime and personal violence; it 
might be concluded that all civil law is superfluous’ (p. 88). 
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secondly, ‘the capacity to make a good use of freedom is the measure of the right to possess 
it’. Finally, ‘capacity for freedom depends on the capacity to be guided to improvement by 
conviction or persuasion’.485 Mill had claimed that you must be a responsible individual before 
you can be entrusted with greater liberty, which meant that those who were not could have their 
liberty curtailed. Accordingly, Mill had developed a merit-based system of freedom where 
greater liberties were awarded to those who could be trusted to cultivate good habits both for 
themselves and society. 
  
It seems that many had read Mill wrong. The main problem for Stephen however was the lack 
of a theory of liberty in Mill’s work.486 The necessity of force is perhaps the most contentious 
element of Stephen’s doctrine. The British Quarterly Review affirmed that force ‘is seen to 
supply the ultimate sanctions for civil government’487 whereby it ‘must provide the series of 
conditions for regulating, the action of men in society, and in their relations as governing and 
governed’. Fraser’s Magazine challenged those who dismissed the exercise of authority on the 
charge that it is a bad course of action. They noted that ‘assuming that all authority is bad in 
itself leads also to the attempt to make out that the more civilised society becomes the less it 
rests upon force’.488 It is wrong to say that using force makes you somehow less civilised. This 
could be equally applied to liberty; assuming all liberty is bad in itself may lead to the 
assumption that greater liberty means greater anarchy.489 
 
However, the British Quarterly Review noted that Stephen’s error in Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity was the exaggeration he placed on force, noting that it would have been better if he 
had noticed that ‘what we need and are able to attain to, is not force alone but force that is 
reasonable and right – that is to say, rational force’. Stephen’s essay offers ‘merely a return to 
                                                        
485 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Sep 1873, p. 351. See further Lippincott, ‘James Fitzjames Stephen-
Critic of Democracy’, pp. 296-307. Mill had claimed that the removal of restraints would invigorate character. 
However, criticisms asserted that the growth of liberty actually tends to diminish originality. Moreover, ‘how 
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extravagances, he has almost explained liberty away altogether’. See Roach, ‘Liberalism and the Victorian 
Intelligentsia’, p. 67. 
487 British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256. 
488 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 94. 
489 For instance, Scarre noted that ‘along with the enthusiasts who praised it to the skies for its defence of 
individual liberty in every sphere of life and thought were critics who judged its defence of individuality as 
encouragement to anarchy and indiscipline’. See Scarre, Mill’s On Liberty, p. 135. 
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the foundations of despotism; for the authority of force, as force, must be despotism’.490 Mill 
was also charged with this due to his insistence for greater individuality. 
 
So, what do we see if we read these two works together? The Athenaeum noted that ‘Mill 
attempted to devise a formula which shall include all cases in which the individual is entitled 
to please himself; Mr. Stephen to devise one which shall include all cases in which the State 
will do well to exert compulsion’. Mill defended ‘the liberty of the individual, for freedom of 
opinion, for originality, in a word for eccentricity in all its forms’ but his ‘side of the 
controversy is the unpopular one’. Stephen conceded that ‘Liberty is good and bad according 
to time, place, and circumstances’.491 The Saturday Review added that liberty should not be a 
glorified term and you should consider ‘who is left at liberty to do what, and what is the restraint 
from which he is liberated?’492 Ultimately, Stephen wished to prove that ‘social coercion would 
in many cases tend to make men virtuous’,493 and by proving that the absence of coercion does 
not tend in such cases to make men virtuous, the utility of coercion has perhaps been 
undervalued. 
 
In light of this, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine rejected On Liberty, claiming that ‘free room 
in which to develop, not one’s “individuality,” but one’s best self, by the light of all that is best 
and greatest, is an indispensable condition of human improvement, a necessary means to a 
desirable end. But that implies a great deal more than freedom – viz., a constraining sense of 
duty’. This implies it is acceptable to restrain those who act contrary to these duties. 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine stressed that even Mill ‘admits that all that makes existence 
valuable depends upon the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people’494 even 
if he would later complain that these restraints are enforced by custom as opposed to reason. If 
ever in doubt, ‘in every civilized community it must be the State as representing the ruling 
power which is the ultimate source of authority that will decide the question at issue’.495 What 
we gain by civilisation ‘is that force is organised, economised, and rightly directed. For the 
many who choose, political freedom means the power of choosing intelligently and for the 
                                                        
490 British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256. 
491 The Athenaeum, 17 May 1873, pp. 627-628. The most cited chapter of Mill’s essay now was ‘Of the Liberty 
of Thought and Discussion’, taking over importance from ‘Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the 
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common good whom they will obey; for the few who are chosen, it means the duty of ruling 
for the common good and no other purpose’. 
 
Such a reading underlines the inconsistency with a utilitarian theory of morality. Many 
responses asked how compulsion can be bad for a utilitarian if it brings about a greater good. 
More so, if the good outweighs the inconvenience of compulsion, then where is there a 
problem? These are major questions which Mill failed to convincingly address, for if 
compulsion can bring you closer to the greatest freedom, why must there be an objection? 
Perhaps Mill wasn’t attempting to answer at all the question of liberty but sought to propose 
axioms which would foster debate so that people could answer themselves, ‘what acts affect 
the interests of others so definitely that the consequences are of calculable importance’.496 In 
turn, society might realise that they often suppress the liberty of those who could make a 
meaningful contribution. 
 
The reception of both Mill and Stephen’s theory of liberty dominated discussion on liberty and 
individual-state relationships by the 1870s. Mill felt ‘more strongly upon the rights of the 
individual and the value of originality’, whereas Stephen insisted ‘upon the claims of society 
and the advantages of orderly and concerted action’.497 As we have seen in 1859, Mill was 
accused of spreading a strikingly low estimate of humanity. In 1873 this resulted in criticism 
from the Saturday Review as to how such an individual ‘can with any degree of consistency be 
the advocate of liberty in the sense of a negation of all government, and of equality in any sense 
at all’.498 Mill lacked awareness that ‘society is founded on a graduated force which runs from 
one end of it to the other. We cannot get rid of the actual force which exists; that depends upon 
the nature of individuals, but law can define and control it’.499 
 
One of the most prevalent attacks can be found in chapter 2 of Stephen’s work, ‘On the Liberty 
of Thought and Discussion’. Here, Stephen addressed the doctrine of toleration, an issue which 
surfaced both in On Liberty and a number of responses in the early 1860s. The Observer noted 
that ‘it is not right to tolerate doctrines which you know and believe to be wrong and 
                                                        
496 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, pp. 88-94. Roach discusses this in his comparison between Mill and Stephen, 
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pernicious’.500 The problem now facing Mill and On Liberty was his assertion that society 
ought ‘to use its power in favour of the unlimited expression of certain unpopular opinions 
instead of against it’.501 For Mill, there was nothing to be lost in holding an opinion which no 
one agreed with, in fact, it would probably lead to more engaging and inviting discussion. 
 
Fundamentally, ‘people do and must act on principles at variance with those which Mr. Mill 
and other passionate lovers of liberty avow; and, in fact, our author urges it is impossible to lay 
down any principles of legislation at all unless you are prepared to say, I am right, and you are 
wrong’. Stephen ‘takes the opportunity of breaking not a few of the idols of popular Liberalism, 
and of protesting against such favourite modern ideas’,502 a recurring trend we find in response 
to the arguments expressed to Mill. Fraser’s Magazine had noticed that ‘when the community 
is once so educated in the importance of any moral doctrines as to call those who disagree with 
it fools or brutes, then, on Mr. Stephen’s own principles of justifiable compulsion, there will 
be sanction enough and to spare’.503 Restraints on individual action are injurious, for they hold 
back the freedom to express whatever opinion one holds. From Stephen’s perspective, it is 
pragmatic to remove such restraints and to deal with any instance of offence, or harm, as and 
when they arise. 
 
It would be incorrect to conclude that responses to On Liberty in the 1870s resulted in Mill’s 
followers abandoning his key arguments. Stephen however added something vital to the term 
liberty which Mill had not. The Athenaeum, in seeking to defend On Liberty, argued that 
‘obviously society is strong enough to protect itself – obviously the individual must always 
find it difficult to assert his rights, his opinions, and his discoveries in the face of an adverse 
majority, even if that majority be sufficiently enlightened to refrain from exercising its 
enormous powers of penal repression’. Mill reinforced that ‘men should be taught that it is 
hardly possible to be too tolerant, whilst intolerance is only too easy’.504 This was too often 
overlooked, a doctrine which had been advanced by Morley but would be thrown ‘overboard 
altogether’505 by Stephen; Stephen would foster intolerance within society whereas Mill would 
encourage open-mindedness. 
                                                        
500 The Observer, 18 May 1873, p. 2. To tolerate something which you do not believe is right ‘is really immoral. 
It is impracticable’ (p. 2).  
501 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 91. 
502 The Observer, 18 May 1873, p. 2. 
503 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 96. 
504 The Athenaeum, 17 May 1873, p. 628. 
505 British Quarterly Review, July 1873, p. 256. 
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Yet the point of departure from defending On Liberty took shape in the 1870s. Stephen’s work 
had certainly fuelled people’s interest in Mill’s essay but this was a mood that had already 
started taking shape within the first five years of its publication. Further reactions which 
challenged the central premise of On Liberty did so by building further upon this requirement 
of a social right to punish. Wesleyan Methodist Magazine asserted that a doctrine of justice, as 
opposed to liberty, directly appealed to the intellect and moral feeling of all individuals.506 The 
‘discrimination between right and wrong, between what is lawful and what is illicit. The respect 
of human personality, the obligation incumbent upon us of observing that respect, and of 
compelling others to do so, the idea of a guarantee protective of man’s freedom’.507 Mill’s point 
was that freedom of thought and discussion was needed to develop the intellectual and moral 
feeling of an individual. Only then would they be able to act freely in relation to what was 
rendered just in society. 
 
Stephen’s growing support had secured him the title ‘worshipper of the regulated law of 
force’.508 The symbolic use of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity became an important part of the 
development of Stephen’s image as a rival to On Liberty.509 The truth is that ‘the feelings and 
rights and wishes of others meet us at every corner, and along every path of social life’. There 
were few objections to the premise that ‘society has a right to enforce attention to customs’.510 
Interference was not felt to be unjust if it meant the protection of your liberty and it seems that 
the majority of people were willing to accept the compromise and allow restraint now and then. 
There was certainly an absence of optimism for liberalism during the 1870s. 
 
                                                        
506 Mill had already been targeted by his critics as they failed to find a convincing argument for equality in On 
Liberty. As we see with the emergence of Stephen’s work, a stronger conception of justice would not only 
enforce equality but protect liberty. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that Mill’s conditions do not 
provide equal liberty for all. In light of this, it seems that Mill’s essay would always fall short in appealing to the 
moral fabric of society, which partly explains why Mill’s critics saw appeal in Stephen’s response and 
moreover, why we see a revival of interest in Mill at the turn of the century after his commentators reconsidered 
his boundaries of liberty. 
507 Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, Feb 1874, p. 154. 
508 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Sep 1873, p. 348. 
509 See further Stapleton, ‘James Fitzjames Stephen: Liberalism, Patriotism, and English Liberty’, pp. 243-263. 
Stapleton noted that ‘Stephen savaged all the ascendant doctrines of the mid nineteenth-century which seemed 
to have crystallized in Mill’s later writings’, p. 243. This can be extended to disciples of Mill such as Morley 
and Spencer. 
510 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Sep 1873, p. 353. To those who challenge the necessity of force, The 
Observer stated that the question is, ‘has or has not persecution been a success?’, (18 May 1873, p. 2). 
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The necessity to enforce customs was at the heart of debates on coercion. The Saturday Review 
stated that ‘given a herd of stupid fools who are never to be coerced, and who are to keep 
everyone from rising above their own level, what will you ever get to the end of time except a 
herd of stupid fools?’511 In Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Stephen sought to ‘glorify the wisdom 
of the majority’ and to ‘extol their beneficent influence in repressing individual eccentricities 
and oddities’.512 Whilst Stephen’s essay was well received, it is incorrect to assume that 
submitting some of your liberties meant forfeiting your ability to develop a unique character. 
Fraser’s Magazine claimed that ‘to be able to punish, a moral majority must be 
overwhelming’,513 demonstrating how critics distanced themselves from Mill’s claim that the 
minority are tyrannised by the majority, something very few responses agreed with. 
 
Accordingly, discussion on the right to do something is an important development which 
unfolds primarily in the 1870s. Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine stated that ultimately, 
‘liberty is an assertion of authority, of the right to compel the observance of other people’s 
duties to ourselves’. They added that ‘the vaunted Radicalism of the present day, is founded 
upon the rights of man’ endorsing Mill’s claim in On Liberty that people have moral as well as 
legal rights, such as the right to liberty and prevention of harm. However, there cannot be such 
a fixed basis on which these rights are certified as ‘in every case society must judge according 
to the circumstances, and not by any preconceived rule, what amount of authority it will 
exercise, or of censure it will impose’.514 Mill stated that matters concerning personal conduct 
are those not to be interfered with, but Mill nowhere defines this in his work, which was 
problematic for the later reception of On Liberty. 
 
Since the publication of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, there has been a renewed interest in the 
natural role law plays in aiding the flourishing of liberty. The London Serio-Comic Journal, a 
conservative satirical magazine, noted that without laws, people ‘murder and ruin, and pillage 
and maim – committing their crimes in EQUALITY’S name’.515 Mill, ‘the advocate of liberty, 
in the sense of every man rebelling against the society of which he is part’,516 had propagated 
an aggressive creed of individualism and promoted inequality and division rather than 
                                                        
511 Saturday Review, 19 Apr 1873, p. 517. 
512 The Examiner, 21 Nov 1874, p. 1269. 
513 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 89. 
514 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Sep 1873, pp. 349-353. 
515 London Serio-Comic Journal, 19 Aug 1871, p. 246. 
516 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, Sep 1873, p. 348. 
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encouraging the formation of a healthy society. This, however, is a misunderstanding. The 
Saturday Review contended that ‘ineradicable dissimilarity is an unsafe foundation of 
equality’517 where the ‘certain artificial and injurious inequalities between different sorts of 
men exist, and it is expedient to abolish them’. Mill’s creed was precisely that, artificial, for it 
built up a wall keeping people from mixing with one another whereas Stephen, along with the 
responses to On Liberty, sought to break this wall down and allow collective living for the sake 
of everyone. It was added that Mill’s ‘groundless mutual aversion between men’518 exists 
purely because Mill supported artificial restraints in an attempt to make people as 
individualistic as possible. Nineteenth-century liberalism had opened the gates to 
conservatism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The claim that society cannot progress without order directed responses to On Liberty in the 
1870s. Mill’s essay is referenced frequently in public discussions yet the frosty reception he 
received really seems to be because he ended up with more problems than what he had started 
with.519 This poses a serious problem for contemporary readings which seldom challenge On 
Liberty to the extent that his immediate critics did. The account provided thus far highlights 
the need for greater contextual readings of Mill’s works in order to ascertain what he was doing 
and who for. 
 
This chapter has three purposes. Firstly, to briefly examine the later editions of Mill’s System 
of Logic and the Principles to see if, and how, ideas on liberty have changed since the earlier 
editions. Secondly, to consider the reception of On Liberty between 1870 and 1880. Thirdly, 
the reception of Mill’s ideas on liberty alongside responses from a select few intellectuals of 
the period. The earlier reception of the System of Logic was discussed amongst conservative 
periodicals but by the 1870s, a handful of liberal affiliated articles surfaced, noting how Mill 
demonstrated the importance of developing the mental and moral qualities of the individual. 
                                                        
517 Saturday Review, 19 Apr 1873, p. 517. 
518 Fraser’s Magazine, July 1873, p. 93. 
519 See further Smart, ‘‘Some Will Be More Equal Than Others’. J. S. Mill on Democracy, Freedom and 
Meritocracy’, pp. 308-323. Smart suggests that On Liberty ‘reinforced Mill’s defence of the intelligentsia, and 
served as the theoretical foundations for the inegalitarian constitutional framework of Considerations on 
Representative Government’, p. 322. Mill felt society should progress towards the ‘good society’ and he was 
‘torn between his sympathy for the demand for universal franchise and his belief in the necessity to protect the 
delicate flower of intellect’, p. 322. For this reason, Mill would always be controversial. 
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The Principles had been praised in the 1840s for championing individual rights and whilst this 
had not changed by the 1870s, a number of religious periodicals engaged with the later editions 
of this text, particularly the Church of England and Catholics. These religious affiliated 
periodicals emphasised the need for everyone to work together to benefit the community, to 
show compassion and charity. Of John Morley’s influence in the 1870s, responses were mostly 
liberal and sympathetic to the church. Liberal periodicals claimed that intervention could 
promote individual maturity, but crucially, tyranny and liberty must be balanced or mediated 
to cultivate a more tolerant society. The debate on individualism and paternalism (helping 
others to help themselves) was not confined to a small circle of readership. From conservative 
to Methodist, liberal to Christian, this was a topic central to most periodicals in light of the 
political and social developments. Unsurprisingly, the conservative James Fitzjames Stephen’s 
work, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, was dominated by responses from conservative 
periodicals. Mill’s critics labelled his essay inconsistent, misleading, with many conservative 
periodicals citing the magnitude of liberty outlined in On Liberty as dangerous and unpopular. 
 
Of course, Mill had his enthusiasts but those who put their faith in him did so not because they 
believed in unregulated freedom but because they felt that individuals should dedicate time to 
their own pursuits, using their individual qualities to help society prosper. The significance 
behind the meaning of liberty was drastically different for the two sides of the debate. Mill 
believed that liberty was not to be interfered with unless it brought harm to others. For those 
writing in response to Mill, the term liberty necessitated controls and restraints to direct the 
flow of freedom in a healthy direction; this is tantamount to the account Stephen provided in 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. When Stephen published his essay, there was a resurgence of 
attacks against On Liberty. 
 
Many criticisms targeted in particular Mill’s discussion of individuality, noting that it does not 
allow society to be its own leader and produce distinct characters. Moreover, it was so strict 
that no one could ever seriously adhere to it without jeopardising their own individuality. 
Morley demonstrated continuity with the ideas proposed in On Liberty, marking a decisive 
shift from Stephen’s rhetoric. Stephen and Mill had differed with respect to the consequences 
and applications of their views on toleration and this determined the extent to which people 
would support one or the other. Many had been anticipating a little book on liberty in 1859 but 
it had proved far more controversial than many anticipated. 
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Chapter 4 
Mill, the State and the Demise of Individualism 
1880-1890 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The previous chapter has shown how readers of On Liberty were more persuaded by Stephen’s 
argument that order and restraint are necessary for the flourishing of liberty. Commentators of 
On Liberty claimed that liberty cannot always be exercised unimpeded for unregulated freedom 
will lead to further tyranny. Critics had begun to dismiss Mill for championing too much liberty 
but often failed to suggest alternative readings of either how to moderate this or what his 
intentions actually were in On Liberty. This chapter unveils further the suspicion critics had 
towards Mill’s work, often turning to Stephen’s dispute with Mill from the 1870s, which 
permitted the use of force, if required, to ensure that people were not a nuisance. Accordingly, 
readings of On Liberty in the 1880s meant critics were left to decide whether On Liberty 
restricted liberty only in cases where conduct caused harm to another or whether it restricted 
liberty in order to prevent harm to others. 
 
We have seen previously arguments which stress how individual actions ought to be scrutinised 
and this responsibility fell on the government or another person if an individual failed to control 
their own actions. In light of this, Mill was met with a charge that his earlier essay ‘On Genius’ 
received; he could be no advocate of equality. On Liberty was strongly autocratic and would 
bring about the quick end to liberty for all. As this chapter will demonstrate, Mill’s essay was 
subject to less criticism in the 1880s. Writers such as Spencer, Herbert and Levy had argued a 
similar case to what Mill had addressed in 1859. Their ideas are recognisably Millian, but they 
rarely make direct reference to On Liberty or Mill for that matter. They dissociated themselves 
from the intellectual but did not distance themselves from his ideas. Mill’s critics had distanced 
themselves from his essay as they felt he did not permit state interference on enough occasions. 
Yet reading On Liberty from a different perspective and in conjunction with his other works, 
we see that this wasn’t quite the case. 
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FROM INDIVIDUALIST TO COLLECTIVIST: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL 
 
So far, we have seen how Mill’s association with individualism or collectivism directed 
responses to On Liberty. Albert Venn Dicey (1835–1922) wrote extensively on this debate. A 
leading constitutional lawyer, Dicey was professor of English law at Oxford University from 
1882 until 1909.520 He had concluded that the move from individualism towards collectivism 
was accountable to a revolution in political belief, a departure from the Benthamite era of peace 
and retrenchment. Whilst Mill was not himself involved in this debate, Dicey often engaged 
with his works, writing that whilst in the 1830s, ‘some individualists were prepared to cut down 
the right of combination as stringently might be required for the absolute protection of each 
individual’s freedom of action’, others, like Mill, had taken a different route. For Dicey, Mill 
favoured ‘securing the right of combination, to curtail the free action of individuals’521 in order 
to bring about greater liberty, whilst pardoning interference from the state.522 Individualism 
and collectivism viewed the relationship between the individual and the state differently and 
by the 1880s, misreading’s and controversy surrounding On Liberty continued to add to this 
debate.523 
 
As we have seen, by the 1870s, there was a clear departure from wanting to isolate or confine 
oneself to a secluded life with little or no involvement with the wider community. Dicey had 
                                                        
520 Dicey wrote Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) as well as authoring Lectures on 
the Relation between Law and Public Opinion During the Nineteenth Century (1905). Dicey was in favour of 
Mill’s liberalism early on in his career, but by the 1880s, he had warned of the dangers that came with 
liberalism. 
521 Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion During the Nineteenth Century, p. 113. 
Dicey felt that utilitarians had not given greater attention to ‘the difficulty of combining the contractual freedom 
of each individual when acting alone with that unlimited right of association’, p. 113. Neglecting this social aspect 
of human nature is the gap within the Benthamite creed. Dicey added that to the many admirers, On Liberty 
appeared ‘to provide the final and conclusive demonstration of the absolute truth of individualism’, p. 130. Dicey 
himself felt that both the Principles and On Liberty had ‘promoted a rigorous Liberal Benthamism’, see pp. 130, 
275, 361-363. 
522 Dicey suggested that Mill was an individualist from the 1830s, then changed his mind by the time he wrote 
On Liberty in 1859 to something more collectivist/socialist. As I have argued previously, Mill was much more 
supportive of the power of combining, long before 1859 and many of his immediate commentators and 
secondary critics have failed to read Mill in this way. Ultimately, this is where Mill and Spencer disagreed: in a 
letter to John Plummer in 1863, Mill wrote that Spencer ‘carries his hostility to government agency beyond 
reasonable bounds’ for assuming that the business of government was to leave people to do as they please (CW 
15, p. 888). 
523 See Collini, Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880-1914. 
Collini wrote that the late Victorian ‘disagreement over the role of the state was conceptualized in terms of the 
opposition between Individualism and Collectivism’, pp. 14-15. See further James Meadowcroft, 
Conceptualizing the State, which addresses terms such as individualism and collectivism in this period. 
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observed a tripartite theory of the currents of public opinion in the nineteenth-century.524 From 
this, we can identify a clear perspective of where the shift from individualism to collectivism 
occurred and what this meant for the reception of On Liberty. Mill’s shift in favour of 
collectivism may well have arisen out of the number of critical commentaries of On Liberty 
but we can actually identify this sentiment much further back to his earlier writings. Just as 
Mill had put the fear of tyranny at the centre of his thought, his critics concentrated on the fear 
of individualism. However, in light of the reception of On Liberty thus far, Dicey’s tripartite 
theory is in need of revision.525 The hostility towards Mill’s call for greater individuality 
implied a much earlier blossoming of a collective consciousness than Dicey’s model allows. 
What is clear however is that the transition from individualism to collectivism marked a critical 
stage in the social and political developments of the nineteenth-century. 
 
In his Autobiography, Mill had written that his own reaction to Bentham made him more 
inclined to focus on the community; he wrote: ‘I was a democrat, but not the least of a 
Socialist’.526 Dicey had also written that collectivism is ‘meant to mean the school of opinion 
often termed (and generally by more or less hostile critics) socialism, which favours the 
intervention of the State, even at some sacrifice of individual freedom, for the purpose of 
conferring benefit upon the mass of the people’.527 By the 1880s, interest in Mill’s essay had 
not declined. In a decade which welcomed compulsory education and a third reform act (the 
previous two acts were passed in 1832 and 1867), On Liberty seemed a little bit more relevant 
to its readers. 
 
                                                        
524 Dicey noted that the first period was of ‘Old Toryism’, (1800-1830). This was followed by ‘Benthamism or 
Individualism’, 1825-1865/70 and was succeeded by ‘Collectivism’, 1865/70-1900. 
525 See further Perkin, ‘Individualism versus Collectivism in Nineteenth-Century Britain: A False Antithesis’, 
pp. 105-118. Perkin stated that individualism and collectivism ‘were not opposites but adjacent steps in a 
progression’ and Dicey had created ‘a dilemma which does not exist’, p. 110. Sugarman added that ‘Dicey, like 
most people, was not internally consistent’, p. 111. In trying to locate the practical limits on law and state, Dicey 
demonstrated the inconsistencies which riddled his works. See also Parris, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution 
in Government: A Reappraisal Reappraised’, pp. 23-25 for a brief discussion which criticises Dicey’s tripartite 
division. 
526 CW 1, p. 238. Mill continued that he is less of a democrat now than he had been because he ‘dreaded the 
ignorance and especially the selfishness and brutality of the mass: but our ideal of ultimate improvement went 
far beyond Democracy, and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists’, CW 1, p. 239. 
These reflections in the 1830s suggest Mill’s sympathy towards socialism and collectivism started considerably 
earlier. 
527 Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century, pp. 46-47. See further Sugarman, ‘The Legal Boundaries of Liberty: Dicey, Liberalism and Legal 
Science’, pp. 102-111. Sugarman notes that Dicey’s preoccupation with collectivism and stability was the 
impetus behind a number of his works. 
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Thus far, at the heart of debate surrounding On Liberty was whether force can ever be employed 
to improve individual faculties and if so, when. Mill had not said that actions should be left to 
the responsibility of the individual in all instances. The liberal newspaper, Edinburgh Evening 
News, noted that there were ‘only two ways of conquering the evils of life, under the 
compulsory group and under the voluntary group’. Mill and a number of commentators had 
agreed however that liberty could be taken away in instances where the individual failed to 
make a choice in their best interests. Interpretations stated that there was certain to be some 
form of tyrannical abuse if individuals were bestowed with so many opportunities to do wrong, 
yet this expanded further than the sphere of education which Mill discussed. Citing specifically 
the rights of labour, the radical liberal newspaper, the Dundee Advertiser, stated that there was 
great oppressive abuse of the liberty of association due to its misuse. Edinburgh Evening News 
claimed that even political parties thought they could entice people by offering them ‘some 
slice of some property’.528 What this demonstrated was a public appeal to improve the 
relationship between the individual and the state; the ultimatum was to adopt either Mill’s 
peace through liberty or his critic’s suggestion of peace through order, both of which had 
proven to be unsustainable under scrutiny. 
 
In light of this, the monthly literary periodical, Time, suggested that ‘liberty is the freedom to 
do what the law permits’.529 The Academy added that only this will bring complete liberty 
‘except in cases of flagrant incitement to immorality’.530 The individual is driven by the idea 
of a whole society, ‘to talk of the rights of the isolated individual, abstracted from that law, is 
an absurdity. Such an individual does not exist; and if he did exist, he could have no rights, for 
right is the correlative of duty’. Commentators sought to emphasise that for the individual to 
have any rights, which would enable them to develop their character, they must be an 
assimilated part of society; society does not, or could not, exist without the individual. From 
this reading, they appear complimentary rather than dissimilar ideas. 
 
                                                        
528 Edinburgh Evening News, 20 Nov 1886, p. 2. 
529 Time, March 1888, p. 379. For a counter argument, see Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism, p. 138. The protection of individual liberty carries with it the chance that people will make decisions 
which harm themselves or serve to injure the liberty of others. The tension between permitting the liberty to do 
and legislating morals was at the height of debate by the 1880s. Berkowitz noted that ‘every effort to direct by 
law, or set legal limits on, individual experiments in living threatens to subvert the principle of autonomy by 
legislating the meaning of right choice’, p. 138. Ultimately, the task of Mill and his critics was to ascertain 
which one poses a greater threat to the liberal ambition to safeguard individual liberty. 
530 The Academy, 21 Mar 1885, p. 199. 
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Perhaps, after all, Mill was for liberalism but not for liberty; or rather, he was a sceptical liberal. 
The Fortnightly Review noted that ‘liberalism is not a development, nor an exaggeration of 
liberty, but its very opposite, its blight and its bane, its depravation and its death’. It often 
represented a ‘far more noxious version of the doctrines of Divine Right and Passive 
Obedience’. Challenging Mill’s preference for a minority few who could guide others, The 
Fortnightly Review stated that a dogma in the will of one or many is a form of absolutism and 
absolutism ‘is fatal to all that the wise have ever venerated as liberty’. They added that society 
consisted of ‘a multitude of sovereign human units, who are free because they occasionally 
vote in elections’531 but this was not a long-term solution to the problem of inequality. 
 
In December 1885, after nearly three decades of debate over Mill’s essay, Time concluded that 
‘the main work of Liberalism is to diminish the amount of Government action’ and there were 
several reasons for this. Firstly, ‘political freedom has been won by a very long and very 
gradual series of struggles and with this came a ‘disposition to suspect and resent Government 
interference’. Secondly, whilst sympathetic to the idea of leaving people to do things for 
themselves, there are gains to be made, ‘not in the mere absence of Government action, but in 
the habit of free association’. Further to this, Time stated that ‘a highly differentiated and 
decentralised government is not identical with no Government at all’.532 Ultimately, it was a 
question of government power; when they could exercise this and where. 
 
Mill’s ambition in On Liberty had become inextricably linked to the problem of authority. 
Responses agreed that greater liberty brought with it a risk to harm others. Therefore, the power 
and authority of the state needed to be enlarged to ‘ameliorate the intellectual, moral, and 
material condition of a greater number of citizens’.533 On top of this, the fear that ‘liberalism 
is growing more and more coercive in its legislation’534 echoed earlier claims that compulsion 
or persuasion are not always counter-productive. Earlier responses to On Liberty had stressed 
that Mill’s ideas were unsustainable, and that force may be necessarily employed in order to 
                                                        
531 The Fortnightly Review, May 1886, pp. 660-678. 
532 Time, Dec 1885, pp. 645-646. However, one should consider those who claim that Mill’s liberalism 
resembles something of a moral totalitarianism. See Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, p. xlviii. Mill sought to 
convert people to act more in line with those he deemed elite members of the community; nor would he 
necessarily ‘save’ those unable to develop characters he desperately sought. 
533 The Contemporary Review, Apr 1885, p. 491. Coates made a connection with laissez-faire, writing that ‘the 
very process of depriving the state of its power over economic activities required the employment of the power 
of the state’. See Coates, ‘Benthamism, Laissez Faire, and Collectivism’, p. 358. To shake off the shackles of 
government interference, you needed to initially employ their help. 
534 The Academy, 20 Dec 1884, p. 407. 
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prevent misuse. It seems that the amount of liberty we have was less important than whether it 
was equally available. By the 1880s, On Liberty had still failed to convince Mill’s critics that 
he was an advocate of equality. Mill’s characters of genius could subvert and limit the freedom 
of others, as they apparently know best. Mill believed in liberty, but liberty for those who had 
proven they were responsible. 
 
It was this reading of Mill which was so strongly condemned. Mill had advocated an 
unhampered form of individual liberty, one which was not to be interfered with unless harm 
was brought to others. This exception to the rule would simply not work. The Cornish 
Telegraph, a conservative newspaper, noted that ‘with reference to the charge of undue 
interference with the liberties of the subject, their objectors raised the sacred standard of liberty 
and mentioned a name which was most dear to every Englishman, the name of liberty; but 
liberty without order was license, and it was the function of Government to combine liberty 
and order’.535 Mill would likely have been sympathetic to this, for an ordered society might 
help diminish intolerant attitudes and subsequently develop an inclusive society. 
 
So far, we have seen how responses focused on the need for order and control, so that harmful 
expressions of liberty could be restrained. Even the local newspaper, Kent & Sussex Courier, 
wrote that ‘the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, be it against the tyranny of emperor, king, 
or caucus’.536 Liberty should enable individuals to better their lives and contribute towards 
society, but it also provides the opportunity to harm others. In light of this, it was stated that ‘if 
liberty caused crime, the question arose whether that liberty should not be abridged’.537 Taking 
away the liberty of an individual would have been scorned by Mill for it posed a risk to the 
development of eccentric individuals.538 On Liberty fostered and encouraged the enhancement 
of good personalities yet liberty needed to be regulated and individuals could still be eccentric 
characters within the boundaries that were equal to all; this appears to be where the 
misunderstanding between Mill and his critics developed. 
 
                                                        
535 The Cornish Telegraph, 26 Jan 1882, p. 6. 
536 Kent & Sussex Courier, 20 Feb 1885, p. 4. 
537 The Cornish Telegraph, 26 Jan 1882, p. 6. 
538 See further Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist, who noted that Mill ‘seemed 
to place a premium on eccentricity’, p. 167. Smith added that ‘for Mill, removal of restraints could lead to an 
invigoration of character’ yet it could also lead to its demise. 
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Thus far, it has been asserted that liberty could not exist, in the sense of liberty to do something, 
without a body of laws providing clear boundaries where people can exercise this. The Kent & 
Sussex Courier noted that the ‘only security for the preservation of their liberty lies in the 
maintenance of their Constitution’, which in turn secures their liberty. There would be no abuse 
of power if everyone was treated equally, no one could escape charge, and everyone is 
protected for ‘no one is at liberty to resist the law’.539 If nothing more, it would act as a deterrent 
for those intending to harm others.540 
 
Accordingly, putting restraints on liberty seemed to be a practical way to ensure that people 
would be treated equally and have their liberty secured. Mill had clearly failed to understand 
the magnitude of the liberty he permitted in 1859. Dundee Advertiser asked ‘who that has not 
himself been once imprisoned can appreciate what liberty means?’541 Those who engaged with 
On Liberty found countless examples of where people could abuse their liberty in Mill’s society 
but this entirely misses the point.542 People could and did abuse opportunities to express their 
liberty and this is why society needed to be equal. The Cornish Telegraph speculated that ‘there 
was such a large amount of pauperism, crime, and insanity, and the time had come when it was 
necessary to restrain the liberty if the people could be saved’.543 From this reading, Mill was 
putting lives at great risk as opposed to helping them. 
 
Lessons needed to be learnt from On Liberty and for this reason it could not be dismissed. 
Warminster & Westbury Journal noted that ‘the old principle of liberty as defined by its great 
expounders – liberty to do, to say, and to think as one likes, subject to the general interests of 
society, as laid down by society itself, had been dethroned in favour of mere license, under 
which the so-called champions of liberty, aimed at becoming the enslavers of everybody 
else’.544 Mill’s push for liberty needed a pacemaker and his ideas needed to be tamed. Dundee 
Advertiser added that whilst the use of force to direct the best action ought to be certified, there 
were ‘abuses of an undeniable liberty which the law did not protect’. These acts are ‘not only 
                                                        
539 Kent & Sussex Courier, 20 Feb 1885, pp. 3-4. 
540 See the discussion in Time, which reviewed Liberty and Law by George Lacy, published in 1888. This was 
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abuse, but suicide’.545 Mill’s insinuation that ‘all legislation was founded on the principle that 
liberty should be regulated for the public good’,546 only made the reception of his essay more 
controversial. 
 
Even so, Mill could be pleased with the sheer volume of engagement with On Liberty. Even if 
his critics dismissed him, they had absorbed his ideas in the process. With the problem of 
authority came further debate on the balance between liberty and law. The monthly radical 
journal, Blackie, wrote that liberty was best defended through the ‘wise restraint of law’.547 
Kent & Sussex Courier added that ‘true liberty is the resultant of mutually conflicting forces in 
a community, and it is imperilled whenever anyone of them is suffered to dominate’.548 Mill 
only felt one force was necessary, the freedom to do as one pleases on the precondition that it 
does not harm others. In light of this, the conservative periodical, the London Quarterly Review, 
called on its readers to ‘discharge the necessary civil duties and not be lawless’549 in order to 
provide the most comprehensive protection of individual rights. Critics were hesitant to grant 
individuals complete control over their actions; as much as this could be dangerous so could 
entrusting Mill’s minority few. 
 
In previous decades, responses contested the lack of restraint and checks upon liberty in Mill’s 
essay. The Fortnightly Review noted that ‘liberty is found not in anarchy but in obedience, not 
in lawlessness but in law’. We obey the law because we want to be free and ‘the exercise of 
absolute and unbounded liberty by any finite being is irrational, because it necessarily implies 
the destruction of such being’. The chief focus of responses emphasised that cooperation and 
mutual cohesion were fundamental building blocks for a prosperous society. We have seen 
however that at the centre of Mill’s thought was a pervasive fear of the tyranny of the majority; 
the tension between the individual and the collective. Whilst the state cannot make men good, 
it can keep them from being violent to one another and this is the point Mill’s critics sought to 
underline. 
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We have seen that Mill’s critics used the application of law in two ways to discredit On Liberty. 
Firstly, to demonstrate how it ensured checks and balances were carried out on expressions of 
liberty and secondly, how this, in turn, ‘defended’ liberty more than Mill’s essay could. The 
Fortnightly Review stated that Mill’s error was to dismiss the fact that ‘law is appointed for the 
common good, and not for a special or private good’. They added, ‘what heavier blow could 
be given to individuality – that essential element of liberty – than to cast all the youth of a 
country into one common mould?’ Liberty after all is an ‘exercise of personality’. The 
Fortnightly Review further wrote that this recognition of liberty supplies ‘the true bond of 
national cohesion, and keeps our Britain whole within herself’.550 On Liberty came to be seen 
as a dangerous text, inspiring people to act in a manner which would undo the thread of stability 
in society and unravel disarray. 
 
Although chapter three of On Liberty received the most criticism, it was not the only threat 
Mill faced; his differentiation between self and other-regarding actions was next under attack. 
Time noted that ‘there is no such thing as liberty, or as a “self-regarding” action. Everything is 
law’.551 It was wrong and inconsistent for the state to remove from ‘the individual temptations 
to go wrong or chances of failure’.552 Mill’s theory was incredibly restrictive and if people 
were to develop the character that Mill wanted them to, he needed to give them greater 
flexibility in their choices. In May 1883, The National Review noted that there had been ‘a 
considerable modification of their views upon State interference’. The relationship between the 
individual and the state meant that ‘in future the exercise of State-power would mean the 
gratification of their own wishes’. If Mill sought to get people thinking more seriously about 
individual liberty, then he succeeded, even if they disagreed. 
 
These responses highlighted that Mill’s vision did not apply to all, not that it wouldn’t work 
for some. The National Review noted that Mill’s reading of individuality was ‘a rampart against 
improper interference with liberty’. When reading On Liberty, critics noted that ‘all it really 
lays down is that society can have no business to interfere with acts that are purely self-
regarding’. Echoing criticisms from the 1860s, Mill ‘could only establish the claims of liberty 
to the provinces he wished to assign to it, partly by dubbing certain classes of acts self-
regarding that are only occasionally or usually so, partly by leaving his principle behind him 
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occasionally and fighting with the weapons that some of his followers characterise as useless’. 
The National Review added that ‘until we have learnt how to control or deal with it, society 
may consider itself forced to demand temporarily some contraction of individual liberty, in 
more branches than one’.553 Critics were persistent in their efforts to prove that Mill was 
fundamentally inconsistent. 
 
By the early 1880s, On Liberty had become a major talking point again. We have seen the array 
of accusations Mill had already received; the social and political implications of his 
individualism or self and other-regarding actions; the potential religious consequences of his 
thoughts on toleration, to name but a few. Many assumed that for Mill, the individual and the 
state were opposites, but this is a misreading of the text. For example, Time wrote that the 
individual and the state are always pinned down as the antithesis of the other. Unfortunately, 
‘it is this theory of the individual which underlines Mill’s famous book on Liberty’. This would 
remain hugely problematic for Mill. Critics argued that you simply cannot talk about the 
individual as if their worth is separate to that of the community. However, this had become 
‘the dogma of the old-fashioned radical’ and such blanket judgements were misleading. 
 
Mill had not established a consistent reputation when he wrote On Liberty. Time identified that 
for individualists, ‘the essence of Liberal efforts has been the struggle for individualism against 
Governments – not against bad or despotic Governments merely, but against Governments as 
such’. Time added that ‘we had always thought that, when men fought for liberty, and checked 
the tyranny of kings and potentates, they did it for the sake of the common weal’,554 not for the 
sake of carrying out what they referred to as Mill’s negatively regulative function of the state. 
The National Review stated that ‘to subordinate individual liberty entirely to State control 
would at once stop the growth of the healthiest nation in existence, and probably kill it almost 
immediately; while to carry the principle of individual liberty to its logical end would be to 
bring about its instant dissolution’.555 As we will see, this Mill’s reputation in 1883 would do 
little to deter people such as Spencer from defending Mill’s premise. Reconstructing Mill’s 
argument here would prove instrumental for the reception of On Liberty in the following 
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decade and Spencer had done enough to ensure both their reputations remained somewhat 
intact. 
 
However, a further controversial part of Mill’s essay was his preference for eccentric 
characters. Time brought attention to the fact that ‘sometimes the common welfare has been 
promoted by resisting and restraining bad interference, sometimes by instituting Government 
action to check evils that had grown up through past bad interference or through long-continued 
neglect’. If there were no government, society would resemble nothing more than ‘an animal 
drunk, or asleep, with the brain doing as little as possible’. Time thus noted that ‘individual 
freedom presupposes the pervading intervention of an effectual Government’.556 For his critics, 
if Mill wanted greater individuality, he needed to accept that this necessitated an active 
government and more importantly, a proactive community where everyone has a role. 
 
Thus far, the question during the 1880s fixated on what ‘position can be taken up on the basis 
of the new ideas for the defence of the proper province of individual liberty and private 
enterprise against unwise and improper aggression by the State’. Those who supported state 
interference were aware that when endorsing government intervention, they simultaneously 
‘invested the State with an almost supernatural power of doing wrong’.557 However, the 
authority of the state was a better alternative than no authoritative figure at all and 
commentators seemed to trust a government rather than their neighbour or friend. In this sense, 
Mill’s critics were far more invested in a collectivist policy of state action. 
 
Despite its flaws, readers of On Liberty continued to engage with Mill and the debate of how 
to define the limits of individual liberty. Whether liberty is negatively or positively expressed, 
both readings necessitate a consideration of the role of the state in protecting and preserving it. 
The Academy noted that ‘we are left to infer that liberty is, negatively expressed, that absence 
of restraint which is compatible with the moral purpose of the state, or, positively expressed, 
that it is the rational pursuit of a rational end which the state commends and on occasion 
enforces’.558 Both readings suggest the state plays a larger role than Mill was prepared to 
concede. The Fortnightly Review added that ‘freedom is, in fact, the prerogative not of the 
individual, but of the State’ further claiming that ‘the doctrine of individual sovereignty and of 
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the equality of all men in right, is a never-failing fount of discontent, disgust, mutinous 
despair’.559 State coercive measures sought to improve people’s conditions, adding to the odds 
that they would be able to make efficient choices on their own. 
 
When and how the state may interfere in individual liberty is a question of practical 
consideration that perhaps Mill had developed considerably more than his critics noticed. Even 
for those who felt the state should serve a greater role than On Liberty seemed to permit, 
commentators such as The Academy compromised that the role of the individual is ‘not to 
supersede his energies, but direct them into nobler courses’. The individual should be 
‘unrestrained enough for responsibility, without allowing him to claim a freedom which he 
may use to immoral purpose’.560 Mill’s statement on harm and self-protection raised an 
important question: in the struggle between liberty or freedom and protection or security, which 
is more important to control? 
 
The liberal newspaper, Manchester Guardian, highlighted the three great personal rights of 
man. The liberty of free action, the right to a free conscience and the right to free possession.561 
As well as personal rights, ‘there are also natural rights belonging to the State, namely, self-
protection and the enforcement of justice’ which ultimately involves developing the intellectual 
and moral faculties of the individual in order to relieve the state of any responsibility to manage 
them. The state, not the individual, is the guardian of justice and such rhetoric would ‘substitute 
for the much abused word liberty’562 where people were given the advice ‘to seek for justice 
and endeavour to enforce it’.563 Liberty can only be realised in a social state, where the rights 
of all are respected and protected. Mill deplored a lack of individuality, but he did not assume 
that this was only possible when there was a weak or absent government. Echoing Locke and 
Rousseau, The Fortnightly Review stated that ‘the many should elect the rulers and hold them 
responsible’,564 stressing the need for cooperation and accountability. 
 
The National Review echoed early responses to Mill’s essay that the state needed greater rights 
to exercise authority but added that ‘we must not loosen or tighten its interpretation to suit our 
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convenience’. If indeed ‘individualism is admitted to be an essential element in social progress, 
the action of Government must always be restrained by a due consideration for it’.565 Despite 
the range of criticism On Liberty received, Mill was never unanimously dismissed. Self-
government had received much encouragement; Time conceded that most ‘know in our inmost 
hearts how defective our Local Government is, how chaotic its condition, how much more of 
it we need, and how much more controlled it often requires to be’.566 Perhaps all along, the 
issue was not with managing the liberty of individuals, but managing the liberty of the state in 
so far as the restraint or intervention exerted is in accordance with the assumed consequences. 
It was ultimately a question of expediency. The National Review understood On Liberty as 
Mill’s attempt ‘to prove that in certain classes of cases the evils of interference with liberty 
always exceeded the benefits, and that interference, therefore, was, in such cases, invariably 
inexpedient’.567 On the other hand, Mill had written a treatise demonstrating the expediency of 
granting more responsibilities for those mentally fit enough. 
 
Mill pleaded for both freedom of thought and discussion as well as creative individual 
expression as an element of well-being. Critics noted the epistemological importance of 
completely free dialogue, but Mill contributed little towards working out the conditions 
surrounding free speech. This can be in part explained by Mill’s failure to sufficiently justify 
his intentions in On Liberty. Critics of Mill had long stressed the significance of public opinion 
and by the mid 1880s, it is clear that Mill and his challengers had differing thoughts on what 
the function of public opinion was.568 The National Review questioned ‘how the just claims of 
individualism are to be maintained without it; whether it is not possible, on the view of the 
nature of human affairs described in this article, to make an adequate defence of the proper 
province of individual liberty and enterprise by means of experience and observation (in the 
widest meaning of those words), and such rules and generalisations as we are able legitimately 
to base upon them’.569 Mill claimed that mass opinion had the potential to coerce people to act 
or speak in uniformity. However, public opinion could aid in improving the character of more 
timid minds. Moreover, this could also act as a mediator to the minority ‘moral police’ which 
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Mill seemed to favour over the majority. In this sense, it was very much indeed a case of 
‘aristocratic liberalism’ defended by Mill.570 
 
So far, no principle had yet determined the true domains of individuality and state regulation. 
The National Review noted that ‘law is nothing but public opinion organised and equipped with 
force’ and that ‘in any question of state action, whether it be directed towards the undertaking 
of certain functions, or to the actual restraining of individuals, they are by no means usually 
the only ones, or even always – in seeming, at any rate – the most important’. In light of this, 
The National Review stated that it is wrong to say that you barter some of your freedom for 
greater freedoms. This is certainly not the case, for ‘what man barters some portion of his 
freedom for seems to me to be: first, some security for life and liberty; secondly, opportunity 
rather than freedom to exercise his faculties’.571 
 
Since 1859, we have seen liberals, conservatives and non-partisan commentators emphasise 
that the state deserved a far greater role than On Liberty would ever have permitted.572 Liberty 
is only possible when society possesses ‘a Government, not the mandatory of any one class, 
but broad-based upon the will of the whole people, an independent judiciary, trial by jury’. The 
state was an association of free persons and as the few should not control the majority, the 
majority must not control the few. The Academy noted that ‘the oppression, in either case, being 
merely the iniquitous employment of superior strength’. Real progress consisted in ‘the gradual 
vindication of the personal, social, and public prerogatives which make up individual 
freedom’.573 
 
So, what did critics respond to Mill’s claim that we are free to do anything unless it causes 
harm to another? The National Review suggested that Mill’s liberty ‘deliberately limited it to 
comparatively modern times. By so doing he deprived it of a good deal of authority’.574 In light 
of this, Time noted that ‘an ideal state would be one in which there was no waste at all of the 
lives, and intellects, and souls of individual men and women’. Accordingly, women served a 
greater role. The state had grown in terms of its ability to legislate, it was ‘originally concerned 
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almost exclusively with defence of the society as a whole against other societies, or with 
conducting its attacks on other societies, Government has come more and more to discharge 
the function of defending individuals against each other’575 as its power has strengthened. 
 
Therefore, government could defend individual liberty and where necessary, restrain it, 
forming a compromise between individualism and collectivism. The Academy brought 
attention to the premise that ‘the policy of leaving people to do as they like was leading straight 
to moral degeneration’. From this point on, On Liberty came to be associated with volatility. 
Mill’s preference of a minority guiding the majority was also contested. The Academy added 
that ‘the subordination of minority to majority is legitimate; beyond that it is a greater 
aggression upon the individual than is requisite for protecting him’.576 What this engagement 
demonstrates are the failings of Mill’s harm principle; it is too dependent on the use of our 
higher faculties. This is surely more likely to result in less creative characters than one enforced 
by a government of a multitude of personality types; for his enemies, Mill had evinced an 
intolerable view of human nature. Readings of Mill as an individualist would continue into the 
1890s, many of which interpreted On Liberty as a literal plea for developing selfish and 
competitive characters. However, what Mill really wanted was a tolerant and equal community 
where the widest possible selection of individuals could flourish. 
 
HERBERT SPENCER: FREE FROM STATE CONTROL; FREE FROM STATE 
SUPERVISION 
 
Like Dicey, Spencer would be influential in continuing the debate on individualism and 
collectivism. Like Mill, Spencer’s liberalism was built on a progressive conception of human 
nature. Yet whilst a cloud of doubt lingers over whether Mill was an individualist or 
collectivist, there were no reservations as to what side of the debate Spencer represented. 
Despite Mill never directly engaging in this debate, many readings of On Liberty describe Mill 
as one or the other and for this reason, the connection between Spencer and Mill will be 
considered here. In 1884, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) published his chief work, The Man 
Versus the State.577 Like Mill, he argued for the emancipation of the individual from 
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government control. However, for the many who engaged with Spencer, it was never man 
versus the state it had always been the state versus the man. 
 
On Liberty had received a great deal of criticism and left others deeply suspicious of Mill. 
Much of this was in relation to his writings on the role of the individual, yet some had targeted 
his views on limited state interference, others challenged his writings on socialism. The London 
Quarterly Review commented that Mill’s essay produced a profound and wide impression upon 
the minds of the day yet noted that ‘we have little sympathy with the advanced forms of State 
Socialism which give point to his protests and sarcasm, and almost lend plausibility to his 
theories’.578 The debate regarding socialism versus individualism was a major concern of the 
1880s, appearing most obviously around the time in which Spencer’s works began to surface. 
The Contemporary Review wrote however that both Mill and Spencer’s ‘conclusions are not in 
the true interest of humanity’.579 Moreover, ‘there are certain things which no man would ever 
choose to abandon to State power, on the other hand, all would agree that the State should 
accept the charge of protecting frontiers and punishing theft and murder’. Mill had written 
against over-legislation and dismissed the claim that ‘government defines and sanctions rights, 
and employs the public strength to enforce their being respected’580 but he was not so 
dismissive of helping those unable to help themselves. 
 
We have seen the struggle Mill had faced. Time observed that Mill was counsel for man rather 
than the state. However, there are things which supersede the individual and that is ‘the growing 
sense of a common responsibility to diminish the misery of human life’. Mill had wrongly 
treated the powers of the state and individual liberty as two sides of the same coin, for ‘Mill, 
and all those who take up his attitude towards the State, seem to assume that all power gained 
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by the State is so much taken from the individual, and, conversely, that all power gained by the 
individual is gained at the expense of the State’.581 In an article the following year, Time added 
that Mill and others wrongly felt that as governments had made errors in the past, they could 
not be trusted to protect liberty now or in the future, but ‘is there not such a thing as learning 
by blunders in individual life?’582 After all, the state could free ‘the individual from the 
necessity of a perpetual struggle’583 that they faced on their own, sympathising with readings 
which suggest Mill supported paternalism. Despite these setbacks, Mill was continuously 
defended by one of his long-standing loyalists, The Academy; they echoed his statement that 
excessive legislation caused a great deal of loss and suffering, adding ‘what can be done by 
individuals the State should leave alone’. This approach would put a stop to slavery, for 
regulation fosters ‘the assumption that Government should step in whenever anything is not 
right’.584 Mill’s argument in On Liberty clearly meant something more significant than the 
credit it had received even if it was not always clear what Mill himself was contending. 
 
We have seen throughout Mill’s writings the value of education. We have equally seen his 
distaste at education prescribed by the state.585 Diversity of conduct, opinion and character 
required an education. Mill had noted that this ought to be compulsory, that there was great 
utility in knowledge and conceded that it was best if the masses took guidance from intellectual 
minds for social betterment. Mill did not trust everyone to decide what was the best education 
or what was in their best interests, he had after all written that ‘the uncultivated cannot be 
competent judges of cultivation’.586 Like many contemporary readings of Mill’s thoughts on 
education today, those who read him in the 1880s saw no difficulty with the government 
enforcing education. If society was short of cultivated officials, why not just ‘educate our 
legislators, codify our laws’ for ‘it is childish to argue that, because three thousand acts of 
Parliament have been repealed, it is a mistake to pass any’.587 The Contemporary Review added 
that state intervention was solely responsible for ‘greater justice enforced, children better 
educated, the farmer better guaranteed against the proprietor’.588 Despite this clear tension, 
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Mill epitomised residual faith in education to counteract the potentially destructive state. Public 
opinion however championed the state to be guardian and protector of liberty. 
 
Ultimately, it was improving individuals and institutions which underlined both Mill and his 
critic’s thoughts on liberty. The Contemporary Review noted that ‘laws which deprive me of 
what I have for my own good and for the further development of my faculties are well-meaning, 
as is the constraint imposed on his children by a wise father for their instruction or correction. 
Besides, to contribute to make laws elevates a man’s character’. If these laws are lacking in 
any way we are free to change them, yet measures taken by legislators do not take away our 
liberty but ensure that where restrictions are in place, they act to promote equality. Such 
equality ‘will bring liberty to the oppressed, consolation to the outcast, and the produce of their 
labours to the workers’,589 a feat which On Liberty had failed to secure; many of Mill’s 
challengers after all failed to see the ‘equality’ element in his essay but this is a complete 
misreading of the text. 
 
In light of this, Time accused Mill of supposing we are blind ‘to the many real difficulties and 
objections which there are in the way of remedying and preventing evils by direct State action’. 
They added that if the end is good, state intervention is necessary and expedient and ‘we must 
be prepared to count the cost’.590 The Contemporary Review stated that ‘the limit of rights 
which may be claimed by any one individual must depend upon his aptitudes for making good 
use of them’.591 Targeting Spencer, Time contended that in objecting to state action, Spencer 
had argued that the individual has a sphere which the state must not trespass, but that ‘the State 
– i.e., the Government - is always necessarily in a minority, and has no “divine right” to control 
individuals’.592 However, the state had a role to defend ‘society against external invaders and 
against internal invaders’.593 On Liberty had provided no type of force which could be used in 
instances where people exploited the privilege of unrestrained liberty and this was to be heavily 
disputed. Commentators noted that ‘in every independent political community there must be 
some power which is ultimate, to which in the last resort the appeal can be made’.594 Mill had 
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demonstrated clearly that it was very difficult to set boundaries to our liberty. The 
Contemporary Review stated that there was a need to make clear where state interference 
should cease, writing that ‘state power ought to be limited, and that a domain should be 
reserved to individual liberty which should be always respected; but the limits of this domain 
should be fixed, not by the people, but by reason and science, keeping in view what is best for 
the public welfare’.595 
 
The London Quarterly Review noted that Mill’s hesitancy suggested he ‘was accordingly 
restrained from pushing his individualism’.596 The Contemporary Review added that ‘state 
intervention is the most rapidly increasing, and where opinion is at the same time pressing for 
these powers of interference to be still further extended’.597 Mill’s warning of the tyranny of 
mass opinion was a concern shared by the Manchester Guardian, who wrote that even ‘the 
House of Commons, as a whole, is more and more obliged to subordinate itself to public 
opinion, the implication is that those who form public opinion are those who really exercise 
power’.598 Despite all the negativity surrounding On Liberty, Mill had encouraged progressive 
thinking vis-à-vis the individual and their relationship with the state. Moreover, his essay raised 
awareness of how toxic public opinion had the potential to be. Commentators however were 
quick to note that most good things which have happened emerged as a result of the assistance 
of the state. Despite the occasional setback, ‘we are not so badly off as some people who have 
never had Parliaments to make blunders at all’. Critics noted that their ‘main reason for desiring 
more State action is in order to give the individual a greater chance of developing all his 
activities in a healthy way’, preferring to ignore Mill’s advice on how to achieve precisely that. 
 
Despite permitting the state to serve a central role in society, occasional responses flirted with 
the idea suggested in the 1870s that voluntary assistance or self-government would at times 
prove to be more advantageous. Time claimed that ‘where it is possible to attain the end in view 
by individual enterprise or by the voluntary co-operation of individuals, there it is certainly 
inexpedient to use the more cumbrous machinery of the State’. Spencer’s rhetoric in which he 
describes society as an organism was categorised into two systems, compulsory cooperation 
                                                        
595 The Contemporary Review, Apr 1885, p. 488. See further Miller, ‘Herbert Spencer’s Drift to Conservatism’, 
pp. 483-497. Miller noted that Spencer offered the right to ignore the state in his Social Statics, in line with 
Mill’s clause that one can do as one pleases as long as it does not harm another. 
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and voluntary cooperation. Where people can do it themselves, they should be entrusted with 
that responsibility. Time further added that it was possible ‘for a Democracy to construct a 
strong and vigorous State, and thereby to foster a strong and vigorous individuality, not selfish 
nor isolated, but finding its truest welfare in the welfare of the community’.599 The essence of 
practical agency after all was to make and remake ourselves. 
 
We have seen how the idea of state action drove much of the debate after the publication of On 
Liberty. There are two parts to the argument here. The first concerns the opinion that ‘the State 
should make use of its legitimate powers of action for the establishment of greater equality 
among men, in proportion to their personal merits’600 and this would work in conformity with 
the progress of humanity. The second assumes ‘that every increase of the powers of 
government (Mr. Spencer uses “Government” and “State” as convertible terms) implies an 
equivalent decrease in the liberties of individuals’ but, to use Spencer’s rhetoric, this is 
‘profoundly inorganic’.601 Mill and his intellectual successors wrongly assumed that as the state 
gains strength, the individual loses their liberty. The function of the state was a divisive issue 
by the turn of the century. Yet Mill and others had failed to satisfy concerns from their critics 
that their ideas could adequately protect the welfare of the community. This raised important 
questions concerning the legitimacy of compulsion, and it fell to the responsibility of another 
of Mill’s loyalists to persuade his readers of the value of On Liberty. 
 
AUBERON HERBERT: THE LEGITIMACY OF COMPULSION 
 
By the 1880s, Auberon Herbert (1838-1906), like Spencer, had proven himself to be a 
determined advocate of individualism.602 The accolade he is given as a champion of liberty is 
                                                        
599 Time, Feb 1886, pp. 142-145. Spencer was also aware of ‘of the destruction of voluntary effort caused by an 
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obsession with the liberty of the individual was enough of a Lockean and Spencerian to believe in the constraints 
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reminiscent of the title Mill assumed when On Liberty was first published. How Herbert dealt 
with both the content and reception of On Liberty by the 1880s would prove crucial when 
revising current readings of the essay. Herbert would do well to firstly define the term. In an 
article of 1880, the term liberty was claimed to be nothing more than a ‘vision of childhood, a 
fiction, a high-sounding name’,603 the ambiguity over the term continued to cause controversy. 
Accordingly, Herbert’s works had prompted the Essex Herald to emphasise ‘the right to 
individual liberty’,604 in an article of 1883, an argument we will need to revisit closely. 
 
Edinburgh Evening News noticed a parallel between Mill and Herbert’s work. They observed 
that where Mill stood for liberty until harm was done to another, Herbert claimed ‘that every 
man and every woman should have the widest possible liberty of action, limited only in one 
direction. This limitation suggested itself to them at once; he must be held free to guide his 
own life, to act as he chooses, to find his own happiness, to pursue his own interests, to take 
charge of his own life, but in doing these he must allow to his neighbours exactly the same 
quality’.605 The liberal newspaper, Peeblesshire Advertiser, stated that the principles sought 
after were ‘individual liberty, the rights of citizens and the principles of toleration’.606 Of the 
legitimacy of compulsion, Edinburgh Evening News wrote ‘the tendency of political life was 
to employ the State to do more and more for the people, but now came the question, could they, 
in order to do this, rightly employ the state?’607 Yet Herbert had written that ‘you will not make 
people wiser and better by taking liberty of action from them. A man can only learn when he 
is free to act’.608 
 
As we have seen, the majority of responses to Mill’s essay insisted that giving up a little of our 
liberty in order to gain some security and protection was worth the risk. Fun magazine noted 
of Mill that ‘all law and legislation he would make a rapid clearance; and this he vows would 
make us all true liberty embrace’. However, as much as Herbert would restrain the interference 
of legislation, ‘he would doubtless let the burglar go a-burgling quite in freedom’ and ‘he’d let 
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all vices flourish’.609 Whilst Mill had expressed preference for a particular type of character, 
he never pardoned a culture of vice or anarchy. The Saturday Review had too challenged 
Herbert, noting that despite longing to see people educated he ‘would jealously guard alike the 
sacred right of those who choose to abuse their liberty to sow the seeds of vice and misery 
untold for generations yet to come, and the sacred right of “modern savages” wantonly to 
destroy’.610 
 
Herbert, like Mill, was sure that people would not abuse their freedom and bring misery to 
others or live a life of vice. Whilst Mill’s critics were uninspired by his essay, the personal 
liberty club told a different story. The party of individual liberty demonstrated how far they 
had interpreted Mill’s essay. In the reading rooms, members were free to speak as loudly as 
they pleased, and ‘any member seeing a newspaper he wants in the hands of another can snatch 
it away from him’. Moreover, in the card room, ‘members are quite free to cheat if it pleases 
them’611 and more generally, ‘no member need pay for anything unless he likes’. This 
‘freedom’ or ‘liberty to do’ is clearly problematic and Herbert evidently goes beyond what Mill 
had championed in On Liberty for Mill never sanctioned such actions, or at least not explicitly. 
For Herbert, ‘individual freedom is not a means but an end, and an end of such paramount and 
sacred obligation that no risk of practical inconvenience should be suffered to stand in its 
way’.612 What Herbert regarded as most fundamental was ensuring a capacity for choice and 
protection of rights and interests. Here, then, individuality was more than having the liberty to 
choose how to live your life. It became a way of life. 
 
Whereas Mill had been challenged for exaggerating how distinct and original our characters 
ought to be, Herbert championed voluntarism. It is this distinction which meant that Herbert 
was met more positively, even if his liberty would permit people to be a nuisance to others. 
The Manchester Guardian wrote that Herbert’s ‘individualistic creed was a creed of peace and 
conciliation’.613 The tendency in the 1860s and 1870s was to support the exercise of regulated 
force. By the 1880s, there was greater emphasis on voluntarism; ‘this ceaseless effort to compel 
each other, in turn for each new object that is clamoured for by this or that set of politicians, 
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this ceaseless effort to bind chains round the hands of each other, is preventing progress of the 
real kind’.614 Real progress consists in peace, friendship and association, not coercion, 
underlying Mill’s sympathies with paternalism. 
 
Herbert and Spencer had added something vital to the later responses to On Liberty. They noted 
that the risk taken with unrestricted liberty is the inconvenience that others may pose to us (a 
reference to earlier discussion on toleration), but this did not mean that we ought to use force 
to prevent this. The Manchester Guardian noted that ‘people generally were enslaved by the 
idea of State help; they thought their troubles, discomforts, and ignorance were to remain until 
the State could lend a helping hand. From the idea they had to escape, and in its place, they had 
to put the idea of reconstructing life by their own hands. The great things already achieved by 
voluntary associations was proof that much more might be attained in the direction 
indicated’.615 Whilst Herbert shared Mill’s concerns of a declining state and the need to give 
people opportunity, the Manchester Guardian wrote state intervention meant ‘stripping one 
man of his self-control and, like a stolen cloak, putting it on the shoulders of another man’. 
Voluntary associations were promptly discussed as a means to social progress, contrary to 
Mill’s preferred policy of helping people to help themselves. 
 
With the rekindling of interest in Mill’s essay, engagement with On Liberty focused again on 
the role of the state. The Manchester Guardian noted that ‘it sounded very well and reasonable 
at first to say that the great mass of opinion would always direct in its own interest whatever 
machine of Government was set up, but the truth was these great machines passed absolutely 
out of the people’s control’.616 Moreover, man ‘should be accounted a free man, free in the 
disposal of his faculties and his possessions’.617 In a later article, the Manchester Guardian 
added that the state ‘corrupted the people, prevented their checking and controlling of mistakes 
and crimes of the government’.618 Inspired by Spencer, it seems that Herbert’s warning of the 
threat of government policy was being adhered to. 
 
So, why were people becoming increasingly suspicious of the state? Utilising force to coerce 
individuals to act in a certain way meant that people ‘placed upon the shoulders of the 
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Government a burden which it could not bear’.619 The Manchester Guardian focused on 
Herbert’s relationship with the Manchester school of self-reliance and self-help, writing that 
‘they not only complained that Government mismanaged, wasted, and bungled, but they 
questioned the whole fabric of power. They said there were no true foundations on which this 
power of men to regulate and control each other rested. They said all government is force, and 
force may only be rightfully used for one, and only one, purpose. In self-defence, to protect the 
individual, to protect the country, it might be used; for all other purposes it was a crime, it was 
an absurd and unreasonable crime’.620 Herbert himself had written that ‘governments are only 
machines, created by the individuals of a nation’, adding that ‘they cannot possibly have larger 
moral rights of using force’621 than the individuals who delegated them. 
 
On Liberty had fostered debate and discussion on when it was right or wrong for the state to 
compel people. Herbert ‘had often said that the State being only a force-instrument, could only 
properly do one work – the work of force: that was restraining the violent forms of force, the 
restraining of thief, murderer, or enemy from another country. All else was to be done by 
voluntary combination’.622 The Saturday Review noted that whilst ‘you cannot make people 
moral, and it is far better to promote a high standard of morality than to have to punish crime; 
prevention is better than the cure’. It should be remembered that ‘we are obliged in the interests 
of society to coerce both thieves and drunkards’623 for the protection of society. 
 
These origins of voluntarism could no longer be ignored. The Manchester Guardian noted that 
‘self-regulation was the true principle as against regulation by some external authority’. 
Revising existing interpretations of Mill’s essay led to comments that ‘peace, friendship, 
voluntary combination – this was the true road: strife, love of power, political organisation, 
enforcement of the individual – this was the road that led to an ever-increasing weakness of 
national character and increasing suffering’.624 People needed to have a sense of responsibility 
but force would ‘relieve us from all the deserved penalties of our carelessness and mental 
indolence by depriving us of free action’.625 The Manchester Guardian added that ‘each 
individual had the right of self-defence – the right to use force to repel force - and the right to 
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the free and full use of his faculties’.626 In an article of the following year, they noted that ‘the 
people of this country were much more inclined to ask what was this right of controlling, and 
on what foundations it rested’.627 In order to answer these questions, readers turned their 
attention back to On Liberty. 
 
J. H. LEVY AND THE OUTCOME OF INDIVIDUALISM 
 
Joseph Hiam Levy (1838-1913) had demonstrated his support for individualism long before 
the 1880s.628 His reading of individualism maintained that the government is permitted up to 
the point which maximises freedom; we should be able to exercise our liberty as widely as 
possible. Levy was instrumental in forming the Personal Rights Association in 1871 with 
Auberon Herbert, which would maintain government as far as necessary, opposed tyranny, 
disliked all obstacles to women and wanted to extend the franchise to those deemed 
responsible.629 By the 1880s, Levy was at the height of his reputation as a libertarian thinker. 
 
Championing equality of all persons, the Personal Rights Association was established to 
defend the individual after decades of articles avowing that without the correct legislation in 
place, individual liberty will be unjustly infringed upon. Commentators further upheld that 
‘everything which did not imperatively require the exercise of force left as voluntary agency 
and the power of persuasion’.630 The liberal newspaper, Luton Times and Advertiser, observed 
that Levy sought to ‘protect and enlarge personal liberty and personal rights, and to oppose the 
multiplication of laws and the tendency to control and direct, through parliament, the affairs of 
the people’.631 Mill had done something right in convincing the correct people of the 
importance of his essay, for writers such as Levy, it enabled them to focus their own ideas too 
and it further clarified responses to Mill. The Nonconformist Coventry Times noted that the 
powers of government were to be ‘limited as far as possible to the protection of every member 
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of the community against wrong’.632 The conservative Southern Reporter added that ‘a good 
despotism is better than a bad democracy’. After all, every man ‘is a law unto himself in matters 
social and political’.633 The criticism On Liberty received came from a variety of classes and 
political or religious obligations.634 The fear that it would stir up a radical movement was 
perhaps exactly what Mill intended. 
 
By the 1880s, the majority of responses to On Liberty echoed Mill’s chief principles. Whilst 
dismissing him, they simultaneously invested in his thought. The liberal newspaper, Weston-
super-Mare Gazette, noted that ‘each one has an individual responsibility. Each is accountable 
for his actions. Each action decides our character’. They added, strikingly similarly to what 
Mill described in 1859, that ‘perfection of character is what we should seek to aim at and 
attain’.635 The relationship between Mill’s project and his readers by the 1880s is easily 
comparable. Levy had been instrumental in this. Those who wrote favourably of individualism 
often made a point of stressing how inconsistent socialism was. Pall Mall Gazette observed 
that ‘the socialists have been having almost a monopoly of current literature under the cloak of 
a history of the English poor’.636 It was time for change and arguments against the collectivist 
effort emerged. Like Mill, there remained a very real fear that whilst the individual is a unit 
within society, ‘the individual man might lose his personal identity and individual 
responsibility in the crowd’.637 Mill had pushed this argument since the 1830s and it was not 
until the 1880s that we see evidence that his writings were taken seriously. Society, after all 
represented a nest of uniformity. 
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Levy would be crucial in defining Mill’s socialism; he wrote that Mill ‘has done more to 
propagate Socialism than any writer of our generation, Karl Marx not excepted’ adding that 
Mill ‘knew what he was saying’638 when he confessed his socialist sympathies in his 
Autobiography. Like Spencer, Mill had described an egalitarian ideology. Moreover, we can 
relate Mill’s ‘Chapters on Socialism’ (1879) with T. H. Green’s liberal interventionism. As 
Skorupski has suggested, ‘Mill’s and Green’s concern with individual development was placed 
on the political plane with questions of social justice and national efficiency’.639 Sidney Webb 
stated that Mill abandoned mere ‘political democracy for an almost complete socialism’.640 In 
response, Stephen expressed his anxieties over a tendency towards socialism and anarchy in 
England. William Morris, in his News from Nowhere, admitted that Mill had convinced him, 
confessing ‘that socialism was a necessary change, and that it was possible to bring it about in 
our own days’.641 In 1879, The Fortnightly Review had printed Mill’s ‘Chapters on Socialism’ 
in their monthly editions. In his earlier days, Mill had written to Henry Chapman in 1844, that 
there would be no ‘social stability or security if there is not a habitual bond of good offices and 
sympathy between the ruling classes and the ruled’ which would have no effect if there were 
no socialism to ‘frighten the rich’. In a further letter to John Pringle Nichol in 1848, Mill wrote 
unfavourably of those who held back cases of legitimate socialism. Still, he was pleased to see 
‘that there are, at least in France, so many men in conspicuous station who have sincerely every 
noble feeling and purpose with respect to mankind’.642 
 
For some, in more recent literature, Mill was not a socialist at all. McCloskey wrote that ‘Mill 
was never a socialist, but his writings did much to advance the cause of socialism, particularly 
Fabian Socialism’.643 Kurer added that ‘the majority view holds that Mill was not a socialist, 
let alone a committed one’.644 Yet others have maintained that Mill could credibly call himself 
a socialist. Claeys has argued that Mill’s commitment to cooperative socialism from the 1830s 
‘must be interpreted as an extension of his concern for individuality, independence and self-
cultivation rather than as existing in an uneasy relationship with these ideals’.645 Kurer also 
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claimed that ‘Mill had a coherent view about what constitutes socialism’,646 while Medearis 
uses examples of Mill’s views on private property to strengthen the case that he was a socialist 
after all.647 
 
In addition to this, for Mises, Mill was the ‘the great advocate of socialism’648 whilst Hayek 
charged Mill with outlining a ‘complete incomprehension of the central problem of economic 
theory’.649 Gaus claims that Mill was ‘deeply skeptical of socialism just because of his positive 
economics and his devotion to liberty’.650 Reeves has written that ‘it was Mill’s liberalism 
which shaped his response to socialism’.651 Baum has suggested that ‘Mill’s interest in 
socialism stems largely from his understanding of the restraints to and possibilities for freedom 
contained in modern economics’.652 Considering any ambiguities in Mill’s thought, Claeys 
summarised that ‘if Mill’s principles veered in one direction, they veered more towards 
socialism, insofar as much greater equality was an ultimate goal, and particularly Saint-
Simonianism, in its theory of justice and reward according to labour, than towards 
capitalism’.653  
 
Halliday has written that Mill’s writings on socialism were ‘a defence of any means to social 
co-operation which improved conduct and character, while mitigating the pernicious effects of 
wage-labour, private ownership and free competition’.654 Meadearis has claimed that it was 
Mill’s critique of private property which moved him towards socialism.655 Riley suggests that 
‘a decentralized socialist economy, in which many producer cooperatives compete with each 
other in product and factor markets, is evidently the only form of socialism he takes 
seriously’.656 Capaldi has written that ‘Mill considered himself to be an “ideal” socialist’657 
adding that for Mill, this meant something similar with the utopian socialists of the 1830s and 
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1840s. Since the 1870s however, attention turned to using the language of individualist or 
collectivist to describe Mill’s theory of liberty. 
 
Those who were previously Mill’s critics were now openly opposing collectivism or indeed 
socialism and took their arguments concerning liberty down an exclusively individualistic path. 
Pall Mall Gazette claimed that there is too much socialism in the guise of centralised 
governments or village communities and as a result, the individual has ‘had his character 
warped and his acquisitive instincts atrophied by disuse’.658 Levy would later write (not until 
1904 however) in his Socialism and Individualism the following concerning the case against 
socialism: ‘I assert that it is essentially inconsistent with that sovereignty of the individual over 
himself which is the most sacred and fundamental of human rights, and that, however much 
there may be to deplore in the present state of things – of which the individualist is not the 
apologist – the socialistic road is not that which we should take if we desire the suppression of 
injustice and the misery which follows in its wake’.659 
 
In his Autobiography, Mill referred to himself as both a democrat and a socialist.660 Ten has 
written that ‘Mill’s greatest sympathy with socialism lies with its account of the evils of 
existing society’,661 a concern which surfaces in a number of his works and which he addresses 
in detail in his Autobiography and his posthumously published ‘Chapters on Socialism’. Mill’s 
development of socialism was encouraged by his reflections on the injustices and inequalities 
within society. This led Mill to declare, in his vindication on the 1848 revolution in France, 
that socialism was ‘the modern form of the protest…against the unjust distribution of social 
advantages’.662 In his Autobiography, Mill described his ideal of future improvement as being 
‘under the general designation of socialist’.663 In books IV and V of the Principles, Mill 
provided a description of the appeal of socialism and explained how society could and should 
adopt socialism rather than capitalism. In his ‘Chapters on Socialism’, Mill wrote that ‘this 
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doctrine does not as yet show signs of being widely prevalent in Great Britain, but the soil is 
well prepared’.664 The influence of Mill’s socialism cannot be underestimated, particularly in 
light of Levy’s reading of Mill since responses from 1859. So, what of these readings of Mill 
as a socialist sympathiser? Levy connected Mill directly to the socialist movement and the 
significance of this reading encourages a revision into arguments concerning Mill’s collectivist 
background since the 1830s when he started writing on marriage, the family and individual 
liberty. This is particularly important as reactions to Mill’s earlier works showed a public 
endorsement of a collectivist vision of liberty as opposed to an individualist. 
 
The parallel between public perceptions of On Liberty and individualism by the 1880s was 
remarkably similar. Dundee Advertiser noted that ‘individual merit wherever it is found. 
Elevate, not the State, but the individual citizen, who by individual effort strengthens our social 
system’. Whilst Mill’s emphasis on encouraging people to develop their individual faculties 
was seldom read as a defence, or complimentary to the community, readers took note of the 
warning Levy postulated in his work and revised their approach to Mill’s essay. Of the state, 
‘the great trust we have committed to you is one of constant watchfulness’.665 In praise of 
individualism, it was no longer believed that restraints on liberty were necessary to secure the 
liberties of the entire community. By ridding people of these restraints, they would be more 
able to cultivate well-regulated and good minds, ‘like the ticking of a clock, which goes on in 
its unvarying and steady course, in spite of all atmospheric change’.666 
 
We have seen why Levy was hostile to socialism and, like Mill, he had looked to history in 
order to explain why. After warning of the dangers associated with the socialist path, Levy 
later explained the outcome of individualism: ‘if repression does its work once more - if, false 
to our history and our heritage, we surrender one after another of our liberties we had not the 
courage and the intelligence to persevere on the road on which we found all that is most 
valuable in British history and British character, the road of freedom and justice’.667 As Morley 
                                                        
664 CW 5, p. 709. 
665 Dundee Advertiser, 7 Oct 1880, p. 6. Carbone noted that ‘Mill’s individualism assumes that people can 
generally be relied upon to make wise decisions’. See Carbone, ‘John Stuart Mill on Freedom, Education, and 
Social Reform’, p. 7. For this reason, people should be left to themselves and both readers of Mill and Levy 
approved of this stance. 
666 Weston-super-Mare Gazette, 4 May 1889, p. 6. 
667 Levy, Socialism and Individualism, p. 155. Thilly noted that freedom was a fundamental feature of Mill’s 
agenda and ‘without freedom of thought, tastes, and experiments in living, there can be no rich diversity of 
individuals, no unique personalities, no originality of mind or individuality of character, and hence no progress’, 
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had warned of the need for greater compromise between opinions and beliefs, the 1880s 
advised of the need for a fair balance between interests in the community; the conservative  
Aberdeen People’s Journal noted that ‘the good of the society consists in the just balance and 
proper combination of the interests of all its members, which have hitherto been supposed to 
be secured through the recognition of individual rights’.668 England was fragile and people 
were right to be protective of their liberty. 
 
Levy offered the clearest and most cogent defence of Mill’s discussion on the individual, 
arguing the following: ‘do not allow yourselves to be misled into the belief that Individualism 
means either selfishness or isolation. It really implies the limitation of the rights of each 
individual by those of every other. It sets bounds to the pursuit of one’s own happiness, and 
prescribes a loyal acceptance of the lot, however humble, which Freedom may award’. 
Incredibly, this was sufficient justification for developing our own character and also opened 
the door to greater dialogue concerning the rights of women. Mill’s critics seemed convinced 
by Levy’s assertion that ‘with the eruptive energy of society we can do much more and far 
better’ and that we must wake up these underground forces, ‘a fluid mass of ideas, emotions, 
passions’. They were never as great a risk as Mill’s critics maintained and by the turn of the 
century, society decisively seemed ready for embracing his ideas. 
 
Mill’s reflections on individuality were decisively understood and absorbed by the 1880s. Levy 
had written on the outcome of individualism that ‘our intellectual and moral natures come into 
play only when we judge and decide for ourselves’.669 This was reinforced by Weston-super-
Mare Gazette, ‘individual life is marked out by moments’ and we need to have the freedom of 
expression and thought in order to develop our faculties. These responses to ideas on liberty 
and freedom are typical of the majority of responses to Mill during this period. It is impossible 
to miss the zealous appeal for greater demonstrations of individual eccentricity throughout On 
Liberty. Weston-super-Mare further wrote that ‘we all have it in our power to rise in the scale 
of life, to make our mark, to reach a high standard, to help on the cause of humanity, to benefit 
                                                        
p. 13. See Thilly, ‘The Individualism of John Stuart Mill’, pp. 1-17. Levy would concur that these faculties can 
only be developed when we are left to manage them ourselves. 
668 Aberdeen People’s Journal, 29 May 1880, p. 4. 
669 Levy and Bax, Socialism and Individualism, pp. 99, 66, 153. However, for an argument against 
individualism, see Nolte, ‘The People versus Individualism’, pp. 545-553. 
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others, to improve our talents, to refine and exalt our whole being’.670 Mill could rest assured, 
for he now had the impact he sought in 1859. 
 
As we will see in the following chapter, the extent to which this not only included women but 
was dependent upon them surfaces with overwhelming persuasion. However, this move in the 
direction of gender equality can be seen as early as the 1880s; the Leicester Chronicle, a liberal 
newspaper, noted that ‘surely it is safest to bring the light of the public conscience to bear upon 
the teaching and influence of every individual in the community’.671 As the conservative 
newspaper, St James’s Gazette noted in 1885, there was never any doubt as to the right or duty 
of government to remain in office; it was a question of who will challenge them and this 
required a trained individual character. Perhaps the slow developments in social and political 
life were because society had ‘not instilled into her a knowledge of public duty’.672 Perhaps the 
contribution of women filled the missing piece to practically, rather than theoretically, 
transform society. On the effect of marriage, the Leicester Chronicle stated that by making her 
thoughts accountable to her husband, ‘you have made it her merit that she should be ignorant 
of and unpractised in all those virtues which are of direct benefit to the community’.673 Women 
had a responsibility to develop their character, not just for themselves but for civic well-being 
and it seems that by 1887, people were convinced that this was not so scandalous after all. 
 
Levy himself had some relatable comments, albeit with religious undertones, concerning the 
position of women and the outcome of individualism. In The Fall of Man (not published until 
1900), Levy wrote the following: ‘if I understand the story of the Fall alright, it means that 
Man, by eating too freely of the Tree of Knowledge, brings on the multiplication of childbirth 
and the sorrows of motherhood; that, in order to feed the extra mouths, Man is forced from the 
freedom and detachment of Nomadism into the toil of agriculture; and that the results are the 
clashing of interests, fratricidal strife, and the subjection of Women’.674 If men continue to put 
their want to expand their knowledge above the rights of women, it will not only be society 
which will suffer, but their families too.675 This theme feeds into the reception of On Liberty I 
                                                        
670 Weston-super-Mare Gazette, 4 May 1889, p. 6. 
671 Leicester Chronicle, 28 May 1887, p. 7. 
672 St James’s Gazette, 14 Dec 1885, p. 3. 
673 Leicester Chronicle, 28 May 1887, p. 7. 
674 Levy, The Fall of Man, pp. 18-19. 
675 An article by the Edinburgh Evening News in the 1870s had made a passing comment that Levy ‘declared 
that women holding eminent political positions would make the best mothers’. See Edinburgh Evening News, 6 
Mar 1876, p. 2. 
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will address in the following chapter, which chiefly discussed liberty in both the private and 
public sphere, particularly in the context of the family and the need for greater collaboration 
for individual progress. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The reception of On Liberty thus far has demonstrated how Mill was too useful to be ignored. 
Spencer, Herbert and Levy all adopted or cherry-picked from Mill’s philosophical framework 
when commenting upon the impact his essay had on society. By the 1880s, Mill’s work still 
interested intellectuals and social movements. As with Mill, the response to Spencer was 
somewhat frosty. Commentators rearranged the title of his work to turn attention to the chief 
concern in society. Critics insisted that the state ultimately had prerogative over the individual. 
Moreover, increasing state power did not mean individual liberty would be reduced. Despite 
this setback to Mill’s essay, commentators demonstrated a subtle breakaway in favour of 
reconsidering the extent to which the state could interfere. Even so, efforts from the 1880s had 
failed to have as much an impact as Stephen’s work in 1873 and it had proven difficult for 
figures such as Spencer, Herbert and Levy to shake the hold which Stephen had over the public 
mind. 
 
This chapter has detailed the reception of On Liberty from 1880 to 1890. In the previous 
chapter, we have seen how Mill’s association with individualism or collectivism influenced a 
number of responses to On Liberty. This debate, which continued into the 1880s, focused on 
whether force can be employed to improve individual faculties. The majority of responses were 
written by liberals or radicals. Together, they wrote on the rights of man, in defence of liberty 
and safeguarding the right of combination to promote individual freedom. Like Dicey, Spencer 
was a central figure during the change from individualism to collectivism in nineteenth-century 
England. Consistent with the reception of earlier works on individualism, articles in the 1880s 
came from largely conservative and liberal periodicals. Conservative reviews described their 
concern at the socialist argument of On Liberty. The state had responsibilities and Mill’s 
argument for a free society was not in anyone’s interests. In contrast, liberal articles adopted 
Spencer and Mill’s warning of the tyranny of the majority as a central argument as to why 
individuals could ignore the state and be free to do as one wills. Of Auberon Herbert’s influence 
in the 1880s, responses to debate on liberty, individualism and collectivism were almost 
entirely written by liberal periodicals. Extending Mill’s argument further, these liberal and 
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radical newspapers and magazines demanded greater freedoms to act as they pleased along 
with minimal state intervention and no practical inconveniences should stand in the way of 
this. The individualist, Joseph Hiam Levy, provoked articles from chiefly conservative and 
liberal periodicals. Outraged by conservative critics, they responded that they would prefer a 
good tyrant to the dangerous individualism proclaimed by Levy and Mill. However, their 
liberal counterpart stressed that greater individuality was needed for us to accept accountability 
for our actions and improve our character. This conflict between conservative and liberal 
periodicals was rooted in a difference of opinion on how to create a just and balanced society. 
This is consistent in both their reading of Mill and later, Levy. 
 
So, what of Mill’s loyalists? Spencer’s The Man Versus the State epitomised Mill’s plea for all 
individuals to be free from state control and supervision, prompting commentators to revolt 
against all state meddling. Herbert had encouraged critics to reconsider the use of force upon 
one another and to contemplate other solutions to individual differences. He had assured 
society that the state was there to assist. The argument for order and control had lost its way 
by the 1880s and attention turned to developing ideas in favour of self-reliance and 
voluntarism. There were limits to the expediency of interference and this was picked up by 
Levy; his reflections on what it meant to develop your individuality had clarified confusion 
from Mill’s critics. As we will see in the following chapter, this made room for discussion on 
Mill’s overarching anxiety, a concern which can be connected to a number of his works. The 
story thus far ends discussion on the value of individuality and whether we should cultivate 
this at the expense of the collective. By the 1890s, attention turned to the utility of the family 
and how Mill saw this in relation to his writings on liberty and his connection, already noted 
by some critics, with Malthusianism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Later Responses to On Liberty: Mill, the Individual and the Family 
1890-1900 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1859, the vast number of responses and interpretations of On Liberty have demonstrated 
how controversial and unclear Mill’s essay was. Despite this, there was great appeal in reading 
Mill’s work, and it remained subject for consideration and debate into the 1890s. Mill’s essay 
did not receive the fame he perhaps hoped it would achieve. For starters, his description of 
individuality was so provocative that despite three decades of hostility, readers continued to 
focus on this part of Mill’s essay. Yet further criticism of Mill’s thoughts on individuality 
ushered in a new reading of the individual in the context of the family and what this meant for 
concerns surrounding equality, liberty and sociability. An increase in responses on the family 
and marriage also encouraged debate on the political and social direction of the woman 
question. 
 
It became clear by the 1890s that cooperation was an integral ingredient for individual 
development and interpretations of On Liberty prompted a surge in articles writing on the need 
for collectivism rather than individualism. Accordingly, what we see by the 1890s was greater 
discussion on the individual and the family. Family life began to be idealised and was 
considered more stable for progress, particularly when parental roles became more sharply 
defined by the 1900s. Accordingly, a majority of conservative, liberal, radical, non-partisan 
and religious periodicals wrote similar articles emphasising the power of combining. As we 
will see, debate on social progress in the 1890s often raised important questions about the role 
of the family. 
 
On Liberty has been associated with an absolute and uncompromising creed of individualism. 
In the previous three decades the most provocative arguments which dominated the reception 
of On Liberty were chapters two, three and four. By the 1890s, there was an increase in 
responses directed at chapter 5 (Applications). This can partly be explained by earlier 
discussion on whether the family or the individual was the central unit within society. This 
revived earlier criticism of On Liberty, which claimed that Mill had a preference for those with 
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cultivated personalities and a distaste for the majority. In his introduction to On Liberty, Mill 
proclaimed that the individual is sovereign; for Mill, self-government and individual 
responsibility created better characters and thus, was more likely to improve society. This 
argument was very controversial since 1859 and continued to dominate discussion in the 1890s. 
 
For Mill’s critics, the individual and the families they collectively formed needed to be tolerant 
and open-minded in order to truly cultivate freedom. This was not particularly radical and from 
reading Mill alongside the reception, we can identify their joint ambition to create a society of 
equal citizens as one of the most consistent pleas throughout this period. For Mill, marriage 
was an evil of the preceding ‘organic’ age and acted as a space of tyranny. Society could not 
truly progress until these evils were rooted out, but Mill’s critics responded with an argument 
that the family was also a setting for education as equal citizens; to prevent inequality by 
teaching people about the different roles everyone in society can play. 
 
The 1890s ushered in a new phase in the reception of On Liberty, which demonstrated the 
relevance and pertinence of his writings on liberty decades after his death. The National Review 
wrote that ‘Mill thought it necessary in his own time to address his emphatic words to the 
world, much more, we think, would he consider it now’.676 After three decades of engagement 
with On Liberty, Mill’s thoughts on freedom transcended the separate spheres rhetoric of 1890s 
England. As much as his opponents tried to avoid referencing On Liberty, it was difficult to 
ignore the Millian dimension of debate on a number of political and social problems vis-à-vis 
questions of liberty. The intellectual roots of the reception of On Liberty emerged during 
debates on individualism, ideas on marriage and family, enlightenment ideas of autonomy, 
freedom and self-governance as a basis for equality. Accordingly, the family, or a community-
focused form of living, was often suggested in response to Mill’s insistence on developing 
individual personalities first. For Mill’s readers, particularly religious periodicals, this would 
foster a moral and social reformation. 
 
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
 
The previous chapters have sought to make sense of the number of varying interpretations 
which dominate existing scholarship of On Liberty. Despite the number of readings, the most 
                                                        
676 The National Review, Dec 1891, p. 520. 
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consistently discussed argument in On Liberty was Mill’s admiration of expressions of 
individuality, how best to develop them and its importance for progress. It was not the case 
that the image of Mill by the 1900s accurately reflected the entire range of readings or 
interpretations of On Liberty since its early reception. In fact, as the end of the century 
approached, the typical image that had developed over the previous decades was no longer a 
significant interpretation of Mill or On Liberty (Mill was often described as a strict individualist 
with a preference for more cultivated beings who did not need to be immersed in a society 
where the majority had ill-informed opinions). Mill’s reputation changed on many occasions 
throughout this period, but it is from the 1890s where we see it steadily improve. This can 
partly be explained by a change in what Mill’s critics valued but also how they chose to read 
On Liberty in light of contextual developments, such as the newly emerging rights for women 
and the change in structure this brought to the family. 
 
One of the leading reasons as to why On Liberty continued to be discussed and often dismissed 
in the 1890s is because Mill’s critics felt he championed the sovereignty of the individual above 
all else. Since 1859, those who engaged with Mill continued to note their concern over his plea 
for individualism and subsequently, grew increasingly suspicious of both Mill and his work. 
Thus far, the questions which have been addressed in light of the responses to On Liberty have 
sought to understand why Mill’s work was often rejected.  
 
Chapters three and four of On Liberty continuously attracted most disapproval. The Nineteenth 
Century dismissed chapter three for society was already ‘overstocked with the sovereignty of 
the individual’, there was no present danger to individuality nor has there been a particular 
desire for it. They added further ‘that the danger which threatens human nature is the deficiency 
of personal impulses and preferences’.677 The Contemporary Review responded that an 
‘awakened sense of organic relationships in social life prepared the way for the greatly needed 
correction of our excessive individualism’.678 For Mill’s critics, too much individualism was 
                                                        
677 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 492. See further The Contemporary Review, Nov 1893, pp. 724-735. 
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individuality but also felt that a degree of control was needed in order to curb excessive and potentially 
dangerous expressions of individuality. 
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dangerous but they did not argue that we should refrain from encouraging the development of 
eccentric and original thinkers. For those responding to On Liberty, Mill’s appeal for 
individualism would unsettle society; the safeguarding of rights and liberties depended upon a 
continuing relationship between the individual and society, not prioritising one at the expense 
of the other. For those who criticised this aspect of On Liberty, they looked towards the role of 
the family in moderating unwarranted appeals for individuality. 
 
By the 1890s, opposition towards On Liberty was almost exclusively fixed on what critics read 
as Mill’s plea for sovereignty of the individual. The Nineteenth Century claimed that ‘the real 
weakness of the book, the cause of the aversion it inspires in so many minds, lies in its ultra-
absolute dogmatism and its violent exaggeration of individualism’. They further wrote that ‘the 
best, ideals of our time tend still further to assist society in getting the better of the individual. 
Indeed, the book on Liberty, so far from helping to curb the authority of society and limit its 
range, coincided with a very strong lift throughout the whole of society, from top to bottom, to 
make the authority of society more stringent’.679 However, The National Review stressed that 
the benefits of individualism ‘are largely discounted by the evils’, which results in the ‘drying 
up of those fertilising streams of fresh ideas which, by stimulating progress, invigorate our 
civilisation, and make it fruitful for good’. They added that ‘the system has a prejudicial effect 
upon the minds of the taught by stifling the originality’ resulting in great minds, ‘all equally 
excellent, but so excellent that you can hardly tell one from the other’.680 They sought to 
emphasise, like Mill, that society infringed too much upon the development of individual 
characters and this would have severe consequences for everyone. 
 
The question of interference generated further hostility towards Mill’s essay. The Academy 
noted that Mill and Spencer had ‘set forth in a very forcible way the evils of interference; but 
they have hardly made any attempt to measure the undoubted evils of uncontrolled 
interference’.681 The Quiver suggested too much individual liberty risked ‘the danger of excess, 
of self-assertion, of even licence’.682 Since 1859, commentators have written of their concern 
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at the risk posed by Mill’s plea for individuality. The Nineteenth Century noted that whilst 
individuality ‘provides a moral stamina to life, is there any real danger of its being 
undervalued’.683 To counter Mill’s excessive individualism, critics advocated the development 
of positive types of characters in a social context to prevent the dangerous individualism they 
found in On Liberty, which they associated with self-centredness and the reinforcement of a 
sense of superiority, both of which would result in the weakening and destitution of 
personalities and characters. 
 
For instance, the Westminster Review expressed their objection to ‘using compulsion to bring 
about what is supposed to be a reformation in the self-regarding actions of another’.684 Yet Mill 
did not explicitly endorse such a way of life.685 He noted in On Liberty that ‘desires and 
impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and restraint’ but as discussed 
previously, critics noted that there was a deficiency of individual impulse and this posed a 
threat to social progress. Whilst Mill was worried that excessive checks could curb the 
development of liberty, he did not dismiss the usefulness of restraint, instead suggesting that 
they may contribute towards the perfection of the individual. 
 
Let us turn to Mill’s discussion on the question of interference to address this. It wasn’t the 
role of government to engage directly in freedom but to foster experiments of living. Mill 
attacked those who were a nuisance to others and who infringed upon the liberties and freedoms 
of other people. He wrote that ‘the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the 
public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes 
wrongly, and in the wrong place’.686 On this account, everyone brought something beneficial 
to support a progressive society and Mill resented those who interfered with this. What was 
needed was mutual cooperation, a devotion to the community, and the need for men and women 
to be equal.687 Despite Mill writing in On Liberty that the question is not about restraining the 
actions of individuals, but about helping them, his critics were not satisfied. Mill wrote that ‘it 
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is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, 
instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination’.688  
 
The point Mill seems to be emphasising here is his willingness to help people, but opponents 
of Mill responded that by helping some individuals more than others, you risk the strong 
crushing the weak and encouraging unequal levels of liberty to do, to say and to act. Responses 
to On Liberty agreed with Mill that too much interference upon individual liberty was an 
unnecessary evil. Yet the majority of commentators noted Mill’s failure to describe the 
acceptable limits or amount of interference we can impose on another, as noted by The 
Academy in 1891 and this led to hostile reactions.689 This resulted in a number of reactions 
calling on individuals to develop their personalities within a social context to ensure as many 
people as possible could flourish in equal liberty. 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, many responses to On Liberty stressed Mill’s focus on, 
and means to secure, greater individuality. Commentators did not read On Liberty as supporting 
a particularly ‘organic’ theory of society (in fact, Mill felt this would render the future of 
freedom and individuality uncertain; freedom needed to be protected in the occurrence of a 
new organic period). However, not everyone who engaged with Mill and his writings on liberty 
sought to dismiss him; the Westminster Review observed that ‘Mill’s individual is relative only, 
and we cannot find or imagine a normal human being living a complete and continuous human 
life, apart from his organic social surroundings’.690 From this reading, the individual Mill 
described in On Liberty was merely hypothetical (or Mill wasn’t taken seriously) despite the 
Westminster Review emphasising in the 1890s, that for anyone to develop their faculties as Mill 
encouraged, this could only be done in a social context. 
 
In an article published in June the following year (1898), the Westminster Review strengthened 
their argument for the liberty of the individual, writing that Mill’s concern and expression, the 
tyranny of the majority, ‘shows that we appreciate this danger, and that it needs guarding 
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against’. They continued, ‘individuality is in danger of being swamped by social laws. Social 
tyranny at the present day constitutes a positive danger to the individual, for it tends to make 
him a slave to custom, a mere machine, a creature who is given a reason which is not to presume 
to use, except in so far as it finds him at one with society, whose mandates he disobeys at his 
peril’.691 This was echoed by The National Review, who wrote in 1891 that ‘in these days it 
would seem as if individuality and originality stood in as greater danger of being dwarfed and 
crushed as they ever did under any tyranny or despotism, howsoever oppressive’. They added, 
expressions of originality will cease for political and social life had a ‘tendency to 
uniformity’.692 If establishing a fear of uniformity was Mill’s intention, his critics were some 
of his most effective representatives. Despite the amount of disapproval directed at On Liberty, 
Mill’s critics more often than not absorbed his ideas whilst they attacked him, and this is most 
apparent by the 1890s. However scandalous Mill might have been, his readers could and did 
identify with his concerns over the need to protect individual characters in an increasingly 
competitive and collectivist world. 
 
Despite such engagement with Mill’s essay, The Nineteenth Century noted that ‘it is, however, 
obvious, that the influence of John Stuart Mill has been waning in the present generation’.693 
It is perhaps only in 1898 when we see the clearest example, which approves of, engages with 
and encourages greater acceptance of the ideas expressed in On Liberty. Like Mill, the 
Westminster Review felt individuality was under threat from society. They wrote that the 
individual should be granted greater liberty and ‘we should not pay such blind regard to what 
“the world” tells us to be right or wrong, but that we should decide every question on its own 
merits, and never be afraid to stand by our opinions once they are formed’. At present, ‘people 
do everything in crowds’ and like Mill, they were concerned that society was moving towards 
the point when all states cease to progress, ‘when individuality is stamped out’.694 Accordingly, 
The National Review pleaded that something needs to be done quickly to encourage the 
flourishing of individual characters, for this evil which Mill thought so dangerous to liberty ‘is 
like a canker, eating at the roots of our national life’.695 
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The most detailed discussion on Mill’s sovereignty of the individual during the 1890s occurred 
between the Westminster Review and The National Review. These periodicals both read Mill’s 
discussion on individuality as defining the causes and consequences for a lack of original 
characters. Both periodicals noted the tendency of each new generation to imitate their parents, 
siblings and those who they interact with, resulting in a likeness of beliefs and thoughts. In 
particular, The National Review emphasised three sources for this uniformity: political, 
economic and educational. They wrote that previously, ‘the personality of original men was a 
power that made itself felt amongst all grades of society’ but when reflecting upon this in 1891, 
wrote that ‘to try to get much individuality from our present democracy is like trying to pluck 
grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles’. Secondly, they highlighted the growth of capital, 
writing it is ‘directly inimical to the spirit of individuality’, adding that ‘anything more 
destructive of originality in production, from which alone we can hope for variety, and indeed 
for ultimate improvement in our commodities, it would be difficult to conceive’. On education, 
‘the health and progress of every great science, such as education, depend upon continual 
difference, upon new ideas, and experiments carried out to give effect to such ideas, upon the 
never-ending struggle between many different forms and methods each to excel the other’.696 
This is extremely similar to the argument Mill put forth in chapter three of On Liberty; 
opportunities should be given to a variety of characters in order to cultivate different opinions 
and experiments of living, and in matters which do not primarily concern others, individuality 
must be defended. 
 
As discussed, one of the most pivotal claims we find in responses to On Liberty in the first few 
decades after its publication was whether Mill was a champion of the individual or the 
collective (leading on from debate in the 1870s on the merits of individualism vs. collectivism). 
Whilst the majority of responses in the 1890s opposed Mill for encouraging an unwanted and 
strict theory of individualism, Mill seemingly champions both, any progress, either 
individually or collectively is still improvement. Thus far, responses have shown that that the 
quest to find liberty in Mill’s 1859 essay was very controversial and provocative. What 
conditions were most suitable for the flourishing of liberty? Who could have liberty? Was this 
at the expense of another? Did Mill permit a certain group to have greater liberties than others 
in order to excel? These questions chiefly dominated the earlier reception of On Liberty. What 
we see by the 1890s is an increase in the number of responses directly discussing the means to 
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improve society by developing individuals. The majority remained unsatisfied and alarmed by 
Mill, but this did not stop them from discussing his ideas whilst trying to avoid any association 
with them. Despite both dismissal and absorption of Mill, there was no doubt over 
commentators shared feeling of the urgent need to improve individuals for the betterment of 
all. This feeling, particularly in the reception of On Liberty, intensified as the decades went on. 
 
Finding liberty in Mill’s 1859 essay is inseparably coupled with larger debates in the 1890s on 
the family and the need for members of society to make free or unimpeded choices.697 Mill’s 
suggestion that we must have liberty in order to investigate and find out truths forms a 
fundamental objective of the text and this is also reflected in the replies to On Liberty from 
1859. Mill wrote that ‘the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own 
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their 
efforts to obtain it’.698 Yet Mill seems to imply that being free is firstly, both a choice and 
secondly, that you make this choice at your own leisure and you are not compelled to do so.699  
 
As we have seen, it is precisely this argument which resulted in greater hostility towards Mill; 
it suggested that we must seek liberty on our own whilst responses to On Liberty stressed that 
in order to find truths, everybody has a responsibility to themselves, their families, as well as 
the wider community. We all hold ourselves, and are held by others, as responsible for our 
actions and choices we make. Opponents noted a widespread failure to discriminate between 
rules that society must impose and rules we must impose upon ourselves, restating reactions 
which called for a greater community focus. Progress and development were often spoken of 
in relation to communal standards; be it debate on liberty, sanitation, or commerce, all citizens 
had an obligation to their community as much as the community to the citizen (this momentum 
was added to by the development of socialism). 
 
The Saturday Review were particularly concerned by Mill’s sovereignty of the individual. They 
claimed that ‘where unlimited freedom is accorded to the individual a plutocratic caste is 
certain to be involved. In such a society, the many weak must expect to be trampled under foot: 
the death of the unfit is the compliment of the survival of the fit’. For the Saturday Review, On 
                                                        
697 See Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. Ryan notes that ‘freedom is a necessary ingredient in anything 
that Mill can recognize as the life which a rational man would choose’, p. 254. 
698 CW 18, p. 226. 
699 See Smith, ‘Social Liberty and Free Agency’, in Gray and Smith, ed. J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, pp. 239-
259 for a consideration of the ambiguities in Mill’s conception of freedom. 
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Liberty had implied that ‘when such untrammelled freedom is accorded to the individual, the 
man of ability has enormous opportunities for self-advancement and self-enrichment’ but ‘no 
one can enrich himself without enriching the community in which he lives’.700 Yet Mill never 
wanted individuals to develop their faculties in a way which meant that they never gave back 
to their community. For Mill, developing one’s attributes in the context of the community was 
complementary to the development of individuality. 
 
Mill’s essay encouraged the public to seriously address the liberty question. So, how did Mill’s 
readership respond to this challenge presented by On Liberty? How much can we interfere with 
another before imposing upon their individual liberty? The Contemporary Review noted that 
‘all the so-called “social problems” of the day have their root in that fatal propensity to self-
centredness which is for ever opposing man’s efforts towards fuller development’. They added 
that ‘perfect freedom would be the full power of accomplishing this desire (only another name, 
therefore, for complete self-realisation). The very first essential for attaining such freedom is 
that man’s desires should be in harmony with the order of the universe, because the possibilities 
it affords, and those only, can be actualised’.701 On Liberty had been reviewed extensively since 
its publication in 1859 by a wide variety of observers. Whether you were a conservative, a 
radical or a Catholic, a majority agreed that Mill’s individuality needed to be tamed. By the 
late 1890s, the majority of critics were in agreement that Mill pushed his argument for 
individualism too far and that something more social, such as the community or the family, 
was the best environment to safeguard and cultivate liberty. 
 
Despite Mill writing in On Liberty that as long as we do not harm others, the liberty of the 
individual follows the liberty ‘of combination among individuals; freedom to unite’, readers of 
On Liberty did not read this essay as supportive of collectivism. This idea of combining for 
social progress appeared in a number of Mill’s writings. Liberty brought with it a social 
responsibility and Mill had written that freedom is only deserving of that name when we pursue 
                                                        
700 Saturday Review, 2 Jan 1897, pp. 6-7. This argument echoes Cowling’s claim in Mill and Liberalism. 
Cowling argued that ‘On Liberty does not offer safeguards for individuality; it is designed to propagate the 
individuality of the elevated by protecting them against the mediocrity of opinion as a whole’ (p. 104). Cowling 
further claims that convention and custom cannot be trusted and as they are repressive, they must be resisted and 
replaced with a better consensus. 
701 The Contemporary Review, Mar 1898, pp. 442-444. See further Semmel, The Pursuit of Virtue, Struhl, 
‘Mill’s Notion of Social Responsibility’ and Scarre, Mill’s On Liberty, for readings which consider this 
interpretation. Mill was an enemy of isolation, not an ally. 
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‘our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs’702 for 
each individual is their own guardian. 
 
As noted by The Contemporary Review, for anyone to be able to express their liberty freely, 
they must act in harmony with the interests of society. The more outgoing and free people are, 
the more vigorous life becomes for everyone. Mill was edging towards the idea that an ideally 
free life is one where we can spontaneously choose what we want to do but the cause for 
concern was that impulsiveness was needlessly risky. Whilst the Saturday Review responded 
that Mill ‘claimed for the individual the most complete freedom not only in thought but in 
action’.703 The Quiver added that liberty ‘is not attainable at once; we enter upon it 
gradually’.704 Restraints reduce or fall off as we age and mature when we have greater freedoms 
and responsibilities. Yet safeguarding liberty for Mill was not merely a task for those who had 
the ability to do so. Mill looked forward to a time when everyone had an equal share of liberty, 
for once this occurred, society could step over the impediments which fostered unhelpful 
discussion on a multitude of issues, instead concentrating on one of the chief objects of life, 
the opportunity to develop your moral and intellectual faculties. 
 
A PROGRESSIVE LIFE: INDIVIDUALISM AND FAMILY VALUES 
 
The previous chapter considered Dicey’s focus on the shift from individualism to collectivism 
in the 1880s, demonstrating how Mill had long-favoured the art of combining in order to bring 
about greater liberty for a greater number. By the 1890s, those responding to On Liberty seem 
to have experienced a revolution in political belief. Whilst they did not necessarily depart from 
Benthamism (he believed that individual interest is predominant over social interest, that there 
is nothing greater than the individual and that the community is a false body, nothing more 
than the total interests of the individuals who compose it), they began to discuss the individual 
and the family as separate groups. 
                                                        
702 CW 18, p. 226. 
703 Saturday Review, 2 Jan 1897, p. 6. See Brink, ‘Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression’, in Ten, 
ed. Mill’s On Liberty, which develops this discussion further around the premise that Mill’s free speech 
principles play a larger role than previously contended in enshrining the freedom of thought and action. 
704 The Quiver, Jan 1895, p. 258. The idea that liberty is something we attain progressively was picked up 
further by Collini, ‘The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought’, who suggested that character was a 
‘moral tissue’ (p. 37), which integrates with the notion of self-cultivation and enriching our personal character. 
The importance of developing one’s character was crucial for Mill in his essay, this was not something that was 
expected to satisfy his plea overnight. See further Skorupski, John Stuart Mill for a broader discussion on the 
development of the individual, freedom and liberty for Mill. 
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By the 1890s, responses to Mill’s individualism engaged with the individual as the basic unit 
in society and also their role within the family, stressing both the importance of familial duties 
and the progressive aspect of uniting with one another in our community. After all, the 
Westminster Review had written that individuals ‘cannot expect to reap the benefits to be 
derived from living in a community without giving as far as possible his services to the 
community in return’.705 As much as we ought to develop our individuality, we have a social 
responsibility to our communities too and both Mill and his critics wanted us to develop them 
simultaneously. Mill’s fundamental concern in On Liberty has been read as a work stressing 
the value of the individual and as one elevating the importance of the family. The individual 
and the family were not competing concepts after all. 
 
We have seen that Mill’s call for greater individuality received a hostile reception from 1859. 
By the 1890s however, something remarkable happened. The shift in the reception, which saw 
greater attention given to family values, meant that Mill’s writings on individuality seemed 
more important than his early commentators had given credit. Reviews discussed and debated 
whether the individual or the family served a more central role in human progress. For the 
previous three decades, Mill and On Liberty had been attacked for expounding a rigid and 
extreme dogma of individualism. Yet in an article of 1896, The Nineteenth Century debated 
whether Mill was in fact a collectivist, as opposed to the strict individualist critics had described 
him as since 1859. 
 
This theory of Mill as a collectivist was rooted in readings of On Liberty as representing ‘the 
most sustained exposition of Mill’s life-long theme – the abuses of power’.706 By the 1890s, 
responses emphasised that individuals should act in accordance with the interests of the 
community for a harmonious and progressive life but where they cannot, the community should 
be prioritised over the individual. The Westminster Review claimed that we should ‘cultivate 
the strong feelings with which nature has endowed the man, and educate him to a proper 
direction of them, and we shall produce a unit valuable in itself and therefore valuable to the 
                                                        
705 Westminster Review, June 1898, p. 614. 
706 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 500. Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism had argued that On 
Liberty promoted the interests of both men and women against a social tyranny. Mill sought to protect women 
and liberate them. See Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’, Mill was fearful of the tyranny of the majority, one of the 
greatest abuses of power. 
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community’.707 No advances could be made in the realm of thought and action if humans were 
encouraged to isolate or confine themselves to a secluded life; ultimately, readers in the 1890s 
challenged responses from the 1860s that the individual is sovereign, instead focusing on the 
social context where we develop individual faculties in the first place. 
 
Three decades after the publication of On Liberty, we see the first set of reviews which 
seriously commented on and debated the contents of chapter five, noting the relationship 
between Mill’s concern over the abuses of power and relationships within the family. In chapter 
five, Mill wrote that whilst the state is obliged to maintain a watchful eye over the exercise of 
power over others, ‘this obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family 
relations, a case, in its direct influence on human happiness, more important than all others 
taken together’.708 Mill’s readers were certainly sympathetic to this for The Nineteenth Century 
had argued that the true problem is not, what are the limits of the authority of society over the 
individual, but ‘what are the respective limits of State Legislation and Social Opinion’ for ‘no 
man’s life is, or can be, solitary. The whole of “conduct” concerns society, concerns others; for 
human life simply means a continual action upon, and reaction from our fellow beings’.709 
From 1859, readers of On Liberty did not dispute that it was Mill’s attempt to ascertain what 
are the rights of the individual against society. Whilst this reading did not entirely disappear, 
commentators were less frequently differentiating between the individual and society or 
exclusively focusing on the former. 
 
Of Mill’s description of individualism in On Liberty, the Westminster Review noted that ‘the 
Individual possesses rights as against his State, and the difficulty only lies – a very big one – 
in laying down their limits’.710 The Nineteenth Century furthered this by noting that ‘the plea 
for the vast social changes involved is founded on the same theory of the Individual that is the 
root error of Liberty. Nothing can be made right in sociology whilst society is regarded as made 
up of Individuals instead of Families’.711 From this response, Mill’s error in On Liberty was 
                                                        
707 Westminster Review, June 1898, p. 613. 
708 CW 18, p. 301. 
709 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 494. 
710 Westminster Review, Jan 1897, p. 8. For further discussion on ‘rights’ in On Liberty, see Feinberg, Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law which argues the case for personal sovereignty, claiming that we should not compel 
or violate the rights of the individual. See also Stegenga, ‘J. S. Mill’s Concept of Liberty and the Principle of 
Utility’, our conduct is solely our concern and it is not the right of others, including the state, to intervene. See 
further Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, which explores the notion of justice and rights in On Liberty. 
711 This directly criticises Bentham’s writings on the individual as the unit in society. See Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 14-15 and p. 27.  
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that he based his principle of liberty solely on the individual. For the scale of social change 
Mill’s critics supported, families needed to combine and collaborate. The point here is that 
absolute individualism would cast a blight over a number of institutions, such as marriage and 
the family, and those who engaged with On Liberty were sceptical that this is what Mill 
championed. Absolute individualism would have disastrous consequences for society; The 
Nineteenth Century detailing the following examples: ‘the Family as an institution would be 
dissolved; the fine flowers of Womanhood would become cankered; the brutality of Man would 
become a grim reality; and the Subjection of Women would be a fact – and not an epigram’.712 
Such reactions to Mill’s ideas on liberty encourages us to consider whether Mill and his 
commentators were really so different in their thoughts and beliefs. They both shared a 
suspicion of tyranny; they were promoting similar positions, yet these could not be justified as 
one. 
 
The effect of forty years of critical engagement with Mill and On Liberty produced the image 
we see surface frequently in contemporary studies today, many of which conclude that Mill 
was both an individualist and an elitist. As the 1900s approached, this impression had not 
shifted considerably. In an article of 1897, the Cosmopolis claimed that Mill was ‘the sternest 
representative of “absolute individualism,” but in his last years he was very far from being an 
individualist, was abreast of the most modern tendencies in a socialist direction’.713 Whilst Mill 
was frequently dismissed for making this plea in the decades following 1859, by the 1890s, it 
was becoming clear that his opponents had reconsidered this criticism. Very rarely did his 
critics think calls for greater liberty were inappropriate or untimely (even then, this was 
religious periodicals dismissing the suggestion that women have equal liberty to men). Their 
focus was on how best to satisfy the conditions for its flourishing, which many concluded were 
best sustained in a social context (i.e.: the family) rather than individuals. 
 
In a posthumously published work from 1879, Mill demonstrated his appeal to a collectivist 
theory of liberty; he wrote that ‘the very principle on which the production and repartition of 
all material products is now carried on, is essentially vicious and anti-social. It is the principle 
of individualism, competition, each one for himself and against all the rest. It is grounded on 
                                                        
712 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 504. 
713 Cosmopolis, Mar 1897, p. 631. See further Zivi, ‘Cultivating Character: John Stuart Mill and the Subject of 
Rights’. Zivi suggests that Mill never wanted people to isolate themselves, in fact, he wanted them to disperse 
themselves around various social networks in order to develop their individual characters. 
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opposition of interests, not harmony of interests, and under it everyone is required to find his 
place by a struggle, by pushing others back or being pushed back by them’.714 Writing in 
agreement with the need for everyone to act on their personal responsibility to cultivate their 
individuality, The National Review asked their readers to ‘divert, if possible, those other 
streams which now begin to flow around the roots of our existence – the steams of dullness 
and forgetfulness, whose sluggish waters cannot fertilize, and serve only to exhaust the sources 
of life’.715  
 
This is similar to responses from 1859, which wrote with alarm upon reading any plea for 
greater expressions of individuality as a danger to society. Critics thus emphasised that 
individuals are not isolated but are products of their social environment, we develop through a 
variety of interactions and exchanging of sentiments with others. Mill was often read as asking 
for people to develop their own characters first, yet his critics wanted it to be done alongside 
others so all could develop together; for Mill, this risked uniformity. 
 
Whether the individual or the family is the central unit within society caused stark divisions 
throughout the later responses to On Liberty. The Nineteenth Century pointed out that men and 
women are organic members of a social system, adding that ‘the smallest substantive organism 
of which society is composed is the Family, not the Individual. A Family, as such, has a 
rudimentary organic life of its own, but an Individual has not. A Family on an isolated island 
can conceivably continue a normal, but very low, type of human life, physical, moral, 
intellectual, and progressive’.716 The point emphasised here echoes previous responses directed 
at chapter three of On Liberty; you cannot expect any moral or intellectual progress if each 
individual is responsible for their own self-development. The Saturday Review claimed that the 
interests of the individual and those of the social organism are ‘antagonistic, and by which the 
former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the 
race is undergoing’.717 Thus far, responses in the 1890s frequently reiterated the superiority of 
the family over the individual, resulting in continuous and sustained attacks specifically on 
chapter three of On Liberty. 
 
                                                        
714 CW 5, p. 715. 
715 The National Review, Dec 1891, p. 526. 
716 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 495. 
717 The Bookman, Apr 1894, p. 23. 
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However, there were chiefly two reasons as to why not everyone was convinced by this reading 
of On Liberty. Firstly, writers disputed the argument that supporting the family first and 
foremost would result in greater liberty and progress. Secondly, in On Liberty, Mill describes 
a sovereign individual where their liberty is best expressed through self-autonomy, therefore, 
the family is not as central to his essay as others have assumed. The Contemporary Review 
responded that ‘social movements can be expressed in terms of the individual and contract 
rather than family and values’, questioning ‘to what extent should the family have a place in 
our treatment of the question of the individual?’718 The Westminster Review added that the 
individual is not withering away; it was fallacious for commentators to say that reading the 
individual as more central in On Liberty was based on a radical sophism. For those who 
heighten the centrality of the family, ‘the Individual has been, and always will be, we hope, the 
Unit’.719 The Review of Reviews reiterated a similar trend of thought, noting that On Liberty is 
based on a primordial contract and for this reason Mill’s focus is on the individual720 and for 
The Nineteenth Century, it is precisely this assumption that is the real weakness of Mill’s 
work.721 
 
The 1890s resulted in more reviews on the applications chapter of On Liberty (chapter five). 
Crucial to this discussion, commentators highlighted the importance of liberty within the 
family and private sphere more generally. Whilst Mill’s discussion on the individual in On 
Liberty does not need restating, it may be helpful at this point to clarify what, in On Liberty, 
Mill had to say on the subject of the family. Mill noted that actions can exceed purely self-
regarding boundaries and become amenable to moral condemnation as an act of other-
regarding nature. Mill specifically noted that such moral disapproval can only result when a 
                                                        
718 The Contemporary Review, Nov 1893, pp. 727-735. It seemed something of an unrelated issue, that of the 
family to the individual. However, in his ‘Chapters on Socialism’, Mill stressed the expediency of cooperatives 
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fundamental error which vitiates Mill’s book on Liberty’, (Sep 1896, p. 496). 
720 See The Review of Reviews, Sep 1896, p. 225. They added that On Liberty is a ‘powerful protest against all 
forms of over-legislation, intolerance, and the tyranny of majorities’. See Barker, Political Thought in England, 
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For a discussion on the background to this debate of the origins of human society, see Henry Maine, Ancient 
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721 See The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, p. 496. 
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person violates ‘a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons’.722 This 
breach of duty is the condition which, when broken, removes the boundary between self and 
other-regarding actions. For Mill, ignoring your duty, particularly in instances when you have 
an obligation to a person or persons, was something of a cardinal sin. It appears thus far that 
this breach of duty sits at the epicentre of Mill’s discussion. As a result, The Nineteenth Century 
described how this conclusion, paired with Mill’s correspondence with Comte, showed that he 
championed individual liberty above everything else, including the family. The Nineteenth 
Century concluded that ‘Mill was (in theory) an Individualist, whilst Comte was 
(philosophically speaking) a Socialist. Mill cared about independence. Both wanted to combine 
liberty and duty but for Mill, liberty would come first’.723 This would become an important 
reference point for further debate on whether On Liberty endorsed individualism or 
collectivism. 
 
ON LIBERTY: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The emergence of discussion surrounding women’s rights in the 1890s ushered in a new and 
potentially advantageous period for Mill. This would also result in a new phase in the reception 
of On Liberty. There can be no doubt that Mill’s essay had an important impact during this 
period and whilst the reception of On Liberty was often dependent on how Mill’s ideas were 
perceived at any given time, the situation in the 1890s presented the opportunity for a revival 
of interest in Mill’s 1859 essay. The 1870s resulted in some of the most harmful criticism of 
On Liberty but by the 1890s, this had changed. 
 
In the 1870s, we have seen how discussion on individualism and collectivism often echoed 
sentiments from On Liberty that greater consideration should be given to the moral worth of 
individuals. By the middle of the 1890s, this argument emerged in relation to the unfolding 
political and social movement for greater liberty for women. This mixture of renewed interest 
in On Liberty and these new political circumstances, emphasising language such as 
individuality, marriage, the family and education, brought Mill’s arguments back into the heart 
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of discussion on how best to achieve a progressive society, what was our social and individual 
responsibility and what are the best means to achieve this. 
 
It wasn’t just an increase in this type of language which was significant. Many more 
newspapers and periodicals began to address individual rights in the context of the family as 
well as women’s suffrage by the end of the 1890s. The engagement with On Liberty in the late 
1890s demonstrates the influence Mill’s writings on liberty and freedom continued to have. 
For instance, The Sunday at Home: A Family Magazine for Sabbath Reading, a weekly 
magazine published by the (Christian) Religious Tract Society, wrote articles specifically 
describing activities within the family, relationships with others, detailing the interactions 
which ultimately shaped characters, opinions and beliefs. Consistent with other reactions to On 
Liberty in the 1890s (many of which were written by theologians or clergymen), these religious 
periodicals either commented on Mill’s Malthusian sympathies or sought to elevate the 
importance of the family for individual development. The reception of On Liberty has revealed 
how central individual development was to Mill’s readers but also the importance of family 
life, which we see reflected in a number of reviews emphasising how individuals were made 
in the home and domestic labour was a social responsibility. 
 
In particular, it was the radical feminist and liberal periodicals writing in the 1890s who pushed 
debate on liberty within the family further. However, this also caused problems for the 
reception of Mill’s essay and how others, such as clergymen and theologians, who did not share 
the same enthusiasm for equal liberty in the family, would read On Liberty. Taking away the 
right to marry unless you can provide sufficient evidence that you can support children raised 
a number of important questions on marriage and the rights of women. Was marriage restriction 
ever appropriate or was it a step too far, even for Mill? If it was acceptable, when? And did 
women serve a crucial role in resolving this conflict? Others were more puzzled that Mill 
defended Malthusian principles. The Nineteenth Century were surprised, ‘after such trenchant 
assertion of the absolute freedom of the individual, to find a defence of the Malthusian law of 
some continental States, which forbid the marriage of needy adults’.  
 
Mill’s reputation as an advocate of liberty was scrutinised after religious periodicals 
highlighted his Malthusian connection. Critics became suspicious, drawing attention to ‘the 
vehement language against the ‘mischievous act’ of poor persons in breeding’, adding how 
strange it sounds in the mouth of an apostle of freedom. They wrote further that it is even more 
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startling to find that it is preceded by ‘an elaborate plea for ‘the duty of enforcing universal 
education,’ the instrument being public examinations, extending to all children, and beginning 
at an early age, the parent being punished if the child fails to pass’.724 However, only religious 
periodicals discussed Mill’s association with Malthusian principles and whilst it was not a 
long-winded debate, it demonstrates the variety of topics commentators deliberated after 
reading Mill’s essay.  
 
The period from 1897 marked a remarkable transformation for the movement for women’s 
rights. The National Central Society for Women’s Suffrage (founded 1867) joined with the 
Central Committee of the National Society for Women’s Suffrage (founded 1872) to form the 
National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (founded 1897). Chiefly, they demanded 
women have the same vote as men and organised public meetings, circulated leaflets to the 
public and wrote to politicians demanding equal liberty. The political problems thrown up by 
these efforts to foster a moral and social reformation meant that On Liberty was hard to avoid. 
Even though Mill was often condemned, that should not overshadow the other ways in which 
his writings shaped the political ideas and reactions of his commentators. As we have already 
seen throughout the responses to Mill and On Liberty, their belief that liberty was best 
safeguarded, and progress was best achieved in the social context was very much a key part of 
the women’s movement. It was perhaps decades of criticism towards Mill’s theory of 
individuality that in fact encouraged all individuals to believe they should and could develop 
their own sense of self. By 1899, the Westminster Review had written that ‘women should not 
be separately legislated for until they have the power to say what they want’, they should not 
be denied the right which everyone else has, ‘a right to be consulted’.725 By the turn of the 
century, The Academy noted that ‘there seems just now to be a revival of interest in the writings 
and opinions of J. S. Mill’.726 The timing of these responses reveals further the uses of Mill’s 
essay for a variety of political and religious periodicals as the 1900s approached. 
 
In the 1890s, interpretations often concluded that Mill was an individualist for On Liberty 
argued that the individual should focus on developing their own personality and beliefs first. 
A number of replies to this have stressed how this was dangerous and that something more 
social like the family provided the safest environment for the development of originality. Mill’s 
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critics had written extensively on familial interactions and that greater liberty to express our 
opinions formed well-rounded characters. The first few years of our relationships with a parent, 
guardian or sibling are significant in developing individual characters and if properly nurtured, 
this could result in the formation of unique personalities which would satisfy Mill’s plea for 
greater eccentricity. This response to Mill can be traced back to the 1870s alongside debate 
which encouraged everyone to promote a tolerant community, to moderate between tyranny 
and liberty so all could develop unique characters. 
 
There was nothing scandalous or particularly new in Mill’s plea for the development of unique 
characters and expression of opinion, thought and action. This was a concern for everyone but 
the glaring disparity between Mill and his commentators can be found in their methods to 
achieve this. In 1897, the Manchester Guardian exclaimed that ‘the interests of the community 
at large suffer from the present total exclusion of that experience from the representation of the 
country’,727 underlying the centrality of the community to individual and collective 
improvement. A year later, the Westminster Review wrote that English parliamentary reform 
was a movement ‘towards a better order’.728 What this particular response shows is that for 
Mill’s critics, change and cooperation were encouraged, but exclusion was not. 
 
As we have seen, the majority of reviews from 1859 interpreted On Liberty as a plea from Mill 
to isolate and confine ourselves in order to develop distinctive characters. Whether Mill 
intended this reading of his essay or not, that is another question, but it is striking how much 
Mill’s insistence on the need for everyone to develop themselves was absorbed and expressed 
in the newspapers and periodicals of the 1890s. Mill’s earlier critics, whilst trying to avoid a 
connection with the controversial author of On Liberty, had simultaneously found a distinctly 
Millian method in ensuring liberty would not perish by authoritative interference from others 
and this could be found in their insistence for everyone to develop their faculties. 
 
By the 1890s, questions of suffrage were at their peak in relation to debates on electoral reform 
and representation in politics. Discussion on who was entitled to vote tended to provoke 
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thoughts on whether women should be included. In On Liberty, Mill did not comment explicitly 
on the role women should serve yet he made it clear that he felt everyone contributed something 
towards society. Those responding to the social questions by the 1890s on matters concerning 
who could be at liberty to vote, were clear that they felt women did not possess the relevant 
traits or abilities to fulfil this role to the standard required. There is something particularly 
striking here. On Liberty had been interpreted in the 1860s as a text which admired elite 
characters whilst simultaneously, showed no faith or confidence in the ability of the majority 
who did not fulfil Mill’s criteria for individuality. Mill had been heavily criticised for this 
reading. In many ways, the dismissal of On Liberty, founded on Mill’s critics supposing he had 
a preferred group of individuals, is found to be the case by these exact critics, for they had no 
confidence in women during the 1890s to allow them the same opportunities as men. This is 
perhaps the standout example of absorption of Mill and On Liberty throughout the 1890s. 
 
The Speaker rejected suggestions that women be allowed to have increased liberty in the private 
sphere, instead writing that the ‘growing conviction that the very qualities which make women 
so delightful and so invaluable in the home would make them as electors a danger to the 
State’.729 Yet even those who protested against extending the franchise or providing more 
opportunities for women could not ignore the changing political climate. The ignorance, or 
intolerance, of those who refused to engage in progressive discussion on the woman question 
prompted further engagement with On Liberty and Mill’s encouragement for individuals to 
freely express their own thoughts and beliefs. The Manchester Guardian noted that ‘one 
ground of opposition was the selfishness of those who believed that the enfranchisement of 
women would go against the particular party with which they were associated’. However, only 
by giving women the vote could they ‘act hand in hand with men as their companions, for the 
public good’.730 Moderate liberals too claimed that women’s suffrage is surely a matter which 
ought to be assessed on its own merits and individuals should occupy ‘a standpoint high enough 
above the dust and din of party warfare to support a measure intrinsically just and beneficial, 
even though it has been patronised’.731 Once again, the community sits at the centre of 
concerns. 
                                                        
729 The Speaker, 30 May 1896, pp. 576-585. 
730 Manchester Guardian, 15 Apr 1896, p. 10. Above all, there was a great ignorance that prevailed on this 
subject, supporters of women’s suffrage ‘must lose no opportunity of enlightening the men and women of 
England as to the true bearings on the question’, p. 10. This underlines the centrality of the community and 
cooperation to individual development. Accordingly, reactions to debate on liberty by the late 1890s 
demonstrate a much more tolerant and inclusive idea of progress than we have seen in earlier decades. 
731 The Speaker, 30 May 1896, pp. 576-585. 
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The Manchester Guardian added that the enfranchisement of women would not just ‘elevate 
women alone, but also the race at large’.732 To elevate the community, Mill noted that ‘women 
should be in personal servitude’.733 The Manchester Guardian claimed that ‘men had found 
the value of women’s work, and the better part among them felt the absurdity of denying them 
the Parliamentary franchise’.734 The Westminster Review added that ‘men who are wise will 
welcome the work of women, and aid them in their efforts, for they will know that it is only by 
the aid of women that greater changes yet to come can be accomplished, not by violent 
revolution, but by orderly and peaceful evolution’. 
 
Discussion on liberty within the family were entwined with consideration of the position of 
women. On Liberty would be useful for those seeking to advance women’s right and in 1899, 
the Westminster Review had noted that it was Mill’s entrance into parliament in 1865 when 
‘the agitation for Women’s Suffrage immediately began’. Mill’s connection with this 
movement for equality thirty years previously certainly added something to those advocating 
similar ideas in the 1890s. By 1899, it wasn’t so scandalous for article headings to directly 
address the injustices women experience and others were keen to connect Mill to this 
movement. The Westminster Review noted that ‘Mr. John Stuart Mill regarded women as the 
other half of humanity, with equal rights and equal duties, and needing, above all, freedom and 
space in which to develop herself in her own way, and not according to merely masculine 
whims and fancies’.735 After all, the previous year, the same publication had proclaimed not 
only that ‘greater liberty should be given to the individual’ but that ‘each individual is the best 
judge of his own affairs, and that we have no right to say that he shall not do with his own life, 
for his own benefit, what he chooses’.736 The Cosmopolis summarised that ‘the one practical 
question upon which Mill never changed his views was the woman question’.737 Mill’s critics 
were simultaneously absorbing him as they sought to reject him and those that supported the 
extension of liberty incorporated Mill’s argument to justify this. 
                                                        
732 Manchester Guardian, 3 July 1896, p. 7. With respect to the idea of elevating everyone within society, 
inclusive of women, see the differing conclusions of Mill’s intentions in On Liberty reached by Cowling and 
Capaldi. See Cowling, Mill and Liberalism and Capaldi, John Stuart Mill. The former contended that Mill’s 
elevation of individual character left less room for a variety of traits to develop. The latter argued however that 
Mill liberated and transformed existing understandings of ideas for the development of society. 
733 CW 19, p. 479. 
734 Manchester Guardian, 9 July 1895, p. 12. 
735 Westminster Review, Aug 1899, pp. 141, 138, 130. 
736 Westminster Review, June 1898, pp. 614-615. 
737 Cosmopolis, Mar 1897, p. 631. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite so much criticism of Mill since the publication of On Liberty in 1859, The Academy, 
in 1897, concluded that ‘Mill was a practical reformer’ and that ‘he acquired an influence more 
direct and rapid than has perhaps been wielded by any other thinker of the century’.738 Mill 
indeed had an influence on many and his critics were so important as they often absorbed his 
ideas as they dismissed him. Since the publication of On Liberty in 1859, most responses were 
aimed at chapters two and three. In contrast, the least reviewed was chapter four, where ‘the 
breach grows widest between Mill’s absolute individualism and the current of contemporary 
thought’. The Nineteenth Century summarised that Mill’s attempt to ascertain the rights of the 
individual against the state ‘is like asking what are the ‘rights’ of the stomach against the 
body’.739 For many, this was an underlying weakness of On Liberty. 
 
In 1891, Mill had at least persuaded some of his readers of the dangers of imitating other 
opinions and beliefs. A fear of uniformity prompted The National Review to write that ‘it is a 
humiliating thought that our civilisation should have placed us in danger of an evil that is really 
subversive of civilisation’.740 They emphasised the tendency of society to produce individuals 
of one kind, leading the rest down a path of likeness and ordinariness. Several years later, in 
1898, the Westminster Review wrote that ‘strong desires are the marks of a strong character’ 
and the individuality Mill encouraged ‘has made England, and if we wish her to keep her 
position as foremost in the race of the world, we must encourage it judiciously wherever we 
find it’.741 They added that ‘Mill was within the swirl of an eventful time, whose impetus was 
yet to reach to the dawn of another “organic period”; which dawn he also, later on, perceived 
to be imminent’.742 What united Mill and his critics was a sense of anticipation of a new period 
of progress. 
 
A leading criticism in the 1890s was directed at Mill’s defence of the sovereignty of the 
individual. The majority of reactions were written by clergymen, theologians and evangelicals. 
In addition to this, there were some articles from radical liberals and liberal conservatives. 
Clergymen and theologians were particularly dismissive of Mill’s account of individualism, 
                                                        
738 The Academy, 19 June 1897, p. 624. 
739 The Nineteenth Century, Sep 1896, pp. 493-494. 
740 The National Review, Dec 1891, p. 528. 
741 Westminster Review, June 1898, p. 613. 
742 Westminster Review, Jan 1898, p. 51. 
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responding that there was no shortage of individual characters in society. Evangelicals added 
that Mill’s liberty risked individual excess. Liberal conservatives agreed, warning that 
unlimited freedom risked the rise of a plutocratic class where the weak would suffer the most. 
Whilst radical liberals, such as the Westminster Review, absorbed Mill’s argument, claiming 
that individual liberty needed greater protection from social tyranny, he was subject to much 
more dismissal than approval. 
 
The connection between individualism and family values became clear during the 1890s. 
Discussion also continues from the 1870s on whether Mill championed individualism or 
collectivism. By the 1896, articles written by clergymen and theologians describe Mill as a 
collectivist for his greatest anxiety was the abuse of power. Radical liberal periodicals too re-
considered On Liberty in this manner; a long-standing supporter of Mill, the Westminster 
Review, detailing the importance of society in the development of individual characters. 
Clergymen and theologians, also sympathetic to the collectivist movement, noted how 
individual conduct impacts everyone. What stands out here are the religious and non-partisan 
affiliated periodicals, as opposed to conservative or liberal ones. The emphasis is very much 
on the ethical, rather than the political considerations of the application of Mill’s argument. 
 
On Liberty was also linked to social responsibilities in the community and towards one another 
and this is reflected in the noticeable increase in periodicals on family life. Consistent with 
debate in the late 1890s, clergymen and theologians were particularly active, challenging Mill’s 
defence of Malthusian principles. Radical liberals called for freedom to be extended to women 
as they too should have the responsibility to legislate for themselves. Liberal periodicals too 
believed that the best interests of the community were served by equal representation. Others, 
such as the Manchester Guardian, held that greater liberty for women would advance the 
community and state. However, religious periodicals, often edited by clergymen, were 
unconvinced that extending equal liberty to women was practical; the roles of men and women 
in the private and public sphere should remain as they are. This is particularly evident in articles 
by The Nineteenth Century. 
 
Interpretations of On Liberty in the 1890s defended the centrality of the family in safeguarding 
and facilitating individual development and progress. Individuals should be given the liberty 
to develop their own interests and values. However, these reviews emphasise that human 
character is also shaped by the social bonds within the family. For Mill’s critics, if he wished 
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to develop unique characters, sociability was more beneficial to individual morality than 
isolation. What is consistent throughout reviews in the 1890s is the need to define and balance 
the relationship between authority and liberty both in On Liberty but also in the public and 
private sphere. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
THE PROBLEM AT HAND AND MILL’S REPUTATION BY 1900 
 
 
Since its publication in 1859, responses to On Liberty have raised a number of central questions 
concerning society, the individual and the state. By 1900, On Liberty had accumulated four 
decades of critical commentary, reinterpretation, and admiration. At his death in 1873, Mill 
was associated with a rigorous individualism, unorthodox calls for greater feminism, pleas for 
uncontrolled and potentially disastrous liberty, and socialism. This raised an important question 
for what the term ‘Mill’ would come to be associated with. What has been clearly demonstrated 
throughout this discussion is that Mill was too useful to be ignored. References to his ideas 
ensured that even his critics absorbed them and this influenced their own conclusions. 
 
Mill certainly had his fair share of critics. Those who defended or attacked him did so for their 
personal agendas or grievances and fell into the following categories: the liberty lover and the 
statesman. The former often projected utopian ideals and championed unregulated levels of 
liberty, giving little thought to the repercussions (such as social anarchy, the ability to harm 
others). The latter found a way to read Mill which legitimised their calls for greater state or 
social control, to keep people in ‘hedges’ so as not to be a nuisance to others. Alongside these 
two camps, we have those who feared him. The chief motivation for dismissing Mill was often 
concern surrounding the kind of individuality he encouraged.  
 
The evidence presented in this reception history highlights what in On Liberty was met with 
outrage and that which Mill’s critics admired. This maintained Mill’s public profile, especially 
during Mill’s most controversial periods, such as when he penned the Subjection. Despite this, 
there are a number of sources which applauded On Liberty. Mill’s notable admirers, such as 
Auberon Herbert, John Morley and Joseph Hiam Levy played their part in protecting Mill’s 
reputation, yet it is the less known enthusiasts (the newspapers and periodicals) which built a 
very public profile for him. It was this camp which carried him through the more difficult stages 
of his reception. 
 
If we consider the most recent, albeit brief contribution to the reception of On Liberty, we can 
see how this thesis helps to clarify understandings of Mill’s 1859 essay. The most recent 
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reception history of On Liberty, albeit a rather short account, is provided by Peter Nicholson 
in his study into the reception and early reputation of Mill’s political thought. Nicholson 
concluded that Mill ‘had moved so cautiously, temperately and decorously in On Liberty, 
starting off from agreed ideas about religious freedom, sticking to familiar examples, and often 
making his points in very general terms’.743 The conclusion of this thesis demonstrates how 
this was not the case if we consider this next to a range of the responses since 1859. In fact, the 
majority of reviews were more outraged by Mill’s elitist and strict plea for individuality rather 
than his religious views. Even then, throughout this period, his ideas on religious liberty were 
never the chief source of criticism directed at Mill. After all, Mill was often criticised for being 
ambiguous, unclear and inconsistent; yet when his comments were concise, they were 
dangerous and out of touch. 
 
On Liberty did not instantly achieve the prominence it is now awarded in the history of political 
thought. Upon its publication in 1859, On Liberty was subject to frequent criticism and this 
continued by the turn of the century. After almost five decades of interpretation, The 
Fortnightly Review wrote in 1906 that ‘what strikes one first and most emphatically is the very 
impersonal character of the impression that he made alike upon people who admired him and 
upon people who did not’ adding that it was ‘his point of view far more than his personality 
that attracted or repelled’.744 The Bookman emphasised how ‘the record of his earlier years is 
nothing less than terrible to contemplate’745 with The Athenaeum adding that ‘some may think 
the real John Stuart Mill never came completely into being’.746 Expectations of both Mill and 
On Liberty were much higher than Mill seemed to deliver. As we have seen throughout this 
thesis, there is a lot of truth in these comments but Mill’s relationship with the public over 
matters vis-à-vis liberty, freedom and progress throughout this period is more complicated than 
these reflections suggest, and this reception history has sought to clarify some of these 
misunderstandings. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
743 Peter Nicholson, ‘The Reception and Early Reputation of Mill’s Political Thought’, in Skorupski, ed. The 
Cambridge Companion to Mill, p. 470. 
744 The Fortnightly Review, Aug 1906, p. 344. 
745 The Bookman, July 1901, p. 165. 
746 The Athenaeum, 4 June 1910, p. 665. 
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TYING UP LOOSE ENDS: THE SCALE OF MILL’S ELASTIC ANXIETIES 
1831 – 1900 
 
Since the 1830s, Mill gained the attention of a variety of groups and individuals. As we have 
seen, On Liberty attracted a great deal of criticism as well as admiration. However, the 
significance of the reception of his ideas is that it shows how much they absorbed Mill. This is 
particularly clear when we consider chapter three of On Liberty. Mill’s enthusiasm for 
individualism, he hoped, would inspire people to develop and nurture their characters but also 
to confront society for not providing greater and more equal opportunities for individual 
spontaneity. Despite how insulted many were by Mill’s remarks, most could identify and 
empathise with the risks to individual development posed by so few chances to exercise self-
development. For his critics, Mill made a valuable contribution, even if many disagreed with 
how he suggested we achieve this. 
 
So, what of Mill’s earlier works? In the 1830s, Mill authored essays on topics concerned with 
liberty, freedom, genius, cultural and mental development, labour and working conditions. We 
may summarise these as Mill’s ‘elastic anxieties’.747 They also reveal Mill’s flirtation with a 
number of concepts during his early development. Mill’s early reception can be summarised 
with two points. Firstly, responses were somewhat confused as to who was the ‘true’ Mill. It 
was slightly puzzling for commentators that Mill would write something such as ‘On Genius’, 
praised and read as a blueprint for social and moral development, yet could then write the 
System of Logic, a piece that was said to be dry and boring. Secondly, whilst the lack of 
consistency within Mill’s works caused disappointment, it emphasised that liberty was not a 
term which was all encompassing, or one which applied to all individuals at all times. Liberty 
meant something different for an intellectual compared to someone from the working class, 
from man to woman, from Christian to atheist. This might explain why, to Mill’s critics at least, 
he failed to give a clear definition of the term748 but perhaps it was the scale of Mill’s reputation 
which encouraged such a reaction to discussions on liberty. 
 
                                                        
747 See ‘The Spirit of the Age’ (1831), ‘On Genius’ (1832), ‘Bentham’ (1838), ‘Coleridge’ (1840), the System of 
Logic (1843), and the Principles (1848) for a collection of Mill’s earlier essays and publications demonstrating 
the scale of concerns which agitated Mill. 
748 An article published in the Dublin Review, July 1869, focused entirely on the lack of definition of liberty in 
Mill’s essay. Mill ‘leaves his reader at the disadvantage of having to pick out and join together the detached 
pieces of his puzzle’, p. 2. This may partly explain why we are left with so many differing interpretations of 
Mill and On Liberty in contemporary scholarship. 
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The publication of On Liberty was met with great hostility. No one interpreted it as a work on 
liberty, or at least concerned with liberty as they understood it, nor did they feel it was 
representative of his writings on economic or social freedom, nor on his feminism. But this is 
not why he was challenged. On Liberty was targeted due to Mill’s argument on individualism, 
suggestions to weaken the responsibility of the state to effectively zero and preferring an 
intellectual elite. We have also seen how Stephen’s critique in 1873 greatly increased the 
popularity of arguments in favour of greater state involvement. Responses to On Liberty had 
maintained that we simply cannot do without order and Stephen had woken up a leviathan in 
his endeavours to discredit Mill. By the 1870s, commentators questioned whether Mill sought 
to defend the individual at all in On Liberty, for it seemed that he was quite content to leave 
people responsible for their own well-being and development, with or without the support of a 
community.749 
 
Despite the interest that state intervention gathered, it is fair to say that this was a short-lived 
public obsession. Morley and Levy read On Liberty as championing two key ideals; these were 
compromise and equality. Morley emphasised how there needed to be greater willingness to 
compromise for the common good and society had to break down this wall of intolerance. Levy 
had promoted social justice and equality, responding to reviews of On Liberty which called for 
the existence of a judiciary to protect the rights and interests of all individuals. Since 1859, On 
Liberty had experienced a sustained period of criticism and dismissal from a variety of 
commentators, from radicals to Catholics, liberals to conservatives. This demonstrates the 
scope to which Mill’s essay was read and engaged with and a brief summary at the end of each 
chapter shows how political and religious periodicals responded to Mill each decade. 
 
AMBIGUOUS AND INCONSISTENT: RETHINKING ON LIBERTY 
 
After four decades of engagement with Mill and On Liberty, responses in the 1890s centred on 
the subject of individuality and the family. Most treatments of this however have failed to 
seriously consider how Mill sought to cultivate individuality for everyone and what role 
women might play in collective development. Many critics had accused Mill of separating self 
                                                        
749 Capaldi however dismisses such a claim when he noted that ‘in order to achieve the inner state understood as 
autonomy, we must discipline ourselves by doing something in the larger social world’. Capaldi further wrote 
that individuality for Mill was never about removing ourselves from the community; ‘there is an integral 
relationship between self-fulfillment and social fulfilment’. See further Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, pp. 284-285. 
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and social development and this is where many elitist charges surfaced. Considering the issues 
which the reception of On Liberty between 1859 and 1900 has raised, alongside Mill’s 
autobiographical notes on socialism and his private correspondence detailing his thoughts on 
women, interpretations on this have been surprisingly quiet. Here, I will briefly consider the 
position of Mill’s feminism in On Liberty, a reading only recently, and even then, briefly, 
considered in existing Mill scholarship. In 1859, Mill suggested that society was best prepared 
when all were equal and where collectivism was more important than individual interest. In 
trying to work out why On Liberty was often rendered inconsistent and ambiguous, we might 
turn to some of the more consistent reviews on Mill’s writings on liberty. Considering the 
evidence presented when considering the reception of On Liberty (including Mill’s reputation 
established from the reception of his earlier works), this aspect of his thought should be 
reconsidered. It not only shows the concerns of his opponents in the nineteenth-century, but 
also one of Mill’s constant anxieties. 
 
Though the woman question was not prominently discussed in responses to On Liberty until 
the 1890s, it enjoyed a brief spell of interest in the 1860s, particularly surrounding the 
publication of the Subjection in 1869. Despite this, there were a number of political and 
religious affiliated periodicals used throughout this thesis which frequently supported female 
emancipation and increased liberty. Specifically, these were periodicals edited by radical 
unitarians, radicals, evangelicals, radical protestants, liberals and unitarians and protestants 
who gave a framework for moral and social reform. Yet until recently, studies on Mill’s 
feminism have been largely silent on this matter, or at best are only partial readings.750 Between 
1831 and 1900, it was rare for commentators to describe Mill or On Liberty as championing an 
egalitarian society; in fact, Mill and his essay were often demoted as something quite the 
opposite. 
 
There are two parts to the argument here. The first concerns Mill’s considerations on the 
contribution women make to modernise society and cultivate collective development. The 
second considers a number of newspaper and periodical reactions to this particular issue to 
develop the interpretation offered here. If Mill has indeed been misunderstood, reinterpreting 
                                                        
750 For example, Urbinati, ‘John Stuart Mill on Androgyny and Ideal Marriage’, Donner, ‘John Stuart Mill’s 
Liberal Feminism’, Morales, Perfect Equality, Okin, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Feminism’, Packe, The Life of John 
Stuart Mill, Reeves, John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand, Howes, ‘Mill on Women and Human 
Development’, Burgess-Jackson, ‘John Stuart Mill, Radical Feminist’, Mendus, ‘The Marriage of Two Minds: 
The Ideal of Marriage in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill’. 
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On Liberty in relation to the woman question may result in a reading of On Liberty which 
satisfies his critics. This reading can also help in bringing together seemingly incoherent 
aspects of Mill’s thought and this merits serious consideration. 
 
Admittedly, this argument is nowhere outlined in clear terms despite references to the need for 
collective harmony for a progressive movement to improve society. Perhaps it was assumed 
that equality is a fundamental condition for this development. To instil this sense of common 
good within individuals required an agenda of reform which seems difficult to conceive of in 
light of the number of responses claiming Mill was a rigid individualist. The confusion 
surrounding On Liberty since 1859 was chiefly because no one could agree when intervention 
was legitimate and who, either the individual or society, was the intended beneficiary. Whilst 
many interpretations felt this was ambiguous, in On Liberty, Mill wanted individuals to develop 
their characters, to become virtuous, so that they could benefit both themselves and those 
around them. It may have seemed initially individualist, but the ends of this self-development 
had collective progress in mind; bettering the community was a long-term aspiration of both 
Mill and his commentators. Whilst those responding to Mill wanted greater emphasis of this in 
On Liberty, Mill saw this as a gradual process of reform. Mill’s plea for these aims was not in 
conflict with responses to On Liberty since 1859. 
 
Perhaps there is more to be said in existing scholarship regarding the centrality of Mill’s 
feminism to his writings on liberty.751 Throughout this thesis, judgement has been reserved 
over the influence of Mill’s feminism in dictating the scope to which he pushed his argument 
for individuality and freedom. This brief section here however hopes to encourage greater 
consideration into the influence of Mill’s feminism, for there has been little consensus on this 
matter and the extent to which this may have influenced the writing of On Liberty. This is 
surprising considering that Mill had written ‘the sufferings, immoralities, evils of all sorts, 
                                                        
751 See further Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart 
Mill, pp. 195-204 for a discussion on Mill’s views on women dating back to earlier works. Berger asserted that 
‘so far as Mill was concerned, the most basic social institution was based on the near total subordination of one 
sex to another’, p. 202. Berger added further that one of the central themes of On Liberty argued that ‘women 
have a right to equality, and the freedom which is thus justified will have the further effect of improving society 
by abolishing those aspects of the social institutions that corrupt the natures of both men and women, and by 
fostering the full flowering of women as happy, autonomous beings’, p. 203. 
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produced in innumerable cases by the subjection of individual women to individual men’,752 
not only crippled women but humanity itself.753 
 
Mill expressed in On Liberty his deep concern over the unjust exercise of power by some 
individuals over another. For Mill, this posed a risk to both individual development and social 
progress. For Mill, the relationship between man and woman was particularly oppressive and 
troubled him for most of his life. The one area of his interests where Mill did not seem to 
change his opinion was that of the woman question. Overseas in France or across the globe in 
Australia, as long as women were edging closer to social and economic equality, Mill was, 
generally speaking, content.754 Women needed to be liberated from their domestic sphere to 
see a revolution not just in society but in mind, thought and opinion. After the Subjection was 
published in 1869, responses turned their focus towards the ongoing debate on liberty and 
freedom. Debate on women’s rights and equality would not surface again until the mid 1890s 
and this was in the context of debate over whether the family or the individual was the central 
unit within society but this does not mean it was not being debated elsewhere. 
 
We have seen how, in the 1860s, the liberty of women was discussed in responses to the 
Subjection. In the 1890s, whilst debates on liberty and freedom initiated by On Liberty were 
still very much a topical issue, the woman question surfaced in debates on whether the family 
or the individual was more central for social progress. Contrary to previous decades, reducing 
the restraints surrounding women’s free expression was considered a significant step in 
alleviating the burden on everyone in society, the means to achieve this could be extended (and 
often were in the literature) to questions on marriage, divorce and bearing children. For a 
number of Mill’s readers, women were to serve a more central role than had previously been 
given much attention in public responses to Mill’s ideas on liberty. Pall Mall Gazette wrote 
that Mill advocated female suffrage for he regarded women ‘as steps towards a revolution 
which is to alter the character of every family in England, and to cause every man to cease to 
be master in his own house’.755 The Aberdeen Free Press added that the subjection of women 
                                                        
752 CW 21, p. 323. 
753 For a broader discussion on Western perspectives on human development, with a particular focus on 
Wollstonecraft and Mill’s thoughts on women, see Eileen Hunt Botting, ‘The Problem of Cultural Bias: 
Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Western Narratives of Women’s Progress’ in Botting, ed. Wollstonecraft, Mill, and 
Women’s Human Rights, pp. 155-203. Botting noted that ‘Wollstonecraft and Mill upheld Western European 
women’s social status as a cross-cultural standard for economic, political, and cultural progress’, p. 157. 
754 See Mill’s correspondence with Gustave d’Eichthal who shared similar views on feminism. 
755 Pall Mall Gazette, 29 June 1869, p. 13. See further Hollie Mann and Jeff Spinner-Halev, ‘John Stuart Mill’s 
Feminism: On Progress, the State, and the Path to Justice’, pp. 244-270. Mill’s commitment to equalising power 
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is indeed a ‘blot on our civilisation’,756 inferring that they should receive equal liberty to 
advance society collectively.  
 
The Pall Mall Gazette seemed to be convinced by Mill’s writings that women were indeed 
subjected to a life of servitude and this was of no benefit to society. They noted that for men, 
marriage ‘is a strong spur to exertion in active professions, whilst in the case of women, it 
physically incapacitates them from everything of the kind’.757 Even Mill had woefully noted 
that marriage was ‘the destination appointed by society for women, the prospect they are 
brought up to, and the object which it is intended should be sought by all of them’ but 
maintained that if opinions were rightly corrected on the subject of women, they ‘might with 
perfect safety be left to be regulated by opinion, without any interference of law’.758 
 
In On Liberty, Mill implied that divorce should not be deliberately made difficult; in the 
Subjection, he wrote with an undertone that women should be permitted the liberty of changing 
their master if and when they choose. In 1873, The Examiner described how Mill and his 
writings had provided a great boost for women’s causes. They wrote, ‘what he has done for 
women is final; he gave to their service the best powers of his mind, and the best years of his 
life. His death consecrates the gift; it can never lessen its value’.759 This is often overlooked in 
responses to Mill’s broader contribution to liberty and freedom, yet it appears to have been one 
of his greatest achievements for those interpreting Mill’s writings at the time, even when he 
had not specifically discussed women’s liberty in On Liberty. 
 
However, not all readers of the Subjection were as enthusiastic or supportive of its message. 
Aberdeen Free Press wrote that women will never excel as ‘bold originators, but as practical 
guides and assistants’760 and that ‘perhaps we men, we philosophers, know a great deal better 
what is good for women than they know themselves’.761 The Star added further that ‘women 
                                                        
relations required ‘restructuring the family and transforming conventional gender roles’, p. 246. They added that 
‘equality was not possible, Mill argued, unless the family could be transformed to become more egalitarian’, p. 
256. 
756 Aberdeen Free Press, 25 June 1869, p. 5. 
757 Pall Mall Gazette, 29 June 1869, p. 13. See Mill, ‘Marriage and Divorce’, in Jo Ellen Jacobs, ed. The 
Complete Works of Harriet Taylor Mill. 
758 CW 21, pp. 283, 298. Mill would later write that ‘the utmost latitude ought to exist for the adaptation of 
general rules to individual suitabilities; and there ought to be nothing to prevent faculties exceptionally adapted 
to any other pursuit, from obeying their vocation notwithstanding marriage’ (p. 298). 
759 The Examiner, 17 May 1873, p. 20. 
760 Aberdeen Free Press, 25 June 1869, p. 5. 
761 Southern Reporter, 22 July 1869, p. 3. 
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are often tempted, and unluckily they often give way to the temptation, to take up modes of life 
which are very far from healthful to themselves or to society at large’762 despite Mill noting in 
1869 that ‘the things which women are not allowed to do are the very ones for which they are 
peculiarly qualified’.763 Certainly from this clash of ideas, it seems that both Mill and his 
readers were frustrated at the lack of progress but for Mill, the odds of improvement would be 
enhanced significantly if women were given larger roles in society but this would continue to 
be a decisive topic in responses to Mill and more general comments on the woman question, 
marriage and divorce. 
 
For Mill, women had a special role to play in ‘modernising’ society and scholars have 
highlighted how this was influential not just for the Subjection.764 Mill maintained that where 
men ought to be excluded where they prove to be unfit, so should women. What mattered was 
the acknowledgement that ‘even a few women may be fit for these duties’, adding that ‘an 
unprejudiced view of it gives additional strength to the arguments against the disabilities of 
women, and reinforces them by high considerations of practical utility’.765 Extending the 
franchise to women ushered in a period of intense discussion in the 1860 and 1870s yet even 
Mill conceded that the act of voting was not a gift but a trust, it ought to be given to only those 
likely to make beneficial use of it.766 This applied to both men and women. If ‘women are not 
more competent than men, the constituency will not be improved by simple dilution’. However, 
Mill was prepared to break down all legal, social or political barriers because he felt that the 
unjust treatment of women imposed moral problems on society and in a letter of 1871 to Joseph 
Giles, Mill asserted that ‘the most vitally important political & social question of the future, 
that of the equality between men & women’767 will regenerate and revive society on a 
progressive path. Accordingly, the Pall Mall Gazette commented that this enabled Mill to take 
                                                        
762 The Star, 24 Feb 1870, p. 4 (religious or political affiliation unknown). 
763 CW 21, p. 302. 
764 See Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, p. 41. Claeys suggests that this argument underlines ‘much of what Mill 
wrote from 1848 onwards’ but as Mill’s earlier writings developed, so too did his writings on feminism and this 
can be traced back to the 1830s, as found in his essay ‘On Marriage’. 
765 CW 21, pp. 301-302. See Sue Lonoff, ‘Cultivated Feminism; Mill and The Subjection of Women’, which 
noted the ‘power-lust’ that leads men and women to manipulate one another. Lonoff added that ‘the antidote is 
liberty of action, and it must be psychological as well as legal. Women must be free, not just to vote or choose 
their calling, but to feel the sense of pride in whatever they accomplish that has always been a stimulus for 
men’, p. 98. 
766 For Mill, only ‘the competent are required to achieve the full benefits of universal participation’. See J. 
Joseph Miller, ‘J. S. Mill on Plural Voting, Competence and Participation’, p. 667. 
767 CW 17, p. 1830. 
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‘a high à priori ground of ridiculing the fears of all those who dread the sudden emancipation 
of women’.768 
 
It may be helpful here to clarify the extent to which Mill was an advocate of women’s equal 
liberty prior to writing On Liberty. Mill’s earlier views on women and his relationship with 
those who impacted his development is significant in addressing this. Mill’s father, James Mill, 
objected to female suffrage on the grounds that women were best represented by their husbands 
or fathers. Yet from as early as 1833, when writing to Carlyle, Mill noted that the women he 
had encountered were more impressive than most men. Mill wrote, ‘but the women, of all I 
have known, who possessed the highest measure of what are considered feminine qualities, 
have combined with them more of the highest masculine qualities than I have ever seen in any 
but one or two men, & those one or two men were also in many respects almost women’. By 
1834, in a letter to Gustave d’Eichthal, the young Mill was calling for suffrage to be ‘extended 
to all householders’,769 to ensure women were equally represented. Noticeably distancing 
himself from his father’s views on women, Mill demonstrated from an early age the importance 
of equality to his political thought. 
 
On the woman question, Mill had much more to agree upon with Bentham rather than his 
father. Bentham had attacked nations which placed women ‘in a state of perpetual wardship’ 
due to a ‘decided intellectual inferiority’ to men, a crime where ‘tyranny has taken advantage 
of its own’.770 In a letter to John Jay in 1848, Mill echoed similar anxieties when he wrote that 
any ‘country where institutions profess to be founded on equality, and which yet maintains the 
slavery of black men and of all women, will be one of the last to relinquish that other 
servitude’.771 In a letter to George Grey in 1851, Mill added that society was improving only 
when women were elevated ‘towards their relief from disabilities, their increased estimation, 
the assignment to them of a higher position, both social & domestic’.772  
 
                                                        
768 Pall Mall Gazette, 3 Feb 1870, p. 6. See further Aberdeen Free Press, 16 July 1869, p. 5. Those who feared 
the emancipation of women claimed that ‘if a vote were given to every woman, it would be the cause of 
dissensions in many families’. See further Jones, ‘John Stuart Mill as Moralist’, pp. 287-308. The Subjection 
was concerned chiefly with creating the correct conditions for attaining both an ideal character as well as good 
social relations. 
769 CW 12, pp. 184, 241. 
770 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 245. 
771 CW 13, p. 740. 
772 CW 14, p. 64. 
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Mill was further influenced by William Thompson, an Owenite socialist and advocate of 
women’s rights. In 1825, Thompson challenged James Mill’s 1820 Essay on Government and 
encouraged women to escape degradation and develop their faculties. A deprivation so colossal 
that Mill would later describe in 1852 how it contributed towards ‘the perpetuation of all other 
evils by keeping down the moral & intellectual condition of both men & women’.773 Working 
towards a system of association or mutual cooperation, Thompson maintained that only this 
social arrangement can ensure ‘the perfect equality and entire reciprocity of happiness between 
men and women’.774 Mill echoed these comments in his Autobiography, ‘the inferior position 
of women intertwine themselves with all the evils of existing society and with the difficulties 
of human improvement’.775 Proclaiming that ‘women will be no longer made the slaves of, or 
dependent upon men they will be equal in education, rights, privileges, and personal liberty’,776 
Robert Owen provided Mill with another ally in his pursuit for female equality. 
 
On questions of women’s liberty, Mill’s correspondence with Comte started more personally, 
beginning with Mill’s sympathy for the breakdown of Comte’s marriage. Writing to Mill in 
1842, Comte noted that Madame Comte left him because ‘of an unfortunate love, to a woman 
of rare moral and intellectual qualities’.777 This experience seemed to encourage Comte to 
reconsider the position of women in the domestic sphere and reinforced both his and Mill’s 
belief that society needed moral regeneration. A new set of social and moral values were 
needed, and the equality of women was of the utmost importance. Mill would take this one step 
further than Comte, writing to him that the ‘problem of women must be studied anew in all of 
its complexity’,778 condemning Comte’s theoretical conclusions of women’s abilities. 
 
Mill’s praise of the Saint-Simonians (particularly Enfantin) stemmed from their progressive 
attitude towards relations between the sexes. In his Autobiography, Mill had written that ‘I 
honoured them above all for the boldness and freedom from prejudice with which they treated 
                                                        
773 CW 14, pp. 88-89. 
774 William Thompson, Appeal of One Half the Human Race, p. 199. 
775 CW 1, p. 252. 
776 Robert Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, vol 6, p. 780. 
777 John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, The Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, in Oscar 
A. Haac, ed. p. 98. 
778 Comte ‘was convinced that women could not transcend their natural limitations’, but Mill would maintain 
that with the right education and opportunity, there were no boundaries to what women could achieve. See Mill 
and Comte, The Correspondence of John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte, p. 10. Claeys has written that ‘it was 
not politics as such but feminism which made a breach with Comte inevitable’, see Mill and Paternalism, p. 32. 
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the subject of family’ and for ‘proclaiming the perfect equality between men and women’.779 
Mill had been in contact with the Saint-Simonians before the 1830s. In his Autobiography, he 
would detail how his time in Paris was greatly beneficial for his own development. The Saint-
Simonian conception of a new society was committed to equality and cooperation, a unison 
between scientific and moral progress. Since returning to England from France in July 1821, 
Mill noted that he afterwards kept himself ‘au courant’ (informed) of their developments, 
adding that this kept him free from ‘the error always prevalent in England, and from which 
even my father with all his superiority to prejudice was not exempt’. Mill objected to various 
strands of Saint-Simonism by the early 1830s, doubting ‘the beneficial operation of their social 
machinery’780 yet whilst considering their aims to be perfectly reasonable and making an 
impression upon his own modes of thought. 
 
But it is important to note that Mill’s critics were still deeply suspicious of him after the 
publication of On Liberty and the arrival of the Subjection did not necessarily help Mill’s 
reputation, particularly for those who thought his arguments were distasteful and irrelevant.781 
The refusal to tolerate a woman in the House of Commons deeply frustrated him, after all, the 
fact that ‘the generality of the male sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal’782 
was hardly a secret. The Aberdeen Free Press stated that ‘in their own spheres, women have 
done incalculable good, but when they have abandoned these, and endeavoured to play a man’s 
part in the work of the world, they have failed to do so, without grievous detriment to their own 
character as women’.783 The Examiner added that it ‘was one thing to advocate, theoretically, 
the claims of women to representation; it was another to introduce the subject into the House 
of Commons’.784 Whilst commentators may have agreed with Mill, this would have been 
particularly difficult to introduce. 
 
                                                        
779 CW 1, p. 174. 
780 CW 1, pp. 63-64, 174. 
781 See The Examiner, 17 May 1873, p. 20. On Mill’s position as an MP, it was claimed that ‘the persons who 
are loudest in the assertion of his failures are precisely those to whom the reforms advocated by Mr. Mill in his 
writings are distasteful’. See further F. Gerald Downing, ‘A Cynical Response to the Subjection of Women’, pp. 
229-230. See further Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, pp. 368-369, which highlights this intimate link 
between On Liberty and the Subjection. 
782 CW 21, p. 299. 
783 Aberdeen Free Press, 16 July 1869, p. 5. 
784 The Examiner, 17 May 1873, p. 20. 
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But Mill was not the first to openly declare the worth of emancipating women in both the 
private and public sphere for the sake of social progress.785 In 1863, Brecon Reporter and South 
Wales General Advertiser proclaimed that subjecting women ‘to the arbitrary will of man, is 
characteristic of countries steeped in ignorance, barbarism, and tyranny. The elevation of 
women to the intellectual dignity of man, is characteristic of countries blessed with knowledge, 
civilisation, and liberty’.786 The Cork Constitution approved of any change ‘which may help a 
man or woman to get rid of his or her “tyrant”’.787 With the publication of the Subjection in 
1869, Aberdeen Free Press concluded that Mill sought to remove ‘the social straight jacket’,788 
to grant education and embrace the moral and intellectual nature of women with men.789 
Ultimately, differences between the sexes were pinned down to the suppression ‘by education 
of women’s natures’.790 
 
In a section of the unpublished comments of his Autobiography, Mill wrote ‘on that most vital 
question, the social position of women: whose subordination, by law and custom, to men, we 
regarded as the last remaining form of primeval tyranny and serfage, and whose equal 
admissibility to all occupations and equal participation in all rights, we deemed not only to be 
the clear dictate of justice, but to be an essential condition of any great improvement in mankind 
either individually or socially’.791 What is noteworthy is that in the 1890s, Mill’s readers are 
highlighting similar concerns as Mill had expressed only decades previously. Even anti-Millian 
accounts demonstrated the dangers of an unequal society. Most were happy to subscribe to 
much of what Mill had to say about liberty, but his account of the centrality of developing 
individuality sat uneasily with those who wanted people to be more social beings. 
 
Whilst we cannot here resolve the question of how central Mill’s feminism was, this brief 
observation seeks to encourage revision into future scholarly research on Mill and On Liberty. 
                                                        
785 Baum noted how Mill felt ‘that people require certain material resources – including educational 
opportunities, occupational choices, and a certain level of disposable income – to exercise meaningful freedom’. 
See Baum, ‘J. S. Mill on Freedom and Power’, p. 203. 
786 Brecon Reporter and South Wales General Advertiser, 12 Sep 1863, p. 5. 
787 Cork Constitution, 24 July 1869, p. 6. Mill had noted in On Liberty that society itself is a tyrant and ‘its 
means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. 
Society can and does execute its own mandates’, CW 18, pp. 219-220. 
788 Aberdeen Free Press, 6 July 1869, p. 3. 
789 Annas noted that ‘women were not allowed to join in when originality was easy to come by, and now when it 
is hard to come by they start with an educational handicap’. See Annas, ‘Mill and the Subjection of Women’, p. 
187. She later added that ‘if women are really to have equality, their education must be seriously intended to fit 
them for serious jobs’, p. 193. 
790 Annas, ‘Mill and the Subjection of Women’, p. 184. 
791 CW 1, p. 621. 
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For those responding to On Liberty, they emphasise a number of conflicting arguments and 
remarks, which ultimately make it more difficult to ascertain what Mill was trying to do in 
1859. What is important is that Mill’s feminism plays an important part not just for Mill, but 
also his readers, in attempts to improve society. This becomes clear in the 1890s where 
consideration is given to the importance of the social organism in safeguarding and cultivating 
liberty. 
 
The reception of the Subjection revealed a dozen or so articles, which, like Mill, were 
sympathetic to the woman question. Moreover, those newspapers and periodicals which 
encouraged revision into women’s roles all suggested their social position be elevated if they 
are to truly embrace liberty. Based on the evidence we have regarding the liberty of women in 
responses to the Subjection but also in what surfaces in replies to On Liberty too, perhaps to 
clarify the misunderstanding surrounding his 1859 text, we ought to consider more seriously 
how much Mill’s feminist thinking influenced On Liberty and whether this text was aimed at 
providing women with the guidance to escape her tyrant. 
 
MILL AND ON LIBERTY 
 
Despite this, when we consider the camps that Mill’s critics fell into, just a handful rejected 
Mill because they accused him of excessive or unorthodox feminism, yet these attitudes really 
only surfaced in the 1890s when discussion on the family and female equality were prominent. 
Mill directly addressed this worry in the Subjection, but that does not at all mean it was only a 
concern of his in 1869 and we should read this text in isolation, for it may have larger 
ramifications than initially perceived. 
 
Mill and its argument, filtered through debates surrounding the individual and how best to 
develop positive traits and interests, became an issue that was often a vital argument in 
countless books, articles, speeches and plays. The early reception between 1859 and c., 1870 
was the period when the most familiar modern images of Mill were established by clergymen, 
(particularly Catholics, Methodists, Unitarians, Church of England), liberals and conservatives. 
The 1870s resulted in an increase of engagement from liberal and Catholic periodicals. These 
political and religious affiliated periodicals demonstrated a change in the reception and 
people’s attitudes towards Mill and On Liberty. The 1880s too engaged many liberal 
periodicals with a noticeable increase in radical and conservative writings as well, the latter of 
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which were motivated by Stephen’s 1873 essay the previous decade. In the 1890s, the reception 
was chiefly dominated by clergymen, theologians and evangelists. Whilst there were articles 
from radical liberals seeking to defend Mill, these were surpassed by the number of religious 
affiliated periodicals criticising Mill’s account of individual sovereignty. 
 
Mill advocated reduced state interference, condemned those who tyrannised over others or 
those found to be intolerant of a certain group or idea and often cited his dismay at those who 
were a nuisance or caused harm to another. We can employ Mill’s harm principle here to 
explain further. In such instances, the state could intervene in order to keep people in their 
place as to what was acceptable. Mill wrote that ‘the State, while it respects the liberty of each 
in what specifically regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise 
of any power which it allows him to possess over others’.792 Mill continued by stating that this 
obligation is almost entirely disregarded when it came to relations between husband and wife. 
 
This raised an important question as to how much social progress was contingent on universal 
equality. How much of a hindrance was it if people were protected in the public sphere but not 
in the private? Referencing the despotic power of husbands over wives, Mill demonstrated the 
elasticity of his feminism, as an integral component of liberty and an enemy of power.793 It is 
cases like this which make Mill’s argument even more powerful. Mill’s thoughts on liberty 
were greatly influenced by his wife Harriet and it was their conjunction of ideas which had 
produced On Liberty.794 Mill had kept her close to his writing, both before and after her death, 
even going to the length of purchasing a cottage to be as close to where she was buried for both 
comfort and inspiration.795 Mill wrote that ‘my objects in life are solely those which were hers; 
my pursuits and occupations those in which she shared, or sympathized, and which are 
indissolubly associated with her’.796 Mill had a difficult task on his hands and such a feat 
                                                        
792 CW 18, p. 301. See further Waldron, ‘Mill and multiculturalism’ in Ten, ed. Mill’s On Liberty, pp. 165-184. 
793 Mill’s agitation was with authority. Mill may well have had the authority of man over wife in mind here. 
794 Robson suggests that Mill influenced Harriet on questions of equality and that Mill was concerned about 
sexual inequality before he met her. See Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, pp. 50-68. From this account, it 
appears that Mill’s great fear, that of social tyranny, ‘leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself’ (CW 18, p. 220). Harriet needed to be convinced by 
a man no less that she was entitled to the same equality, something which alarmed Mill. As much as women 
were a victim of the prevailing opinion, so was the majority who held such regressive thoughts and imposed 
them on society, they too had been deprived of the opportunity to develop eccentric and individualistic 
characters. 
795 See CW 1, p. 251. 
796 CW 1, p. 251. 
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required public commitment, not increasing levels of individualism. Greater education 
entwined with breaking down barriers of intolerance would prove instrumental here. 
 
The reception of On Liberty has shown how controversial Mill’s essay was.797 These often-
dismissive reviews resulted in varying interpretations of Mill. For the educated intellectuals, 
Mill was your saviour, reinforcing the reasons as to why you should command an authoritative 
position. For women, you were one of the few voices which deeply cared about female 
enfranchisement, seeking to ensure that you were treated equally alongside men. For the 
uneducated labourer, Mill championed individuality and economic freedom, giving you self-
governance to author your own lives. Despite the amount of criticism On Liberty received from 
1859, society could not ignore Mill or his ideas, even after he had died. It became somewhat 
fashionable to read Mill. Whether you agreed with him or not, that was of secondary 
importance. 
 
The evidence dealt with here and in a handful of recent studies demonstrates how the reception 
of Mill’s ideas on liberty had important implications for the future. On Liberty inspired, 
outraged, satisfied and disappointed, often simultaneously, a variety of political and religious 
groups between 1831 and 1900. The reception of Mill’s political thought, particularly On 
Liberty, has shown the extent of Mill’s achievement in sparking significant discussion on the 
concept of liberty in nineteenth-century England; chiefly, it reveals what Mill’s contemporaries 
thought he was saying, what was unique or unoriginal in his argument and what was 
contentious. Such readings have, at times, shown to be at odds with modern interpretations of 
Mill, challenging those readings which assume or take for granted Mill’s influence on 
nineteenth-century political thought or those writing alongside him. However, we can also see 
how his lessons and doctrines were fully absorbed into the mainstream of English political 
thought. On Liberty provoked an intellectual, moral and social crisis that challenged and 
exposed the defects of nineteenth-century England; its pertinence in our modern world is 
unmistakeable and characterises the scale of Mill’s intellectual achievement. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
797 See Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence, pp. 9-14 for a revisionary view of what Mill was attempting not just in 
On Liberty but across his works, focusing principally upon his 1859 essay and the System of Logic. 
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Glossary 
 
PERIODICALS 
 
Aberdeen Free Press (1855-1894): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
Aberdeen People’s Journal (1863-1939): A conservative newspaper owned by the Chalmers family throughout 
 the nineteenth-century. 
The Academy (1869-1902): A liberal periodical during the nineteenth-century, which then shifted towards 
 Conservatism in 1907 when Lord Alfred Douglas became editor. 
Alexandra Magazine & Women’s Social and Industrial Advocate (1860-1878): A feminist magazine, which 
 merged with the English Women’s Journal in August 1864. 
The Athenaeum (1828-1921): A monthly liberal literary magazine. 
Bee-Hive (1861-1878): A trade unionist journal published weekly, it advocated rights for trade unions and 
 supported the more radical members of the liberal party. 
Belfast News-Letter (1828-1956): A daily conservative newspaper. 
Birmingham Daily Post (1857-1979): A weekly newspaper associated with radical politics from the outset. 
Blackie (1889): A monthly radical journal. 
Bolton Evening News (1868-1910): A daily newspaper publishing local news. 
Bradford Observer (1834-1901): A liberal newspaper. 
Brecon Reporter and South Wales General Advertiser (1863-1867): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Bristol Mercury (1716-1900): A liberal newspaper. 
Bucks Herald (1833-1953): A conservative weekly newspaper. 
Burnley Gazette (1863-1914): A liberal weekly newspaper. 
Bury Free Press (1856-1955): A weekly centrist newspaper. 
Bell’s New Weekly Messenger (1832-1855): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
Bell’s Life in London (1822-1886): A weekly, anti-establishment newspaper aimed at the working class. 
Bentley’s Quarterly Review (1859-1860): A conservative periodical published quarterly. 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine (1817-1980): A conservative monthly magazine. 
British Quarterly Review (1845-1886): A sectarian periodical. 
Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register (1802-1836): A radical weekly newspaper. 
The Cornhill Magazine (1860-1975): A monthly literary periodical. 
Caledonian Mercury (1720-1867): A newspaper published 3 days a week commenting on local affairs. 
Cambridge Chronicle and Journal (1813-1900): A conservative weekly newspaper. 
Carlisle Patriot (1816-1897): A conservative weekly newspaper. 
Cheltenham Mercury (1856-1888): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Christian Remembrancer (1819-1868): A High-Church monthly periodical. 
The Christian Socialist (1883-1891): A Christian monthly periodical. 
The Contemporary Review (1866-2013): A quarterly magazine established to promote independent opinion and 
 intellectual debate on theological and ecclesiastical disputes. 
Cork Constitution (1826-1896): A staunch Unionist and Protestant newspaper published 3 times a week. 
Cork Examiner (1841-1911): A daily Catholic newspaper by 1858 (previously only 3 times a week). 
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The Cornish Telegraph (1851-1915): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
Cosmopolis (1896-1898): A multi-lingual monthly literary magazine, also published in Berlin, Paris and Saint 
 Petersburg. 
Coventry Times (1855-1889): A Nonconformist, weekly newspaper. 
The Critic (1843-1863): A conservative magazine published weekly. 
Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette (1822-1890): A weekly newspaper, which supported the Church of England. 
Dewsbury Reporter (1869-1884): A weekly newspaper commenting on local news. 
Dublin Daily Express (1855-1917): A daily newspaper with a strong unionist readership, particularly popular 
 with the landed gentry and the Protestant clergy. 
Dublin Monitor (1838-1845): A political library journal published 3 times a week. 
Dublin Morning Register (1824-1843): A liberal newspaper published daily. 
Dublin Review (1836-1969): A Catholic periodical, initially published quarterly, then monthly. 
Dublin University Magazine (1833-1882): A monthly magazine with a Protestant and Unionist outlook. 
Dundee Advertiser (1861-1899): A radical liberal newspaper, published weekly. 
Dundee Evening Telegraph (1877-1950): A liberal and reformist newspaper, published daily. 
Durham County Advertiser (1814-1910): A weekly literary journal. 
The Economist (1843 - ): A weekly magazine-format newspaper, taking a stance of classical and economic 
 liberalism. 
Edinburgh Evening News (1873-1942): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Edinburgh Review (1802-1929): A quarterly magazine, supporting the Whig party and liberal politics. 
English Women’s Journal (1858-1864): A monthly magazine, which sought to improve the position of women 
 in society. 
Essex Herald (1828-1899): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Evening Mail (1802-1867): A conservative newspaper published 3 times a week. 
The Examiner (1808-1881): A weekly radical newspaper. 
Exeter and Plymouth Gazette (1827-1950): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
Family Mirror (1856-1857): A liberal periodical. 
Foreign Quarterly Review (1827-1846), 
 merged with Westminster Review in 1846, published as Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review 
 (1847-1852), Westminster Review (1852 onwards): a quarterly liberal journal. 
The Fortnightly Review (1865-1954): a fortnightly liberal magazine, 
 incorporated with Contemporary Review in 1954: a liberal quarterly magazine. 
Fraser’s Magazine (1830-1882): A monthly conservative magazine. 
Fun (1861-1901): A politically satirical weekly magazine, often seen as more liberal than the conservative 
 Punch despite mocking both sides of the political spectrum.   
The Individualist. A Monthly Journal of Personal Rights (1903-1914): A liberal monthly journal emphasising 
 the moral worth of the individual. 
The Ipswich Journal (1748-1902): An anti-Chartist weekly newspaper. 
Islington Gazette (1856-1911): A weekly newspaper publishing local news. 
Journal of the Statistical Society of London (1838 - ): A peer-reviewed scientific journal of statistics.  
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Journal of the Vigilance Association for the Defence of Personal Rights (1881-1886), 
 continued as The Personal Rights Journal (1886-1903): A radical periodical. 
Jus. A Weekly Organ of Individualism (1887-1888): A weekly pamphlet produced by the Liberty and Property 
 Defence League, which supported laissez-faire trade. 
Kendal Mercury (1834-1880): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Kent & Sussex Courier (1873-1950): A weekly newspaper publishing local news. 
Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper (1842-1900): A radical weekly Sunday newspaper.  
Law Magazine and Law Review (1856-1872): A quarterly legal journal. 
Leamington Spa Courier (1828-1954): A weekly conservative, pro-Church of England newspaper. 
Leader (1850-1860): A daily weekday radical newspaper. 
Leeds Intelligencer (1754-1866): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
Leeds Mercury (1807-1939): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Leeds Times (1833-1901): A weekly radical newspaper. 
Leicester Chronicle (1813-1915): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
The Leisure Hour (1852-1905): A weekly periodical published by the (Christian) Religious Tract Society.  
The Liberty Review (1893-1909): A weekly liberal journal. 
Liverpool Daily Post (1855-1945): A non-partisan daily newspaper. 
London Daily News (1846-1912): A daily liberal newspaper. 
London Dispatch (1836-1839): A weekly radical periodical. 
London Evening Standard (1827-1909): A daily conservative newspaper. 
London Quarterly Review (1809-1967): A conservative literary and political periodical, published quarterly to 
 counter the influence of the Edinburgh Review. 
The London Review (1809-1835): A quarterly liberal-conservative periodical. 
London Serio-Comic Journal (1867-1907): A weekly conservative satirical magazine and rival to Punch 
 magazine. 
Luton Times and Advertiser (1855-1916): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
The Malthusian (1879-1920): A monthly journal on Malthusian population theory. 
Man of Ross, and General Advertiser (1855-1897): A weekly newspaper publishing local news. 
Manchester Evening News (1870-1945): A daily liberal newspaper. 
Manchester Guardian (1821-1959): A daily liberal newspaper. 
Marylebone Mercury (1857-1945): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Morning Advertiser (1805-1872): A daily newspaper set up to popularise the Society of Licensed Victuallers. It 
 did not align with a political party.  
Morning Chronicle (1801-1865): A moderately liberal daily newspaper, often supporting Whig policies. 
Morning Post (1801-1909): A conservative daily newspaper. 
Monthly Repository (1806-1838): A radical Unitarian monthly periodical. 
Montrose Review (1846-1958): A weekly radical, evangelical newspaper. 
The National Reformer (1860-1882): A weekly journal, established by Secularists and advocating atheism. 
The National Review (1855-1864): A quarterly magazine, joint-edited by a liberal and a clergyman. 
National Preacher (1841): A monthly conservative periodical. 
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New Monthly Magazine (1814-1884): A strict conservative monthly magazine. 
Newcastle Daily Chronicle (1858-1869): A daily (except Sunday) liberal newspaper. 
The Nineteenth Century (1877-1901): A monthly literary magazine; many of its contributors were members of 
 the Metaphysical society (clergymen and theologians). 
Nottingham Review (1818-1852): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
The Observer (1807-1901) A weekly newspaper, edited by both conservatives and liberals during this 
 period. 
Outlook (1898-1928): A weekly conservative magazine. 
Oxford University and City Herald (1806-1870): A weekly university newspaper, economically conservative. 
The Pilot (1828-1849): A liberal newspaper published 3 times a week. 
Pall Mall Gazette (1865-1923): A chiefly conservative daily newspaper, it was at times supportive of liberal 
 policies. 
Peeblesshire Advertiser (1879-1892): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Poor Man’s Guardian (1831-1835): A radical weekly newspaper. 
Public Opinion (1888-1906): Religious or political affiliation unknown. 
The Quiver (1861-1926): A weekly Evangelical journal aimed at the middle-class. 
The Rambler (1848-1862): A monthly Catholic periodical. 
The Review of Reviews (1890-1893): A non-partisan monthly periodical. 
Sheffield Daily Telegraph (1855-1950): A conservative daily newspaper. 
Saint Paul’s Magazine (1867-1874): A conservative monthly magazine. 
Saturday Review (1855-1938): A liberal conservative weekly newspaper. 
Sheffield Independent (1819-1938): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Sheffield Iris (1835-1843): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Shetland Times (1872-1911): A weekly newspaper publishing local news. 
Shrewsbury Chronicle (1772-1910): An independent weekly newspaper. 
Southern Reporter (1858-1945): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
The Speaker (1890-1907): A moderately liberal weekly review publication. 
The Star (1869-1900): Religious or political affiliation unknown. 
St James’s Gazette (1882-1905): A conservative daily newspaper. 
The Sunday at Home: A Family Magazine for Sabbath Reading (1854-1940): A weekly magazine published by 
 the (Christian) Religious Tract Society. 
Time (1885-1888): A monthly literary periodical. 
Transactions (1833): Religious or political affiliation unknown. 
Universal Review (1888-1890): A monthly conservative periodical. 
Warder and Dublin Weekly Mail (1832-1902): A newspaper, published twice a week (religious or political 
 affiliation unknown). 
Warminster & Westbury Journal (1881-1908): A weekly newspaper (religious or political affiliation unknown). 
Wesleyan Methodist Magazine (1822-1913): A Methodist magazine published monthly. 
Western Daily Press (1858-1950): A liberal daily newspaper. 
 195 
Western Gazette (1863-1950): A weekly newspaper, sold to the Conservative party in 1886 (no clear political 
leaning prior to this). 
Western Morning News (1860-1950): A daily liberal newspaper. 
Weston-super-Mare Gazette (1845-1910): A monthly liberal newspaper. 
Westminster Review (1824-1914): A radical liberal journal published quarterly. 
Wiltshire Times and Trowbridge Advertiser (1855-1956): A weekly liberal newspaper. 
Women’s Gazette (1888-1891): A weekly feminist newspaper. 
Woman’s Signal (1894-1899): A weekly feminist magazine. 
Worcestershire Chronicle (1838-1903): A liberal weekly newspaper. 
Yorkshire Post (1754 - ): A weekly conservative newspaper. 
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